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ABSTRACT

Sound natural resource management considers the full range of costs and benefits
of policy action. Understanding these implications as they pertain to nonmarket goods or
externalities requires an accurate assessment of consumer preferences and behavior. The
chapters of this dissertation ascertain this knowledge in the context of recreational
Atlantic striped bass fishery management and offshore wind development in the northeast
United States.
Atlantic striped bass are the most prominent and heavily targeted recreational
species found along the coast from Maine to North Carolina. Yet due in part to heavy
recreational fishing effort, the species may be currently overfished. Given this status, it is
pertinent to explore the concurrent impacts of potential policy action on angler
participation, angler welfare, and recreational fishing mortality such that efficient
compromises between conservation and socioeconomic objectives of fisheries
management can be made.
In Chapter 1, we evaluate the economic incentives faced by recreational striped
bass anglers using data from a recently-administered recreational striped bass angler
survey. We estimate angler preferences for and the nonmarket value of keeping and
releasing small (22”), medium (29”), and trophy-sized (38”) fish. We find that for each
size-class, anglers prefer keeping to releasing striped bass and that the nonmarket value
of Atlantic striped bass increases exponentially with catch size. Illuminating the tradeoffs
made by recreational striped bass anglers, our results indicate that one harvestable
trophy-sized fish can be exchanged for about two medium-sized or three small ones.

Chapter 1 also sheds light on an important issue that arises when using discrete choice
experiment data to evaluate angler preferences; namely, the influence of including versus
excluding catch-and-release regulations on ensuing parameter estimates in models of
angler utility. We find that failing to control for such regulations leads to counterintuitive
estimates of the marginal utility of releasing striped bass. Finally, while choice
experiment survey data is used extensively in the literature on recreational demand
modeling, little attention has been paid to survey non-response bias on welfare estimates.
We spearhead this issue using data collected from survey non-respondents during a
telephone pre-screening interview.
In Chapter 2, we integrate the main results from Chapter 1 and historical catch
data into an aggregate demand model to examine the broad effect of recreational striped
bass fishing policies. We simulate the recreational Atlantic striped bass fishery and
measure the relative effect of alternative sets of fishing regulations on angler welfare,
angler participation, fishing mortality, and mature female fishing mortality. By
comparing fishery outcomes across several recreational fishing policies, we assess
policy-induced economic and biological tradeoffs that have yet to be considered jointly
by managers of the fishery. We find that a wide range of economically efficient policies
are available when the primary purpose of proposed policy action across the studied
region is to control total recreational fishing mortality. When proposed management
action is intended to curtail mature female recreational fishing mortality, however,
proposed policy action that does not account for potential economic consequences can
lead to inefficient outcomes, as exemplified by several of the policies analyzed lying
inside the efficient frontier of welfare and female spawning stock removal volume. The

findings in Chapter 2 illuminate the practicality of assessing angler behavioral responses
as a means of selecting efficient regulations, particularly when fisheries managers seek to
balance socioeconomic goals with multiple conservation objectives.
Chapter 3 of this dissertation, currently in review at Resource and Energy
Economics, addresses one previously unanswered question related to offshore wind
energy development: that is, to what extent do offshore wind farms (OSWFs) impact
local tourism? We examine how the Block Island Wind Farm, the United States’ first
operational OSWF, has impacted the short-term housing rental market. Using data from
AirBnb, we estimate a difference-in-differences model that compares rental activity in
Block Island to that in three nearby tourist destinations in Southern New England before
and after construction. Estimation results suggest that following its construction, the
Block Island Wind Farm caused a significant increase in nightly reservations, occupancy
rates, and monthly revenues for AirBnb properties in Block Island during the peaktourism months of July and August but had no effect in other months. The findings from
this case study indicate that offshore wind farms can act as an attractive feature of a
location, rather than a deterrent, and provide an important data point for the ongoing
debate surrounding tourism impacts of OSWFs.
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CHAPTER 1

ESTIMATING THE RECREATIONAL VALUE OF KEEPING AND RELEASING
ATLANTIC STRIPED BASS

1 Introduction
The status of Atlantic striped bass as the most prominent and heavily targeted
recreational species found along the coast from Maine to North Carolina is represented
poorly by the absence of studies addressing the policy-relevant economic research
questions posed by the fishery’s governing body. A few previous studies estimate the
nonmarket value of catching additional striped bass (U.S. EPA 2004; Gautum and
Steinback 1998; Bockstael et al. 1989), but due to data limitations, these studies do not
examine how recreational anglers value fish they keep relative to fish they release nor
assess the extent to which these values vary with catch size. Consequently, results of
these studies provide little insight into the implications of changing recreational Atlantic
striped bass fishing regulations. We fill this research gap by estimating the recreational
value of keeping and releasing small, medium, and trophy-sized striped bass, providing a
platform on which to “[evaluate] striped bass angler preferences for size of harvested fish
and tradeoffs with bag limits” (ASMFC 2018) and therefore inform managers of this
fishery.
We take a stated preference (SP) approach to nonmarket valuation by estimating
angler preferences and values using choice experiment data obtained from a recentlyadministered striped bass angler survey. These estimates indicate that, for each size-class,
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anglers prefer keeping to releasing striped bass. We also find that the nonmarket value of
keeping and releasing striped bass increase almost exponentially with catch size.
Estimated marginal rates of substitution indicate that anglers are willing to exchange one
harvestable trophy-sized fish for about two medium-sized or three small ones. We also
assess the extent to which our welfare calculations are affected by survey non-response
bias, an issue that has been largely overlooked in nonmarket valuation studies applied in
recreational fisheries contexts. These results show little evidence to suggest that survey
non-response bias infiltrates our estimates of angler willingness-to-pay.
Our investigation of the recreational value of keeping and releasing trophy striped
bass is timely given that (a) the most recent estimate of total female SSB is below the
binding management threshold, indicating that the stock is overfished (ASMFC 2018),
and (b) trophy-sized striped bass are almost exclusively part of the spawning stock
(Bigelow and Schroeder 1953). Our results intuitively indicate that anglers place a high
recreational value on harvesting trophy striped bass, but we also find that releasing fish of
this size is of considerable nonmarket value. We estimate these values such that accurate
inferences can be drawn about the potential economic impact of proposed regulations,
particularly those designed explicitly to protect the spawning population.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we provide
background information about the Atlantic striped bass fishery. Section 3 discusses the
methods and data source used for analysis. The modelling approach is described in
Section 4 and we interpret our results in Section 5. In Section 6, we assess the influence
of non-response bias on welfare estimates and we conclude in Section 7.

2

2 Fishery Overview
Atlantic striped bass (Morone saxatilis) are an anadromous, highly-migratory
species found along the U.S. east coast from Maine to North Carolina. During spring and
early summer, the bulk of the population spawns in estuarine waters of the Chesapeake
Bay and its tributaries, the Delaware River, and the Hudson River. After spawning, adults
migrate north, as far as the Bay of Fundy, Canada, following prey and cooler waters. In
the fall, adults move southward on their migratory path and return to spawning grounds
to overwinter.
Partly due to their wide geographical range, Atlantic striped bass are among the
most popular recreational species in the northeast and mid-Atlantic region of the United
States. Recreational fishing trips targeting or catching striped bass consistently surpass
twenty million annually, a level of effort that conduces high recreational striped bass
harvest volume. In fact, from 2012 to 2016, the average annual recreational harvest
volume of Atlantic striped bass was the largest among all recreationally targeted species
in the U.S. (NMFS 2017).
Commercial landings typically account for a quarter of total striped bass harvest
volume, thus excessive recreational harvest is a perpetual concern for the Atlantic States
Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC). The ASMFC sets biological targets and
thresholds for female spawning stock biomass (SSB) and the rate of fishing mortality (F).
They then translate these reference points into a set of standard recreational regulations
for the coastwide fishery but allow coastal states to implement alternative, conservation
equivalent regulations. If either biological reference points surpasses its threshold, the
ASMFC is obliged to adjust coastwide regulations such that these conservation objectives
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can be met.
The most notable regulatory change in recent years was prompted by results of
the stock assessment for 2012. In addition to revealing a steady decline in female SSB
below target levels since 2006, the stock assessment projected with high probability that
female SSB would fall below its threshold in subsequent years if the rate of fishing
mortality remained at 2012 levels. As a precautionary measure to conserve the spawning
population, the ASMFC approved Addendum 4 to Amendment 6 of the fishery’s
management plan, which called for a 25% reduction in harvest from 2012 levels in
coastal states beginning during the 2015 fishing season (ASMFC 2014). Managers
expected that in addition to conserving the population of spawning fish by reducing
fishing mortality, Addendum 4’s mandate would effectively protect a strong 2011 yearclass. In response to the mandate, many coastal states adopted a one-fish, 28” or longer
daily recreational possession limit during 2015, as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1.
Results of the 2016 stock assessment update proved the Addendum 4 measures
successful. Coastwide harvest of Atlantic striped bass in 2015 was reduced by 22.4%
relative to 2012 levels, and all sectors achieved or exceeded their harvest reduction goal
except for the Chesapeake Bay recreational sector, within which harvest increased by
53.4% relative to 2012 (ASMFC 2016b). Total F in 2015 was estimated to be 0.16, below
both its target (0.18) and threshold (0.22) level (ASMFC 2016a). Female SSB in 2015
was estimated to be 58,853 metric tons (mt), which is below its target of 72,032 mt and
above its threshold of 57,626 mt.
However, improvements to the status of the stock engendered by the Addendum 4
measures were short-lived. Preliminary results of the 2018 benchmark stock assessment,
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which introduced a two-stock statisitical catch-at-age model rather than the single-stock
approach used previously, show that in 2017, female SSB and F for the Delaware
Bay/Hudson River stock, and female SSB and Focean (but not FChesapeake Bay) for the
Chesapeake Bay stock surpassed the biological threshold level (ASMFC 2018). Hence, it
is likely that the Delaware Bay/Hudson River and Chesapeake Bay stock are currently
overfished, the Chesapeake Bay stock is experiencing overfishing in the ocean but not in
the Chesapeake Bay, and the Delaware Bay/Hudson River stock is experiencing
overfishing.

Figure 1. Recreational striped bass fishing regulations during 2014 (top) and
2015 (bottom) (ASMFC 2016b, 2015b).
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3 Methods and Data
3.1 Nonmarket Valuation
Preferences for nonmarket goods and amenities can be evaluated using revealed
preference (RP) or stated preference (SP) methods. RP methods use data on observed
behavior, while SP methods use data derived from survey questions that are carefully
constructed such that preferences and values can be identified. One RP approach for
nonmarket valuation commonly employed in the context of recreational fisheries is the
travel cost model. Travel cost models relate the choice to fish at a specific site, or the
number of fishing trips taken at a site over a period, to access costs and a vector of other
site characteristics that typically include catch or harvest rates (Gautum and Steinback
1998; Bockstael et al. 1989; Loomis 1988). Estimates from these models can be used to
calculate the marginal value of site characteristics, which provides a basis on which to
infer the economic implications of policy-induced changes in such characteristics.
However, when analysts seek to evaluate the potential impact of previously
unobserved policies or if there exists nonrandom variation in the attributes of interest
across sampled fishing sites, the observational data needed to pursue RP methods is
inadequate and SP methods must be adopted. In our case, both reasons necessitated
primary SP data collection and analysis. To begin, our research objectives include
estimating angler preferences for and willingness-to-pay (WTP) values of changes in trip
quality caused by policies that have yet to be implemented in the recreational Atlantic
striped bass fishery. Additionally, information about the length of striped bass that are
released by recreational anglers is limited and, for our purposes, unreliable. The few
states along the coast from Maine to North Carolina that collect these data do so through
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voluntary angler logbook programs, yet the nonrandom nature of these samples make
ensuing utility parameter estimates susceptible to selection bias.
Thus, within a SP framework we employ and analyze data obtained from a
discrete choice experiment (DCE) survey. After presenting respondents with two or more
hypothetical, multi-attribute alternatives, DCE questions ask respondents to choose or
rank their most preferred alternative. Each alternative is comprised of a combination of
attribute levels, the ranges of which are carefully selected to fulfill policy-relevant
research objectives. Responses to DCE questions can be used to evaluate choice
behavior, preferences, and WTP values for marginal changes in attribute levels (Louiviere
et al. 2000).
Several studies have employed a DCE to evaluate angler preferences for different
aspects of the recreational fishing experience. Because they cover a wide range of species
and fishery-specific research objectives, these studies differ in terms of the attributes used
to explain angler preferences. In general, the attributes of interest to fisheries economists
typically include catch or harvest rates and regulations. Angler preferences for marginal
changes in catch and regulations have been estimated jointly for summer flounder in the
Northeast (Massey et al. 2006; Hicks 2002), trout and grayling in Norway (Aas et al.
2000), paddlefish in Oklahoma (Cha and Melstrom 2018), trout in Michigan (Knoche and
Lupi 2016), and pacific halibut and salmon in Alaska (Lew and Larson 2012; Lew and
Seung 2010). In addition to catch rates and regulations, other studies have evaluated nonconsumptive aspects of recreational fishing, such as hooking and losing, or seeing a target
species (Goldsmith et al. 2018; Duffield et al. 2012). Lew and Larson (2015) exclude
catch attributes from the utility function and estimate Alaskan charter boat angler
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preferences and WTP for alternative bag and size limit restrictions.
Some economists have examined the interface between recreational catch and
regulations by estimating the nonmarket value of fish that may kept and of those that
must be released. These studies consistently reveal that the recreational value of keeping
fish is higher than that of releasing fish for a range of recreational species in the U.S.
(Lee et al. 2017; Lew and Larson 2014; Anderson and Lee 2013; Anderson et al. 2013;
Jarvis 2011). Carter and Liese (2012) further differentiate catch disposition into keep,
release due to a minimum size limit, and release due to catch exceeding the bag limit for
four recreational species in Florida. For all four species, they estimate higher WTP values
for keeping fish rather than releasing fish and for one of the species, they estimate WTP
values that differ considerably between the two release dispositions.
We build on this body of literature by estimating keep and release parameters for
three size-classes of fish, an approach that is most closely related to Anderson and Lee
(2013) and Anderson et al. (2013). The authors of these studies estimate size-specific
keep parameters for several species in Washington but, to avoid estimating a very large
number of parameters, aggregate the number of fish that must be released by weight.
Hence, they assume that “anglers do not care whether, for example, 20 pounds of fish
released come from one or two fish”. Based on anecdotal evidence and confirmed by our
results, this is an untenable assumption about the recreational fishery for Atlantic striped
bass.

3.2 Data
The data we use to evaluate recreational striped bass fishing preferences comes
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from a dual mode, i.e., mail and web-based, angler survey that was implemented in late
2016. We randomly selected survey participants into our sample frame from a database
comprised of all recreational anglers who were licensed or registered for saltwater fishing
during 2015 in any of the ten coastal states from Maine to Virginia.
Prior to implementation, we tested the survey instrument by conducting two focus
group sessions each in Massachusetts, New York, and Maryland with recreational striped
bass anglers. We intentionally selected focus group participants who differed in terms of
gender, age, and striped bass fishing experience to obtain feedback from a diverse mix of
anglers. Based on their feedback, we conformed the survey language to regional
differences in dialect to ensure consistent interpretation of survey questions. We also used
the feedback to design contextually realistic and straightforward choice experiment
questions.
Questions in final survey instrument were split into three sections: (1) recreational
saltwater fishing experiences and opinions, (2) the discrete choice experiment (DCE), and
(3) demographics. Each of the four DCE questions presented respondents with three
options: two recreational striped bass fishing trips options and an option to not go
recreational striped bass fishing. The DCE questions instructed respondents to compare
the three options and to indicate their first and second-most preferred option. An example
choice question is displayed in Figure 2 and one version of the complete angler survey
can be found in the Appendix.

3.3 Survey Implementation
We used a stratified random sampling approach to reach the target population of
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recreational striped bass anglers. From each state license or registration frame, we drew
survey participants in proportion to that state’s contribution to the total number of
recreational striped bass fishing trips taken during 2015 across the study region, as shown
in Table 1. Closely following the methods outlined in Dillman et al. (2009), we made up
to six contacts with an original sample of 2,200 anglers: a telephone pre-screening
interview, an advance letter or email invite, an initial survey mailing or email invite, a
reminder letter or email, a second survey mailing or email invite, and a final reminder
letter or email.1 The survey implementation timeline is detailed in Table 2.

1

All survey mailings provided respondents with the option to participate in the web version of the survey.
All email correspondences contained a web-link to the survey.

10

Figure 2. Example DCE question

The first potential point of contact with survey participants, a telephone prescreening interview, allowed us to determine eligibility and thus focus survey efforts on
anglers with relevant fishery experience. Based on responses to the first question of the
telephone survey, we deemed ineligible those who indicated not having fished for striped
bass within the past three years and excluded these anglers from subsequent solicitation
procedures. After establishing eligibility, we solicited anglers’ primary method of striped
bass fishing, total number and targeted striped bass fishing trips taken in the past 12
months, likelihood of striped bass fishing next season, age, and income; in Section 6, we
11

use this information to assess the extent to which survey non-response bias affects our
welfare estimates. Then, we invited those who completed the interview to participate in
the full version of the angler survey. If willing to participate, respondents indicated their
preference for receiving a mail, a web, or both a mail and a web version of the survey.
From the original sample frame of 2,200, we called the 2,085 licensees with telephone
information. Of the 577 people who completed the interview, 325 were eligible to
participate in the survey. These interviews proved effective at boosting response rates; the
survey completion rate among unscreened anglers was only 29%, while 55% of screened
anglers completed the full survey.
Due to a low response rate from the original sample, we drew a supplemental,
web-only sample of 1,000 anglers. These anglers received an advance email invitation to
participate in the survey, a first reminder email, and a final reminder email. The overall
survey response rate, which excludes ineligible participants, the deceased, those with
non-working email addresses, and those with undeliverable mailing addresses, is 22.7%.
It is likely, however, that many non-respondents were ineligible. When adjusted for
estimated ineligibility based on the results of the telephone pre-screening interview, the
survey response rate is approximately 35%.

12

Table 1. Survey distribution, response rates, and composition of final sample by state.

Table 1. Survey distribution, response rates, and composition of final sample by state.
Final survey disposition
2015 striped bass
Estimation
Completed:
Completed:
Did not complete
State
trips/surveys
sample
eligible (%) ineligible (%)
survey† (%)
distributed (%)
(%)
CT
8.77
6.33
8.33
9.28
4.90
DE
0.91
0.58
0.00
0.94
0.64
MA
21.86
28.06
15.63
20.07
28.14
MD
19.68
15.11
14.58
21.09
16.42
ME
4.82
4.60
7.29
4.93
5.12
NH
1.64
1.58
2.08
1.67
1.28
NJ
21.36
28.92
29.17
19.42
25.59
NY
9.86
6.76
14.58
10.63
6.40
RI
4.82
4.03
2.08
5.05
7.46
VA
6.27
4.03
6.25
6.92
4.05
Total (#) 1,869,821/3,200
695
96
2456
469
Notes: 2015 striped bass trips were estimated using the unadjusted MRIP data (released prior to
July 8th, 2018) that was available during the survey sampling procedure. Composition of final
sample by state based on responses to the question: “In what area do you go recreational
fishing for striped bass most often?”
†
Includes surveys mailed to the deceased, ineligibles, non-respondents, those who refused to
participate, and those whose mailings were returned undeliverable

Table 2. Survey implementation schedule.

Table 2. Survey implementation schedule.
Contact Type

Date

Telephone pre-screening interview/email invitation
Reminder email to pre-screened anglers
Advance letter to unscreened anglers
Email invitation to unscreened anglers
First survey mailing to screened anglers/advance letter recipients
Second email invitation to unscreened anglers
Postcard reminder to anglers included in the initial survey mailing
Second survey mailing to non-respondents
Email invitation to all non- respondents
Supplemental sample email invitation
Supplemental sample email reminder
Final email reminder to all non-respondents
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11/23/2016 – 12/17/2016
12/7/2016 – 12/27/2016
12/23/2016
12/27/2016
12/30/2016
1/3/2017
1/5/2017
2/17/2017
2/24/2017
3/13/2017
3/20/2017
4/3/2017

3.4 Experimental Design
The attributes used to create the DCE questions are shown in Table 3. They
include catch of 22", 29", and 38" (hereafter small, medium, and trophy) striped bass, the
minimum and maximum size limit, the bag limit for striped bass longer than the
minimum size limit (bag limit), the bag limit for striped bass shorter than the minimum
size limit but longer than 20” (small-fish slot limit), the number of other legal-sized fish
caught, and the trip cost. Our fractional-factorial experimental design for main effects and
selected interactions selected the subset of all attribute-level combinations that
maximized the statistical efficiency of ensuing model parameters (Kuhfeld et al. 1994). 2
We removed from the design choice scenarios that included a dominant fishing trip
alternative, as well as trip alternatives in which the number of striped bass kept and
released could not be calculated from the combination of striped bass catch and
regulatory attributes.3 To ensure that DCE questions presented respondents with
conceivable sets of regulations, we removed scenarios in which the total possession limit
(bag limit + small-fish slot limit) was greater than three striped bass. The procedure
yielded 72 choice scenarios, blocked into 18 unique sub-versions of the survey that each
contained four DCE questions.

2

We generated the design in SAS using the Kuhfeld macros (Kuhfeld 2010).
An example of such an alternative would contain the following attribute levels: small striped bass
catch=2, medium striped bass catch=1, bag limit=1, small-fish slot limit=1, minimum legal size=30''. In
this example, it is not possible to determine whether a respondent would keep two small striped bass or one
small and one medium striped bass.
3
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Table 3.Choice experiment attributes and levels.

Table 3. Choice experiment attributes and levels.
Attribute
Levels
Catch (# fish)
Small, 22", striped bass
0, 2, 4
Medium-sized, 29", striped bass
0, 1, 2
Trophy-sized, 38", striped bass
0, 1, 2
Other legal-sized fish
0, 2, 4
Striped bass regulations
Minimum legal size
28", 30"
Maximum legal size
None, 36"
Bag limit (# fish ≥ min. size)
1, 2
Small-fish slot limit (# fish > 20" and ≤ min. size)
0, 1, 2
Trip cost ($)
10, 20, 30, 40
Notes: Trip cost levels shown are for shore/kayak version of the survey.
Private/head boat cost levels were 25, 45, 65, and 85. Charter boat cost
levels were 75, 100, 125, and 150.

After creating the design, we modified the DCE questions displayed in final
survey version because several focus group participants had trouble answering DCE
questions in which trip cost levels fell outside the range of costs that these participants
typically incurred. For example, participants who fish for striped bass primarily from the
shore became perplexed when presented with alternatives whose cost reflected a private
or charter boat fishing trip. These findings portended widespread cognitive burden that
we expected would dampen the survey response rate and threaten the reliability of the
data because, unlike many other recreational species in the region, striped bass are
heavily targeted both by both shore-based and boat anglers. 4 We therefore displayed in
the final survey version trip cost levels based on respondents' primary method of striped
bass fishing, if known. We generated ranges of trip costs associated with shore and kayak,

4

In any given year, directed striped bass fishing trips taken on a boat (private, charter, and party) and from
the shore typically account for about 60% and 40% of the total number of directed striped bass fishing trips
taken across the study region, respectively.
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private and party boat, or charter boat fishing trips. In the web version of the survey, we
linked the range of displayed trip costs levels to a preceding survey question such that all
web-survey respondents answered DCE questions appropriately tailored to their indicated
primary method of striped bass fishing. To mail survey respondents who completed the
telephone pre-screening interview and thus indicated their primary method of striped bass
fishing, we sent surveys containing an appropriate range of trip costs. Some mail survey
recipients who did not complete the telephone pre-screening interview, however,
answered DCE questions which displayed trip costs that were misaligned with those they
typically incurred.

4 Modelling Approach
4.1 Random Utility Models
The choice experiment method is grounded in Lancastrian consumer theory,
which postulates that the overall utility provided by a good is determined by the partworth contribution from each observable attribute (Lancaster 1966). In addition to the
observable attributes of a good, an unobserved component specific to each decision
maker influences choice. We analyze our DCE data using random utility maximization
(RUM) models that decompose utility into its observable and unobservable components
(McFadden 1973). RUM models assume that when faced with multiple alternatives,
individual n will select alternative 𝑖 that maximizes utility, 𝑈 :
𝑈 >𝑈

∀ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖.

Partitioning 𝑈 into its two component parts, the choice of alternative 𝑖 is such that
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(1)

𝑉

+ 𝜀

>𝑉

+ 𝜀

(2)

∀ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖,

where 𝑉(∙) is a function typically specified to be linear in parameters, 𝑉

= 𝛽𝑥 , that

relates observed attributes to utility and 𝜀 captures the utility derived from all other
unobservable factors. The utility parameters 𝛽 measure the relative importance of the
attributes 𝑥

that describe alternative 𝑗. Because 𝜀 is stochastic, it is not possible to

determine absolute levels of utility; however, probabilistic inference about individuals'
choices can be made under the standard assumption for logit models that these terms are
distributed i.i.d Type I extreme value. From Equation 2, the probability that angler 𝑛
selects fishing alternative 𝑖 is
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌 ) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 𝜀

− 𝜀

< 𝑉(𝛽𝑥 ) − 𝑉(𝛽𝑥 ) ∀ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖.

(3)

Train (2003) calculates this probability for a multinomial logit (MNL) model as

𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌 ) =

𝑒
∑

𝑒

.

(4)

The MNL model, however, is subject to several behavioral restrictions based on
the assumption that error terms are distributed i.i.d. Type I extreme value. This
assumption implies that unobserved factors are uncorrelated over alternatives and
uncorrelated over time in repeated choice situations. It also leads to the MNL model
exhibiting the properties of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and proportional
substitution, which in most cases are poor representations of individual decision-making
processes. Another limitation of the MNL model is its inability to accommodate
unobserved preference heterogeneity for the attributes 𝑥
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that may exist across a sample

of decision makers.
To relax these behavioral restrictions and allow for heterogeneity in preferences,
we estimate a random parameters logit (RPL) model. We partition the full set of
attributes, 𝑥 , into 𝑥

and 𝑥 , which denote attributes with fixed utility parameters, 𝛽 ,

and attributes with randomly distributed utility parameters, 𝛽 , respectively. The
parameters in 𝛽 become the sum of a population mean parameter, 𝑏, and a deviation
parameter with zero mean, 𝜇 , which represents an angler’s preferences relative to
average preferences across the sampled population. This decomposition captures
stochastic taste variation in the sampled population because preferences for the attributes
in 𝑥

are assumed vary across respondents given a sequence of observed choices. The

utility angler 𝑛 receives by selecting fishing trip alternative 𝑖 in the RPL model is given
by
𝑈 =𝑉 +𝜀
=𝛽 𝑥 +𝛽 𝑥 +𝜀
(5)

= 𝛽 𝑥 + 𝑏𝑥 + 𝜇 𝑥 + 𝜀 .
The stochastic portion of utility in Equation (5) is 𝜂

= 𝜇 𝑥 + 𝜀 , a non-zero

term that incorporates unobserved preference heterogeneity in the attributes 𝑥 . This
specification for the error component relaxes the IIA assumption because, given the
common influence of 𝜇 , utility is correlated over alternatives: Cov 𝜂 , 𝜂
𝐸(𝜇 𝑥 + 𝜀 ) 𝜇 𝑥

+𝜀

=𝑥

=

𝛺 𝑥 , where 𝛺 is the covariance of 𝜇 . We specify

error components to independent across alternatives by restricting off-diagonal elements
of 𝛺 to be zero.
We make two additional modifications based on the nature of our data. First, we
18

treat the data as a panel because respondents answered up to four choice questions. The
unconditional probability that respondents make their observed sequence of choices, 𝐼 =
{𝑖 , … 𝑖 } in scenarios 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇, given the vector of fixed parameters, is the product of
the logit formulas:
𝑒
∑ 𝑒

𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌 |𝛽 ) =

𝑓(𝛽 |𝜃)𝑑𝜃,

(6)

where 𝜃 are parameters that describe the density of the random parameter distribution
𝑓(𝛽 |𝜃) (Train 2003). Second, we exploit additional information from respondents’ full
ranking of alternatives, which we infer through their selection of a first- and second-most
preferred alternative in each choice scenario. Each choice scenario is decomposed, or
“exploded”, into 𝐽 − 1 statistically independent pseudo-observations which therefore
increases the number of sample observations. Compared to those that use unranked data,
choice models estimated using ranked data have been shown to improve the precision,
and thus reduce sampling variance of estimated utility parameters (Chapman and Staelin
1982). The unconditional probability of a respondent ranking the three alternatives in
choice scenario 𝑡 from most- to least-preferred as 𝑗 , 𝑗 , and 𝑗 , in that order, is

𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌 |𝛽 ) =

𝑒
∑

=

𝑒

, ,

𝑒
∑

𝑒

×

𝑒
∑

,

𝑒

𝑓(𝛽 |𝜃)𝑑𝜃

𝑓(𝛽 |𝜃)𝑑𝜃.

With these modifications, the unconditional choice probabilities for our panel rankordered RPL model is expressed as
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(7)

𝑒

𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌 |𝛽 ) =

∑

𝑓(𝛽 |𝜃)𝑑𝜃 .

𝑒

(8)

4.2 Model Specification
A principal goal of this analysis is to evaluate angler preferences for keeping and
releasing striped bass, thus we generate size-specific keep and release variables based on
the catch and regulatory attributes included in the experimental design. As discussed
previously, we removed from the design scenarios in which these variables could not be
determined unambiguously. We model fishing trip utility as a function of the number of
the number of small, medium, and trophy striped bass kept and released (𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝,
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝, 𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑦 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝, 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒, 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒, and
𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒), the number of other legal-sized fish caught (𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ), the trip
cost (𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡), and the opt-out alternative (𝑂𝑝𝑡 − 𝑜𝑢𝑡):
𝑈

= 𝛽 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝
+ 𝛽 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒
+ 𝛽 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ

+ 𝛽 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝

+ 𝛽 𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑦 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝

+ 𝛽 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒
+ 𝛽 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡

+ 𝛽 𝑂𝑝𝑡_𝑜𝑢𝑡

+ 𝛽 𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒
+𝜀

,

(9)

where 𝑛 indexes respondent, 𝑗 indexes alternative, and 𝑡 indexes choice scenario.
Equation (9) assumes that regulations affect fishing trip utility only indirectly by
determining the number and size of striped bass kept and released. Preliminary testing of
models that included regulatory attributes, however, revealed this to be a restrictive
assumption, as these models revealed significant relationships between select regulatory
variables and utility. Additionally, as we will see in the Results section, the coefficient on
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 changes sign when we include regulatory attributes, which suggests
that this estimate may be confounded with other determinants of fishing trip utility.
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Given these findings, we modify Equation (9) by including regulatory variables.
These variables—one for each of the three striped bass catch sizes—control for zero-fish
bag limits and are derived from the minimum and maximum size limit attributes included
in the experimental design. To control for the presence of a zero-fish bag limit for small
and medium striped bass, we include the variables 𝑀𝑖𝑛28 and 𝑀𝑖𝑛30 that equal one if
the minimum size is 28” or 30”, respectively, and the small slot bag limit equals zero. 5
The coefficient on 𝑀𝑖𝑛28 measures the differential impact to angler utility of a 28”
minimum size limit, which restricts harvest of small striped bass, relative to a 20”
minimum size limit. Likewise, the coefficient on 𝑀𝑖𝑛30 measures the differential impact
to angler utility of a 30” minimum size limit, which restricts that harvest of both small
and medium-sized striped bass, relative to a 20” minimum size limit. To control for the
presence of a zero-fish bag limit for trophy striped bass, we include the indicator variable
𝑀𝑎𝑥36, which equals one if the maximum size limit is 36”. The coefficient on this
variable measures the differential impact to angler utility of a 36” maximum size limit
relative to a scenario with no maximum size limit. With these variables included, our
baseline model of fishing trip utility becomes
𝑈

= 𝛽 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝
+ 𝛽 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒
+ 𝛽 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ
+ 𝛽 𝑀𝑖𝑛28

+ 𝛽 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝

+ 𝛽 𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑦 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝

+ 𝛽 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒
+ 𝛽 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡

+ 𝛽 𝑀𝑖𝑛30

+ 𝛽 𝑂𝑝𝑡_𝑜𝑢𝑡
+ 𝛽 𝑀𝑎𝑥36

5

+ 𝛽 𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒

+𝜀

.

(10)

This is necessary as the definition of attribute is defined as “The number of striped bass equal to or longer
20” and shorter than the minimum size restriction”.
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4.3 Estimation Sample
From the full sample of survey respondents, we remove those who indicated not
having fished for striped bass within the past three years and focus instead on eliciting the
preferences of anglers who are more likely to be affected by changes in striped bass
fishing conditions. Furthermore, including in the sample anglers who did not
recreationally fish for striped bass recently may evoke sample selection bias, as these
anglers, if identified a telephone pre-screening interview, were intentionally excluded
from subsequent sampling procedures. We also remove respondents who always selected
the opt-out alternative as their most-preferred alternative despite considerable variation in
attribute levels across choice scenarios, which is indicative of protest behavior. For
reasons discussed in Section 3.4, we exclude observations from mail respondents who
answered DCE questions containing trip cost levels that did not reflect these respondents’
indicated primary method of striped bass fishing. Our final estimation sample consists of
469 anglers.
Table 4 displays demographic and fishing-related information about our sample. It
also includes results from a two recent angler surveys to which we compare the
characteristics of our sample. One of these surveys was directed at recreational striped
bass anglers licensed in CT and MA (Murphy et al. 2015), and was one directed at the
population of recreational anglers in the U.S. (Lovell et al. 2016). The striped bass
anglers in our sample have a mean age of 54.3, which is consistent with the median age
of sampled anglers from Murphy et al. (2015), and spent an average of 26.7 days fishing
for saltwater species in the past 12 months. Both of these characteristics are comparable
to the nationwide statistics in Lovell et al. (2016). In contrast to the population of U.S.
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recreational anglers at large, however, the anglers in our sample are predominantly more
male, slightly more affluent, and have attained higher levels of education. While these
differences engender concerns about sample representativeness, that they have surfaced
previously from a sample of more than twenty thousand randomly-intercepted striped
bass and other anglers (Gautum and Steinback 1998) bolsters confidence that our sample
is not anomalous. Like the sampled recreational striped bass anglers from Murphy et al.
(2015), anglers in our sample have been fishing for striped bass for about 22 years and
spent an average of 14.7 days fishing for striped bass during the past 12 months. Finally,
more than 90% of the anglers in our sample fish for striped bass primarily from the shore
(36.2%) or from a private boat (54.6%).

23

Table 4. Characteristics of sample anglers and the U.S. population of anglers.

Table 4. Characteristics of sample anglers and the U.S. population of anglers.
Recreational striped
Sample bass anglers licensed
Characteristic
anglers
in CT and MA
(Murphy et al. 2015)
Gender (% male)
92.8
96
Age (mean years)
54.3
54 (median)
Household income (%)
< $20,000
3
N/A
$20,000 - $99,999
41
N/A
$100,000+
52
N/A
Did not answer
4
N/A
Education (%)
Less than high school graduate
1.71
N/A
High school graduate or GED
18.8
N/A
Some college no degree,
32.4
N/A
associate/technical degree
Bachelor’s degree
27.1
31
Master’s degree or higher
18.1
N/A
Did not answer
1.9
N/A
Days saltwater fished past 12 months
26.7
N/A
(mean days)
16 (days fished in
Days striped bass fished past 12 months
14.7
previous fishing
(mean days)
season)
Years of saltwater fishing (mean in years)
N/A
N/A
Years of striped bass fishing (mean in
22
23
years)
Primary striped bass fishing mode (%)
Shore
36.2
N/A
Kayak
2.9
N/A
Private motorized boat
54.6
N/A
Charter boat
4.2
N/A
Head or party boat
1.9
N/A

U.S. population
of anglers
(Lovell et al.
2016)
85.5
53.5
7
57
36
N/A
7.4
21.7
27.3
25.5
18.1
N/A
27.8
N/A
31.5
NA
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

5 Results
5.1 Utility Parameter Estimates
Table 5 displays estimation results from four model specifications. The model in
Column (1) is defined by Equation (9) and excludes striped bass regulations. Column (2)
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adds the maximum size limit variable and Column (3) adds the two minimum size limit
variables. Column (4) is defined by Equation (10) and includes all three regulatory
variables. We follow the relevant literature and specify striped bass keep and release
parameters to be normally distributed (Lee et al. 2017; Lew and Larson 2014; Anderson
and Lee 2013; Carter and Liese 2012), which captures the most important sources of
heterogeneity in the context of this study, and we treat the other parameters as fixed. 6 We
estimate all models using NLOGIT version 5.
Across all columns of Table 5, the estimated parameters on the non-striped bass
attributes are stable and behave as expected. The positive and statistically significant
coefficients on 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ suggest that catching other species of fish while fishing for
striped bass is a boon to angler utility. Trip cost parameters, which represent the marginal
utility of price, are negative and statistically significant. Estimated coefficients on the
opt-out variable, which represent the utility from choosing not to fish, are negative,
significant, and intuitively suggest that striped bass anglers prefer fishing for striped bass
when such an opportunity is available. Another result that is common across
specifications is the magnitude and statistical significance of the standard deviation
coefficients on the striped bass catch variables. These estimates indicate considerable
unobserved preference heterogeneity for keeping and releasing striped bass across the
population of sampled anglers.

6

Alternative models in which all non-cost parameters are specified to be normally distributed yielded
qualitatively similar results but at the expense less precisely estimated coefficients.
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Table 5.Utility parameter estimates from panel rank-ordered mixed logit model.

Table 5. Utility parameter estimates from panel rank-ordered mixed logit model.
Variable
Mean parameters
Small keep
Medium keep
Trophy keep
Small release
Medium release
Trophy release
Other catch
Cost
Opt-out
Max. 36”

(1)
0.383***
(0.050)
0.504***
(0.059)
0.606***
(0.081)
0.067***
(0.022)
-0.084*
(0.047)
0.247***
(0.035)
0.152***
(0.016)
-0.017***
(0.002)
-2.933***
(0.130)

(2)
0.380***
(0.050)
0.501***
(0.059)
0.526***
(0.101)
0.070***
(0.022)
-0.084*
(0.047)
0.286***
(0.047)
0.152***
(0.016)
-0.017***
(0.002)
-2.982***
(0.128)
-0.132
(0.088)

Min. 28”

(3)
0.242***
(0.060)
0.348***
(0.061)
0.653***
(0.080)
0.088***
(0.023)
0.129**
(0.058)
0.242***
(0.034)
0.151***
(0.016)
-0.018***
(0.002)
-3.170***
(0.130)
-0.109
(0.088)
-0.644***
(0.106)

Min. 30”

(4)
0.241***
(0.060)
0.347***
(0.062)
0.586***
(0.099)
0.090***
(0.023)
0.127**
(0.059)
0.275***
(0.046)
0.151***
(0.016)
-0.017***
(0.002)
-3.209***
(0.129)
-0.110
(0.085)
-0.106
(0.088)
-0.637***
(0.107)

Standard deviation parameters
Small keep
0.961***
0.961***
0.967***
0.967***
(0.068)
(0.068)
(0.067)
(0.067)
Medium keep
1.168***
1.168***
1.156***
1.156***
(0.066)
(0.066)
(0.063)
(0.063)
Trophy keep
1.258***
1.249***
1.247***
1.242***
(0.094)
(0.094)
(0.093)
(0.093)
Small release
0.411***
0.411***
0.407***
0.408***
(0.025)
(0.025)
(0.024)
(0.024)
Medium release
0.508***
0.504***
0.512***
0.509***
(0.060)
(0.059)
(0.059)
(0.058)
Trophy release
0.679***
0.679***
0.678***
0.678***
(0.043)
(0.042)
(0.042)
(0.041)
Log likelihood
-2010.540
-2010.057
-2003.305
-2002.968
McFadden Pseudo R2
0.358
0.358
0.360
0.360
AIC
4051.100
4052.100
4040.600
4041.900
Notes: Number of observations is 1,747. Number of individuals is 469. 500 Halton draws used to
maximize the simulated log-likelihood.*,**, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level of significance, respectively.
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The model in Column (1) excludes regulatory variables. Estimated marginal
utilities of keeping striped bass are intuitive—anglers prefer keeping larger striped bass to
smaller striped bass. However, the model yields a puzzling pattern of release parameters.
The coefficients on the variables for 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 and 𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 are positive,
significant, and have magnitudes that align with a priori expectations, but the coefficient
on 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 is negative and statistically significant. This latter estimate implies
that catching and having to release medium-sized striped bass negatively affects angler
utility. Results from other model specifications in Table 5, however, suggest that this
estimate is confounded with the impact of catch-and-release only regulations, discussed
in more detail below.
Column (2) adds 𝑀𝑎𝑥36 to the model. The estimate for this variable is negative
yet statistically insignificant, implying that the anglers in our sample are insensitive to
harvest restrictions on trophy-sized striped bass. This finding is consistent with the results
of a recent survey directed at striped bass anglers in Massachusetts and Connecticut. In
their research, Murphy et al. (2015) find that over 55% (71%) of the sampled recreational
striped bass anglers are supportive or have neutral opinions toward a proposed maximum
recreational size restriction of 36'' (36” to 44”). Compared to Column (1) estimates, the
coefficient on 𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑦 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝 decreases slightly in magnitude and its standard error
increases, and both the magnitude and standard error of the coefficient on
𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 increase slightly. Estimated coefficients on the other striped bass catch
variables change very little moving from Column (1) to Column (2).
In Column (3), we replace 𝑀𝑎𝑥36 with the two minimum size restriction
variables. The coefficient on 𝑀𝑖𝑛28 is negative but statistically insignificant, which
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suggests that if at least one medium striped bass can be kept, the average angler is
indifferent to regulations that permit harvest of small striped bass. One potential
explanation for this result is that most recreational striped bass anglers are accustomed to
fishing in the absence of small harvest slot regulations. More specifically, as shown in
Table 1, our sample reflects the population in that it is composed largely of individuals
who fish in waters north of Delaware, where small harvest slots are seldom implemented.
In contrast to the parameter on 𝑀𝑖𝑛28, the estimated parameter on 𝑀𝑖𝑛30 is negative,
significant, and relatively large in magnitude, indicating that anglers are highly averse to
harvest restrictions on medium-sized striped bass. This finding may be driven by angler
sensitivity to changes in the “status-quo”, as most coastal states have adopted a 28”
recreational minimum size limit in recent years (ASMFC 2017, 2016, 2015).
Nonetheless, this finding is consistent with other studies that model angler utility as a
function of both catch and catch-and-release regulations (Cha and Melstrom 2018;
Knoche and Lupi 2016).
The results in Column (3) also illuminate the effect in including minimum size
restriction variables on the estimated striped bass catch parameters. Compared to the
estimates in Column (1), the coefficients on 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝 and 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝 decrease in
magnitude, those on 𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑦 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝 and 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 increases slightly in magnitude,
and there is almost no change in the magnitude of the 𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 parameter. The
most striking difference between Columns (1) and (3) is in the estimated impact of
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 on angler utility. Where in Column (1) it is negative and significant,
the coefficient on 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 in Column (3) is positive, significant, and greater in
absolute magnitude. This estimate implies that, after controlling for catch-and-release
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only regulations, angler utility is positively affected by catching and releasing mediumsized striped bass, a finding that is not in isolation; Jarvis (2011) reveals a similar
directional change in coefficient estimates on pollock and haddock release variables when
regulatory variables are excluded and included in the utility specification. Taken together,
the three striped bass release coefficients in Column (3) intuitively suggest that anglers
prefer catching-and-releasing larger striped bass to smaller striped bass. This finding is
more sensible than that uncovered in Columns (1) and (2) and plausibly reflects the
sportfishing nature of the recreational Atlantic striped bass fishery. Finally, Column (3)
reveals anglers’ relative preferences for small, medium, and trophy striped bass to be
nearly identical across catch dispositions. Specifically, an increase in striped bass catch
size from small to medium leads to a 43% and 47% relative increase in utility for fish that
are kept and fish that are released, respectively; an increase in striped bass catch size
from medium to trophy yields an 88% relative increase in angler utility levels. These
findings lend credence to the set of utility parameters estimated by the specification in
Column (3).
Column (4) considers all three size regulation variables. The coefficients on these
variables are consistent with estimates in Column (2) and Column (3), in which these
variables enter separately. Estimated coefficients on the small and medium striped bass
catch variables align with Column (3) estimates, and coefficients on the trophy catch
variables fall within the range of those estimated by the other specifications in Table 5.
We select a preferred specification by comparing information criteria and model
fit statistics between the models in Table 5. All models perform reasonably well, as the
goodness of fit statistic, McFadden’s pseudo R 2, is and remains high across columns.
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Compared to those in Columns (1) and (2), the models in Columns (3) and (4) have lower
AIC values, which implies a greater support for these models. While AIC values are
similar for these two models, a likelihood ratio test for including 𝑀𝑎𝑥36 in Column (4)
suggests that this variable does not lead to an improved model fit. Additionally, the model
in Column (3) yields more precise estimates of the striped bass catch coefficients than the
model in Column (4), thus we select the model shown in Column (3) as our preferred
specification.
While our preferred specification performs well and yields intuitive results, the
directional change of the coefficient on 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 between Column (1) and
Column (3) of Table 5 warrants additional attention. When 𝑀𝑖𝑛30 is omitted from the
model, as in Column (1) of Table 5, the estimated effect of 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 on angler
utility is negative and statistically significant. Yet the results in Column (3) suggests that,
relative to a 20” minimum size limit, a 30” minimum size limit yields a strong and
adverse effect on angler utility. Taken together with the estimated coefficient on
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 in Column (3), it seems that, rather than catching-and-releasing
medium striped bass, it is imposing a 30” minimum size limit that reduces angler utility.
However, because the variable 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 includes fish that are released due to a
30” minimum size limit as well as those released in excess of a positive bag limit, the
specification in Column (3) cannot separate the effect of releasing medium striped bass
when 𝑀𝑖𝑛30 = 1 from the effect of 𝑀𝑖𝑛30 itself.
We therefore display in Table 6 results from two additional models that isolate
these impacts. In each, we disaggregate 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 into two separate variables:
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 𝐵𝐿, which represents the number of medium striped bass released
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due to a zero-fish bag limit (when 𝑀𝑖𝑛30 = 1), and 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐵𝐿,
which represents the number of medium striped bass released above a positive bag limit
(when 𝑀𝑖𝑛30 = 0). The model in Column (1) of Table 6 excludes regulations and the
model in Column (2) adds the two minimum size regulations.
In Column (1) of Table 6, the coefficient on 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 𝐵𝐿 is
negative and statistically significant, while that on 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐵𝐿 is
positive yet insignificant. This would suggest that the negative impact to angler utility
from a marginal increase in 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 revealed in Column (1) of Table 5 is driven
by catching-and-releasing medium striped bass. The model in Column (2) of Table 6,
however, estimates positive and statistically equivalent coefficients on
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 𝐵𝐿 and 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐵𝐿. It also estimates a
negative and significant coefficient on 𝑀𝑖𝑛30 that, along with other coefficient estimates,
is consistent with our preferred specification from Table 5. The results in this column are
evidence that the estimated impact of 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 on angler utility shown in
Column (1) of Table 5 is confounded with the impact of catch-and-release regulations for
medium striped bass. Hence, including the variable 𝑀𝑖𝑛30 in our model seems essential
for disentangling the effect of catching-and-releasing medium striped bass from the effect
of catch-and-release only regulations, a finding of which further supports the selection of
Column (3) of Table 5 as our preferred specification.

31

Table 6. Utility parameter estimates from panel rank-ordered mixed logit model with disaggregate medium release
variables.

Table 6. Utility parameter estimates from panel rank-ordered mixed logit model with
disaggregate medium release variables.
Variable
(1)
(2)
Mean parameters
Small keep
0.346***
0.227***
(0.051)
(0.061)
Medium keep
0.433***
0.347***
(0.062)
(0.063)
Trophy keep
0.572***
0.652***
(0.083)
(0.084)
Small release
0.077***
0.096***
(0.022)
(0.023)
Medium release zero BL
-0.177***
0.144
(0.064)
(0.100)
Medium release positive BL
0.133
0.131
(0.083)
(0.083)
Trophy release
0.232***
0.236***
(0.035)
(0.035)
Other catch
0.152***
0.156***
(0.016)
(0.016)
Cost
-0.018***
-0.018***
(0.002)
(0.002)
Opt-out
-3.070***
-3.22***
(0.134)
(0.133)
Min. 28”
-0.108
(0.090)
Min. 30”
-0.671***
(0.132)
Standard deviation parameters
Small keep
0.968***
0.965***
(0.067)
(0.067)
Medium keep
1.204***
1.213***
(0.064)
(0.063)
Trophy keep
1.315***
1.319***
(0.105)
(0.103)
Small release
0.418***
0.414***
(0.025)
(0.025)
Medium release zero BL
0.540***
0.583***
(0.078)
(0.076)
Medium release positive BL
0.587***
0.605***
(0.091)
(0.090)
Trophy release
0.767***
0.761***
(0.044)
(0.044)
Log likelihood
-2007.025
-2001.144
McFadden Pseudo R2
0.359
0.361
AIC
4048.0
4040.3
Notes: Number of observations is 1,747. Number of individuals is 469. 500 Halton
draws used to maximize the simulated log-likelihood.*,**, and *** represent
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively.
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5.2 Relative Values of Keeping Striped Bass
Recreational striped bass fishery managers are interested in understanding the
tradeoffs anglers are willing to make between the number and size of fish that can be kept
so that these tradeoffs can be considered when designing regulations. Hence, Table 7
displays estimates of the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between each pair of striped
bass keep variables. These estimates imply the rate at which different sizes of harvestable
striped bass can be exchanged while holding angler utility constant. An estimated MRS of
one, for example, would indicate that two size-classes of harvestable striped bass perfect
are substitutes in that they can be exchanged on a one-to-one basis.
The MRS between attributes 𝑥 and 𝑥 is the ratio of the partial derivative of the
utility function with respect to 𝑥 to the partial derivative of the utility function with
respect to 𝑥 . Because we specify striped bass parameters to be normally distributed,
Table 7 displays estimates of the mean MRS and 95% confidence intervals obtained
using the Krinsky and Robb (1986) approach. We randomly draw observations from a
multivariate normal distribution parametrized with the mean coefficients and covariance
matrix of our preferred specification. Then, using these observations denoted 𝛽

and 𝛽 ,

we calculate the MRS. We repeat this process 5,000 times to obtain an estimate of the
mean MRS between attributes 𝑥 and 𝑥 ,

𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑀𝑅𝑆

,

𝛽

=

𝛽

× 5000 .

(11)

95% confidence intervals are based on percentiles of the simulated distribution.
All estimates displayed in Table 7 are significant at the 1% level of confidence.
The first row indicates an angler willingness-to-exchange of one trophy, harvestable
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striped bass for approximately three small ones. This result implies that, under certain
conditions, a three-fish bag limit for small striped bass could compensate anglers for full
harvest restrictions on trophy-sized striped bass. Based on the current objectives and
status of the fishery, the estimate in the second row of Table 7 is perhaps more policyrelevant. The estimate in this row implies that anglers are willing to forego one
harvestable trophy fish if compensated with about two that are medium-sized. Thus, a
two fish, 28” possession limit accompanied by a restriction on trophy harvest may be a
viable regulatory alternative for mangers seeking to relax current one-fish 28”
regulations, protect larger fish, and hold angler utility levels relatively constant. Finally,
the third row shows that, to hold utility constant after giving up one harvestable mediumsized striped bass, the average angler must harvest 1.52 small striped bass.
Table 7. Mean MRS between striped bass keep attributes.

Table 7. Mean MRS between striped bass keep attributes.
Ratio

Mean MRS

95% CI

Trophy keep:small keep

2.906***

(1.665, 5.399)

Trophy keep:medium keep

1.934***

(1.320, 2.827)

Medium keep:small keep
1.52***
(0.866, 2.681)
Notes: Mean MRS and 95% confidence intervals calculated using the KrinskyRobb approach with 5,000 replications. *,**, and *** represent significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively.

5.3 Angler Welfare
In addition to measuring the extent to which different size-classes of harvestable
fish can be exchanged while holding angler utility constant, a primary objective of this
analysis is to evaluate the nonmarket value of keeping and releasing striped bass. This
information is critical for inferring the potential economic implications of changes in
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regulations. We therefore use estimates from our preferred model specification to
calculate angler WTP for marginal changes in striped bass fishing trip attributes. Table 8
displays mean WTP values and 95% confidence intervals, both calculated using the
approach described in Section 5.2.
All marginal WTP values for striped bass catch attributes are significant at the 1%
confidence level expect for medium release, which is significant at the 5% level.
Preference rankings among size-classes of striped bass revealed in Table 8 mirror those
uncovered by our preferred model specification—trophy striped bass are substantially
more valuable to anglers than medium-sized striped bass, the latter of which are only
moderately more valuable to anglers than small striped bass. Angler WTP for a one-fish
increase in the number of small, medium-sized, and trophy striped bass kept is $13.80,
$19.80, and $37.26, respectively. Angler WTP for releasing an additional small, mediumsized, and trophy striped bass, is $5.05, $7.32, and $13.84, respectively.
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Table 8. Mean WTP for striped bass fishing trip attributes.

Table 8. Mean WTP for striped bass fishing trip attributes.
Attribute
Small keep

Mean WTP
13.80***

95% CI
(7.35, 20.43)

Medium keep

19.80***

(13.50, 26.14)

Trophy keep

37.26***

(28.72, 47.06)

Small release

5.05***

(2.40, 8.03)

Medium release

7.32**

(0.84, 14.12)

Trophy release

13.84***

(9.48, 18.88)

8.67***

(6.44, 11.49)

Other fish
28” minimum size (1=yes)

-6.31

(-16.91, 3.41)

30” minimum size (1=yes)
-36.92***
(-52.04, -23.56)
Notes: Mean WTP and 95% confidence intervals calculated using the KrinskyRobb approach with 5,000 replications. *,**, and *** represent significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively.

Disaggregated across size-class and catch disposition, these WTP estimates
provide a more detailed depiction of the recreational value of striped bass than that which
currently exists. Hence, we cannot compare directly our results to those found previously,
but a brief review of the extant literature is necessary. Gautum and Steinback (1998)
examine how the aggregate recreational value the striped bass fishery could be affected
by policies that increase the environmentally determined catch rate, such as the 19851989 Atlantic striped bass fishery moratorium. Using telephone and intercept survey data,
they estimate a RUM model and find that angler WTP for catching additional striped bass
is $5.57.7 Using only the intercept survey data, they also estimate a travel cost model; this
specification yields a $7.42 angler WTP value for catching additional striped bass. More

7

These values are inflation-adjusted 2016 dollars and represent WTP for one-fish increase in historical
average catch rate. Because they are derived from models that allow for diminishing marginal utility of
catch, WTP for the first fish caught is slightly higher.

36

recently, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) investigate the effects of
reduced impingement and entrainment on recreational fishing opportunities in the midAtlantic (U.S. EPA 2004). They estimate angler WTP for catching additional striped bass
to $20.79 and $20.73 for boat and shore-based anglers, respectively, both values of which
are considerably higher than those estimated in Gautum and Steinback (1998). Thus, in
addition to providing more policy-relevant recreational use values for striped bass
fishing, our results serve to mitigate the ambiguity that permeates current understandings
of the nonmarket value of striped bass.
In the remaining rows of Table 8, we find that angler WTP for a one-fish increase
in the number of other fish caught on a striped bass fishing trip is $8.67. Estimated WTP
for 𝑀𝑖𝑛30 is statistically significant, implying that anglers would require a $36.92
discount to hold welfare constant with an increase in the minimum size limit from 20” to
30”. The statistically insignificant WTP estimate associated with 𝑀𝑖𝑛28 implies that no
angler discount would be required to hold utility constant with an increase in the
minimum size limit from 20” to 28.
Table 8 reveals a large degree of overlap in WTP confidence intervals for
𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝 and 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝, which suggests that these values may indistinguishably
different. We formally test for differences in WTP across keep sizes in Table 9. As
expected, keeping trophy striped bass is worth significantly more to anglers than keeping
smaller ones: the difference in WTP between keeping trophy and medium-sized striped
bass is $17.55, and the difference in WTP between keeping trophy and small striped bass
is $23.61. The difference in WTP between keeping medium-sized and small striped bass,
however, is insignificantly different than zero. Hence, we cannot reject the hypothesis
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that the recreational values anglers place on keeping small and medium striped bass are
equivalent.
Table 9. Mean WTP differences between striped bass keep attributes.

Table 9. Mean WTP differences between striped bass keep attributes.
Difference in mean WTP

95% CI

Trophy keep - small keep

23.61***

(12.54, 35.91)

Trophy keep - medium keep

17.55***

(7.77, 27.93)

Medium keep - small keep
6.09
(-1.93, 14.14)
Notes: Differences in mean WTP and 95% confidence intervals calculated using the KrinskyRobb approach with 5,000 replications. *,**, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level of significance, respectively.

6 Assessing Survey Nonresponse Bias
The validity of inferences drawn from any nonmarket valuation study that relies
on survey data rests on the assumption that estimated utility parameters represent the
preferences of the study population at large. One potential source of bias that can threaten
valid inference is the existence of systematic differences between respondents and nonrespondents that affect both the propensity to respond to the survey and the preference
parameters estimated from the realized sample of respondents (Groves 2006). We utilize
data collected from survey non-respondents during the telephone pre-screening interview
to investigate whether angler preferences and WTP values are influenced by variation in
demographic and fishing-related characteristics that affect individuals’ propensity to
respond to the survey.
We follow the framework in Abdulrahman and Johnston (2016) and implement a
two-stage procedure for assessing survey non-response bias. In the first stage, we
estimate a binomial logit model where survey response is a function of age, income,
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primary method of striped bass fishing, and likelihood of fishing in the next twelve
months. In the second stage, we estimate a modified version of our preferred RUM model
specification that includes interaction terms between trip attributes and predicted
response propensities from the first stage. The coefficients on the interactions measure
the degree to which mean marginal utilities of trip attributes vary with the predicted
likelihood of responding to the survey.
To understand how mean welfare estimates are potentially affected by survey nonresponse bias, we use the second-stage model specification to evaluate WTP at (1) the
average predicted response propensity for the realized sample (respondents) and (2) the
average predicted response propensity for full sample (respondents and non-respondents),
which we assume represents the average propensity to respond for the population of
recreational striped bass anglers. We interpret the difference between (1) and (2) as the
magnitude of the impact of survey non-response bias on angler welfare estimates.

6.1 Propensity to Respond
We model the propensity to respond to the angler survey as a function of
demographic and fishing-related variables. Since the model requires information about
respondents and non-respondents, potential explanatory variables are limited to those
derived from questions asked on both the telephone pre-screening interview and in the
full survey. In addition to the first question which determined survey eligibility, the
telephone pre-screening interview asked questions about anglers’ (1) primary method of
striped bass fishing, (2) total number of recreational fishing trips taken in the past 12
months, (3) total number of recreational striped bass fishing trips taken in the past 12
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months, (4) likelihood of striped bass fishing next season, (5) age, and (6) income.
However, some respondents in our main estimation sample, as well as some nonrespondents who completed the telephone interview, did not provide answers to all six
questions. Fifty respondents did not indicate the total number of saltwater fishing trips
nor the number of striped bass fishing trips they took in the past 12 months, thus we
exclude these variables from the response propensity model. After removing those who
did not answer at least one of the other four questions, we are left with a sample
composed of 447 respondents and 110 non-respondents.
Comparing the characteristics of each group, which are displayed in Table 10,
suggests the potential existence of systematic differences. We find no significant
differences between the two groups in terms of days spent saltwater fishing in the past 12
months (p-value = 0.073) or primary method of striped bass fishing (χ 2(4) = 6.240, pvalue = 0.182). However, respondents and non-respondents differ significantly in the
number days striped bass fishing in the past 12 months (p-value = 0.007), age (p-value =
0.00), income (p-value = 0.018), and likelihood of fishing in the next 12 months (χ 2(4) =
42.946, p-value = 0.00). These observed differences justify further examination into the
influence of survey non-response on our main results.
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Table 10. Demographic and fishing-related information collected from respondents and non-respondents.

Table 10. Demographic and fishing-related information collected from respondents
and non-respondents.
Respondents included
NonVariable
in full sample
respondents
(N=469)
(N=143)
Days saltwater fished past 12 months
(mean days)
Days striped bass fished past 12 months
(mean days)
Primary striped bass fishing mode
(# individuals)(% of sample)
Shore
Kayak
Private motorized boat
Charter boat
Head or party boat
Did not answer
Likelihood of recreational striped bass
fishing during the next 12 months (#
individuals)(% of sample)
Certain to go fishing
Very likely
Somewhat likely
Very unlikely
Definitely will not go fishing
Did not answer
Age (mean age)
Household income (# individuals)(% of
sample)
Less than $20,000
$20,000 to $39,999
$40,000 to $59,999
$60,000 to $79,999
$80,000 to $99,999
$100,000 to $149,999
$150,000 to $199,999
$200,000 or more
Did not answer
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26.73 (n=419)

19.89 (n=139)

14.75 (n=419)

8.48 (n=137)

170 (36.25)
14 (2.99)
256 (54.58)
20 (4.26)
9 (1.92)
0 (0.00)

64 (44.76)
3 (2.10)
64 (44.76)
10 (6.99)
2 (1.40)
0 (0.00)

307 (65.46)
111 (23.67)
41 (8.74)
9 (1.92)
1 (0.21)
0 (0.00)
54.35 (n=460)

53 (37.06)
53 (37.06)
25 (17.48)
7 (4.90)
4 (2.80)
1 (0.70)
44.27 (n=135)

13 (2.77)
26 (5.54)
53 (11.30)
44 (9.38)
67 (14.29)
112 (23.88)
80 (17.06)
54 (11.51)
20 (4.26)

5 (3.50)
13 (9.09)
21 (14.69)
12 (8.39)
14 (9.79)
21 (14.69)
10 (6.99)
15 (10.49)
32 (22.38)

Proceeding to the first-stage, we estimate a binomial logit model in which the
propensity that individual 𝑛 responds to the survey is specified as
𝑃 (𝑦 ≠ 0|𝑍 ) = 𝛼𝑍 + 𝑒 ,

(12)

where the dependent variable, 𝑦 , is discrete and equals one if an individual responds to
the survey and zero otherwise, 𝑍 is a vector of demographic and fishing related variables
whose relative impact on response propensity is measured by the parameters in 𝛼, and 𝑒
is an independently and identically distributed error term.
Table 11 displays odds ratio estimates from Equation (12). All estimates are
statistically significant at the 5% level of confidence or higher except for that on the
indicator variable for primary fishing method, which equals one if an individual fishes for
striped bass from a kayak, private boat, charter boat, or party boat, and zero otherwise.
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 is measured using the midpoint of each response category8 and the magnitude of
its estimate indicates that for each a $10,000 increase in household income, the odds an
individual responds to the survey by a factor of 1.039. Age is also positively correlated
with response propensity; a one-year increase in individuals’ age increases the odds of
responding the survey by a factor of 1.056. Intuitively, response propensity decreases
with decreases in individuals’ likelihood of fishing in the next 12 months. Compared to
those who are certain to go fishing, the odds that individuals who will “definitely will not
go fishing” respond to the survey are lower by roughly a factor of 12. In the final step of
the first-stage, we use the model defined by Equation (12) to obtain individuals’ predicted
probability of responding to the survey conditional on the covariates in 𝑍 , which is

8

We set the highest income category, $200,000 or more, to $225,000.
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calculated as

𝑃 (𝑦 ≠ 0|𝑍 ) =

exp(𝛼𝑍 + 𝑒 )
.
1 + exp(𝛼𝑍 + 𝑒 )

(13)

Table 11. Results from response propensity model.

Table 11. Results from response propensity model.
Odds Ratio
(standard error)

Variable
Primarily fish for striped bass on a boat (1=yes)
Income ($10,000s)
Age

1.086
(0.260)
1.039**
(0.020)
1.056***
(0.009)

Likelihood of recreational striped bass fishing
during the next 12 months†
Very likely

0.378***
(0.100)
Somewhat likely
0.247***
(0.084)
Very unlikely
0.209**
(0.134)
Definitely will not go fishing
0.083**
(0.099)
Constant
0.307**
(0.150)
Number of observations
557
2
Pseudo R
0.162
†
Notes: baseline is “Certain to go fishing”. *,**, and *** represent significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively

6.2 Response Bias in Marginal Utilities and WTP Values
The second stage integrates the predictions from Equation (13) into the RUM
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model defined by equation 10.9 We interact all non-cost attributes (𝑋

) with 𝑃 and the

utility function is written as
𝑈

=𝛽 𝑋

+ 𝛽 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡

+ 𝛽𝑋

𝑃 +𝜀

.

(14)

Here, marginal utilities of the fishing trip attributes are given by (𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑃 ) and the
marginal utility of trip cost is measured by 𝛽 . The coefficients in 𝛽 indicate the degree
to which variation in predicted response propensity differentially affects the marginal
utility of fishing trip attributes. To assess whether such variation affects welfare
estimates, we use the Krinsky and Robb approached discussed in Section 5.2 and, for
each attribute, evaluate WTP at (1) the average predicted response propensity for the
realized sample (respondents), 𝑃 , and (2) the average predicted response propensity for
full sample (respondents and non-respondents), 𝑃 :

𝑊𝑇𝑃

=

𝛽 +𝛽𝑃
,
𝛽

(15)

𝑊𝑇𝑃

=

𝛽 +𝛽𝑃
.
𝛽

(16)

For each attribute, we calculate the difference between 𝑊𝑇𝑃

and 𝑊𝑇𝑃 . This

measures the degree to which marginal WTP values differ between the realized sample
and the population based on demographic and fishing-related variations in response
propensity, and is written as

𝑊𝑇𝑃

=

𝛽 +𝛽𝑃
𝛽

−

𝛽 +𝛽𝑃
𝛽

9

=

𝛽 +𝛽 𝑃
𝛽

−𝑃

.

(17)

Alternatively, the inverse of predicted response propensity can be used to weight observations prior to
estimation. Estimates from this specification, displayed in the Appendix, are consistent with those
estimated by our preferred specification.
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Table 12 displays results from the unrestricted model, defined by Equation (10),
which includes interaction terms between fishing trip attributes and predicted response
propensities. For reasons discussed above, however, this sample includes fewer
individuals than the main estimation sample used in Table 5. Therefore, Table 12 also
displays results from a restricted model that excludes the additional interaction terms.
Comparing results from the restricted model to those from our preferred specification,
shown in Column (3) of Table 5, allows us to assess the extent to which estimated fishing
trip preferences differ between the full and reduced sample.
Results of the restricted model in Table 12 are broadly consistent with the results
of our preferred specification. Except for the statistically insignificant coefficient on
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒, estimated parameters from the restricted model maintain the sign,
level of significance, and approximate magnitude as their analogues in Column (3) of
Table 5. Because each specification utilizes a different sample, we cannot explicitly test
for differences in utility model parameters, yet the consistency of estimation results
between the two specifications bolsters our confidence in the validity of the inferences
drawn from this analysis.
The coefficients on the interaction terms included the unrestricted model can be
interpreted as the deviation in mean marginal utilities associated with a one percentage
point change in the predicted likelihood of response. Most of these coefficients, however,
are statistically insignificant. We interpret this as evidence that, for these attributes,
estimated mean marginal utilities do not suffer from the presence of non-response bias.
The statistically significant and negative coefficient on 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ × 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 indicates
that the baseline level of utility from catching other species of legal-sized fish on striped
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bass trips is lower for those who have a higher propensity to respond to the survey.
Table 12. Results from panel rank-ordered mixed logit model with propensity score interactions.
Table 12. Results from panel rank-ordered mixed logit model with propensity score interactions.
Restricted
Unrestricted
Attribute
Mean
St. Dev.
Mean
St. Dev.
Main effects
Small keep
0.246***
0.938***
-0.203
0.933***
(0.061)
(0.068)
(0.384)
(0.069)
Medium keep
0.298***
1.167***
0.087
1.134***
(0.063)
(0.062)
(0.330)
(0.062)
Trophy keep
0.662***
1.253***
0.973**
1.244***
(0.084)
(0.101)
(0.459)
(0.101)
Small release
0.089***
0.400***
-0.039
0.396***
(0.023)
(0.025)
(0.148)
(0.025)
Medium release
0.092
0.501***
0.605
0.492***
(0.060)
(0.060)
(0.384)
(0.061)
Trophy release
0.242***
0.677***
0.184
0.687***
(0.035)
(0.041)
(0.205)
(0.042)
Other catch
0.147***
0.379***
(0.016)
(0.107)
Cost
-0.017***
-0.016***
(0.002)
(0.002)
Opt-out
-3.155***
-0.723
(0.130)
(0.617)
Min. 28”
-0.098
-0.797
(0.090)
(0.550)
Min. 30”
-0.689***
-0.591
(0.108)
(0.752)
Interactions
Small keep × Score
0.537
(0.450)
Medium keep × Score
0.238
(0.389)
Trophy keep × Score
-0.390
(0.537)
Small release × Score
0.151
(0.174)
Medium release × Score
-0.606
(0.448)
Trophy release × Score
0.069
(0.244)
Other catch × Score
-0.277**
(0.124)
Opt-out × Score
-2.933***
(0.732)
Min. 28” × Score
0.843
(0.647)
Min. 30” × Score
-0.133
(0.865)
Log likelihood
-1937.26
-1924.27
McFadden Pseudo R2
0.358
0.362
AIC
3908.5
3902.5
Notes: Number of observations is 1,684. Number of individuals is 447. 500 Halton draws used to maximize the
simulated log-likelihood.*,**, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance,
respectively.
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Likewise, those who are have a higher propensity to respond to the survey are less
likely to choose the no-fish trip alternative, as indicated by the negative and significant
coefficient on 𝑂𝑝𝑡 − 𝑜𝑢𝑡 × 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒. Taken together with the findings in Table 11 that
reveal response propensity to be positively correlated with likelihood of fishing for
striped bass in the next 12 months, these results intuitively suggest that, compared to
those less likely to go fishing, individuals who are more likely to go striped bass fishing
next year receive less utility from (1) catching non-striped bass species while fishing for
striped bass and (2) not fishing for striped bass.
We now examine the extent to which variation in response propensity based on
demographic and fishing-related characteristics affects welfare calculations. Columns (2)
and (3) of Table 13 displays mean WTP values for fishing trip attributes based on the
restricted model. In Columns (4) and (5), we show the results of Equations (15) and (16),
respectively. The sixth column of Table 13 displays differences between mean WTP
evaluated at 𝑃

and mean WTP evaluated at 𝑃 , calculated from equation 17. We

duplicate WTP estimates from our main analysis in the second column of Table 13 to
assess differences in welfare calculations between the full sample (Column 2) and the
reduced, non-response sample (Column 3).
As revealed previously by comparing utility model parameters, we find no
substantial differences in the magnitudes of WTP values between those derived from the
full and non-response sample except for that pertaining to a marginal change in
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒, which becomes insignificant when estimated using the non-response
sample. Across fishing trip attributes, WTP values evaluated at the mean propensity score
of respondents and non-respondents (Column 4) are consistent with those evaluated
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Table 13. Estimates of and differences in mean WTP evaluated at the average predicted response propensity for the
realized sample (respondents) and full sample (respondents and non-respondents).

Table 13. Estimates of and differences in mean WTP evaluated at the average predicted response
propensity for the realized sample (respondents) and full sample (respondents and non-respondents).
Restricted
Unrestricted
Difference
All
Respondents
Non-response
in means
Attribute
Main sample
sample
(𝑊𝑇𝑃 )
(𝑊𝑇𝑃 )
(𝑊𝑇𝑃
)
Small keep

13.80***
(7.35, 20.43)

14.80***
(8.04, 21.74)

13.84***
(6.57, 21.31)

14.93***
(7.96, 22.25)

-1.10
(-3.08, 0.72)

Medium keep

19.80***
17.82***
(13.50, 26.14) (11.28, 24.72)

16.92***
(9.61, 24.03)

17.28***
(10.45, 24.16)

-0.44
(-2.01, 1.12)

Trophy keep

37.26***
39.84***
(28.72, 47.06) (30.42, 50.88)

40.39***
(30.76, 51.67)

39.49***
(29.95, 50.31)

0.79
(-1.28, 2.98)

Small release

5.05***
(2.40, 8.03)

5.37***
(2.41, 8.67)

5.07***
(2.07, 8.51)

5.35***
(2.45, 8.70)

-0.31
(-1.06, 0.40)

Medium release

7.32**
(0.84, 14.12)

5.51
(-1.61, 12.69)

7.25*
(-0.14, 15.06)

6.08
(-1.29, 13.71)

1.24
(-0.56, 3.14)

Trophy release

13.84***
(9.48, 18.88)

14.70***
(10.05, 20.46)

14.73***
(9.49, 21.29)

14.79***
(9.72, 21.13)

-0.14
(-1.13, 0.88)

Other fish

8.67***
(6.44, 11.49)

8.88***
(6.37, 11.99)

9.64***
(6.90, 13.22)

9.05***
(6.54, 12.31)

0.57**
(0.069, 1.11)

28” minimum
size (1=yes)

-6.31
(-16.91, 3.41)

-5.93
(-17.58, 4.79)

-7.52
(-20.34, 3.98)

-5.82
(-18.13, 5.38)

-1.69
(-4.45, 0.94)

30” minimum
size (1=yes)

-36.92***
-41.80***
(-52.04, -3.56) (60.03, -27.44)

-43.11***
-43.14***
(-62.24, -26.87) (-61.91, -27.96)

0.30
(-3.21, 3.80)

# observations
1,747
1,684
1,684
1,684
1,684
# individuals
469
447
447
447
447
Notes: Mean WTP, differences in means, and 95% confidence intervals (below in parenthesis)
calculated using the Krinsky-Robb approach with 5,000 replications. *,**, and *** represent
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively.

at the mean propensity score of respondents (Column 5). Differences between Column
(4) and Column (5) estimates, shown in Column (6) of Table 13, can be interpreted as the
degree to which survey non-response bias affects estimated WTP values. Estimates in
Column (6) are statistically insignificant for all attributes except 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ, yet the
magnitude of this coefficient trivial. Overall, the results in Column (6) provide
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considerable evidence against the notion that our estimates of WTP are affected by bias
related to survey non-response propensity.

7 Conclusion
To meet the demands of fishery managers, this study “[evaluates] striped bass
angler preferences for size of harvested fish and tradeoffs with bag limits” (ASMFC
2018). We separately identify the recreational value anglers place on keeping and
releasing small, medium, and trophy striped bass using data from a recent choice
experiment survey. In line with the results from choice experiment studies focused on
other recreational species, model estimates indicate that anglers place a higher value on
striped bass that may be kept than on those that must be released. However, in contrast to
the results of some of these studies indicating that angler welfare increases less than
proportionally with catch size (Goldsmith et al. 2018; Anderson and Lee 2013), we find
that the recreational value of keeping or releasing striped bass increases almost
exponentially with fish size, which likely reflects the sportfishing nature of the Atlantic
striped bass fishery. Additionally, we find little evidence to suggest that our welfare
estimates suffer from the presence of survey non-response bias.
Accounting for the recreational value of catching-and-releasing striped bass is
necessary to accurately assess the extent to which harvest restrictions affect anglers. One
finding pertinent to this claim is the relatively high recreational value anglers place on
catching-and-releasing trophy-sized striped bass. Our estimates indicate that releasing a
trophy striped bass is slightly more valuable to anglers than keeping a small one, and only
slightly less valuable than keeping a medium-sized one. While anglers will incur a
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considerable welfare loss from catching-and-releasing a trophy-sized striped bass as
opposed to keeping that same fish, the results suggest that such a loss can be largely
recouped if an angler catches and keeps a medium striped bass on the same trip. We do
not investigate the underlying factors driving the high catch-and-release value of trophy
striped bass, but one possible explanation is the ostensibly widespread support for
conservation-minded fishing practices given by regulatory and other agencies across the
study region. In addition to being implicit in recreational regulations that fully or partially
restrict trophy harvest, many states encourage such practices through voluntary catchand-release award programs or tournaments; in Maryland, for example, recreational
anglers who release alive a striped bass longer than 40” can receive the Governor’s
Striped Bass Conservation Award. Some volunteer conservation organization employ
similar tactics; Striper Forever’s Release a Breeder Club, for example, recognizes anglers
who release unharmed striped bass longer than 36” in total length.
Our study provides additional insight into the effects of including versus
excluding catch-and-release regulations in models of angler utility applied to choice
experiment data. When we exclude catch-and-release regulations from the model, the
estimated impact to angler utility from releasing medium-sized striped bass is negative.
Our preferred model specification, however, which includes catch-and-release
regulations, estimates a positive relationship between angler utility and releasing
medium-sized striped bass, the magnitude of which intuitively falls within the range of
that associated with releasing small and trophy-sized striped bass. Estimates from this
model indicate that angler utility is negatively affected by catch-and-release regulations
for medium-sized (29”) striped bass, yet unaffected when such regulations are applied to
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small or trophy striped bass. While specific to the context of this study, these findings
highlight the importance of controlling for catch-and-release regulations in models of
angler utility that rely on DCE data.
While the results of our study can be used to infer the potential economic impact
of changes in recreational striped bass fishing regulations, some limitations exist. First,
when generating keep and released variables from the DCE data, anglers are assumed to
harvest all fish that can be legally retained, but further research is needed to understand
whether this is a realistic depiction of angler behavior. Second, evaluating the extent to
which changes in striped bass regulations affect aggregate trip demand and angler welfare
requires considering the proportion of fishing trips that may be affected by such changes,
which is outside the scope of this study. In the next chapter of this dissertation, however,
we use results from this analysis to evaluate aggregate fishery outcomes conditional on
changes in recreational Atlantic striped bass regulations.
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CHAPTER 2

SHORT-RUN ECONOMIC AND BIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF
RECREATIONAL ATLANTIC STRIPED BASS FISHING POLICY

1 Introduction
Recreational fisheries managers often attempt meet short-run conservation
objectives by adjusting daily possession and size limit regulations. These policy actions
influence aggregate recreational fishing demand by altering the incentives faced by
individual anglers. If inaccurately predicted or left unaccounted, however, policy-induced
shifts in demand may undermine managers’ attempts to meet intended conservation
objectives or result in policies that overly reduce angler welfare. To predict the
concurrent impacts of policy action on demand, welfare, and fishing mortality—key
linkages in the coupled social-ecological system of recreational fishing (Fenichel et al.
2013; Hunt et al. 2013)—it is necessary to evaluate the incentives faced by anglers.
We evaluate the incentives faced by recreational Atlantic striped bass anglers and
use this knowledge to predict aggregate, short-run economic and biological effects of
changing possession (bag) and size limits. Our predictive model of angler behavior links
recreational striped bass fishing policy in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut
to individual, trip-level outcomes. The model is parameterized with the results of a recent
choice experiment survey, where angler participation and welfare are conditional on trip
cost and the number and size of striped bass kept and released. It simulates the fishery
under actual 2015 policy conditions, imposes alternative 2015 bag and size limits, and
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calculates resultant changes in angler welfare and demand. We use estimates of the
change in recreational demand occurring under alternative 2015 policy conditions to
compute expected levels recreational fishing mortality. By comparing model outputs
across several bag and size limit combinations, we illustrate the biological and economic
tradeoffs created by different recreational Atlantic striped bass fishing policies.
A central research objective is to assess the effect of different harvest-size
restrictions on angler welfare and female spawning stock biomass (SSB). The
recreational Atlantic striped bass fishery provides an excellent canvas for illustrating
these tradeoffs because (a) the most recent estimate of female SSB, while preliminary, is
below the binding management threshold, indicating that the stock is overfished (ASMFC
2018), (b) trophy-sized striped bass are almost exclusively part of the spawning stock
(Bigelow and Schroeder 1953), and (c) the recreational value of striped bass increases
exponentially with the size of fish kept or released. Thus, this fishery is particularly
suited for investigating the economic and biological implications of full or partial harvest
restrictions on trophy-sized striped bass.
Results indicate that striped bass angler welfare is highly responsive to changes in
the baseline minimum size limit because such policy adjustments strongly influence the
rate at which angler encounter harvestable striped bass. Conforming to intuition, we find
that harvest slot policies, which specify both a minimum and maximum size limit, more
effectively mitigate mature female fishing mortality than minimum length only policies.
But when these types of policies specify a narrow legal size range, they may lead to
inefficient outcomes in terms of angler welfare and total recreational fishing mortality.
We also find instances where two or more policies yield similar impacts to angler welfare
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and recreational fishing mortality but differ considerably in their effect on female SSB.
These and other findings highlight the importance of accounting for both angler welfare
and the biological characteristics of the stock when proposed policy action seeks to
efficiently reach socioeconomic and conservation goals of fisheries management.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we provide
background information about the recreational Atlantic striped bass fishery. In Section 3
and 4, we discuss the relevant literature examining the biological and economic impacts
of recreational fishing regulations. Section 5 discusses the data used to estimate the
angler behavioral model and we interpret results from this model in Section 6. Section 7
describes our procedure for evaluating aggregate impacts of recreational striped bass
fishing. In Sections 8, we discuss results of the aggregate demand model and we conclude
our analysis in Section 8.

2 Fishery Background
Atlantic striped bass are the most prominent and heavily targeted recreational
species found along the coast from Maine to North Carolina. Typically caught or targeted
on more than 20 million recreational fishing trips annually, striped bass are also one of
most-harvested recreational species in the region; in fact, from 2012 to 2016, annual
average harvest volume of Atlantic striped bass was the largest among all recreationally
targeted species in the U.S. (NMFS 2017).
Given the popularity of Atlantic striped bass as a recreational target, excessive
recreational harvest is a perpetual concern for the fishery’s governing body, the Atlantic
States Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC). The ASMFC sets biological targets and
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thresholds for the rate of fishing mortality (F) and level of female spawning stock
biomass (SSB). They then translate these biological reference points into a set of standard
recreational regulations for the coastwide fishery but allow coastal states to implement
alternative, conservation equivalent regulations. This regulatory flexibility typically
results in a variety of state-level recreational striped bass bag and size limits, the latter
which include minimum lengths, harvest slots, and protected harvest slots, as shown in
Figure 1.10
The most notable regulatory change made in recent years was prompted by results
of the stock assessment for 2012. In addition to revealing a steady decline in female SSB
below target levels since 2006, the stock assessment projected with high probability that
female SSB would fall below its threshold in subsequent years if the rate of fishing
mortality remained at 2012 levels. As a precautionary measure to conserve the spawning
population, the ASMFC approved Addendum 4 to Amendment 6 of the fishery’s
management plan, which called for a 25% reduction in harvest from 2012 levels in
coastal states beginning during the 2015 fishing season (ASMFC 2014). Managers
expected that in addition to conserving the population of spawning fish by reducing
fishing mortality, Addendum 4’s mandate would effectively protect a strong 2011 yearclass. In response to the mandate, many coastal states adopted a one-fish, 28” or longer
daily recreational possession limit during 2015.
Results of the 2016 stock assessment update proved the Addendum 4 measures
successful. Coastwide harvest of Atlantic striped bass in 2015 was reduced by 22.4%

10

Minimum size limits specify a minimum length of legally harvestable fish, harvest slots specify a
minimum and maximum length of legally harvestable fish, and protected harvest slots specify a minimum
and maximum length of fish that cannot be legally harvested.
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relative to 2012 levels, and all sectors achieved or exceeded their harvest reduction goal
except for the Chesapeake Bay recreational sector, within which harvest increased by
53.4% relative to 2012 (ASMFC 2016b). Total F in 2015 was estimated to be 0.16, below
both its target (0.18) and threshold (0.22) level (ASMFC 2016a). Female SSB in 2015
was estimated to be 58,853 metric tons (mt), which is below its target of 72,032 mt and
above its threshold of 57,626 mt.
However, improvements to the status of the stock engendered by the Addendum 4
measures were short-lived. Preliminary results of the 2018 benchmark stock assessment,
which introduced a two-stock statistical catch-at-age model rather than the single-stock
approach used previously, show that in 2017, female SSB and F for the Delaware
Bay/Hudson River stock, and female SSB and Focean (but not FChesapeake Bay) for the
Chesapeake Bay stock surpassed the biological threshold level (ASMFC 2018). Hence, it
is likely that the Delaware Bay/Hudson River and Chesapeake Bay stock are currently
overfished, the Chesapeake Bay stock is experiencing overfishing in the ocean but not in
the Chesapeake Bay, and the Delaware Bay/Hudson River stock is experiencing

3 Relevant Biological Literature
Given the current status of the Atlantic striped bass fishery and prevailing
management objectives, it is pertinent to explore the short-run impacts to angler welfare,
total fishing mortality, and mature female fishing mortality of alternative legal harvest
size restrictions. In the Atlantic striped bass and other recreational fisheries, minimum
length only, harvest slots, and other types of harvest size restrictions are to employed to
prevent recruitment overfishing, a condition in which the spawning stock is depleted to a
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level at which future recruitment declines strongly (Allen et al. 2013). Of course, the
appropriate specification of the legal harvest size restrictions depends on biological
characteristics, current stock conditions, and management objectives of the fishery in
question. Yet increasing attention has been paid to the biological and fishing-quality
ramifications of minimum length only (ML) and harvest slot (HS) policies in recreational
fisheries management.
Compared to ML policies, HSs have been shown to maintain more natural age
structures, more positively affect spawning and recruitment potential, produce higher
harvest numbers and trophy catch, lead to lower discard mortality, and distribute sexbiased fishing exploitation more evenly across both sexes for a variety of recreational
species (Arlinghaus et al. 2010; Pierce 2010; Wilde 1997; Koehn and Todd 2012; Morson
et al. 2017). Gwinn et al. (2015) evaluate the differential effect of ML versus HS policies
on fishery outcomes for a range of representative fisheries. They simulate an age- and
size-structured fish population model under multiple exploitation level and life-history
parameterizations. For each exploitation level (low and high) they define three
management objectives (harvest-oriented, trophy-catch oriented, and a compromise
between the two former objectives), choose the objective-meeting ML and HS policy, and
calculate fishery and conservation metrics at that regulation. Most relevant to the current
study are Gwinn et al. (2015)’s simulation results pertaining to the life-history
parametrization of “large-bodied fish with slow growth, late maturation, and high levels
of density-dependent recruitment compensation (e.g. striped bass Morone saxatilis,
Moronidae)”. Across the three management objectives, each evaluated under two
exploitation levels, they find that compared to ML policies, HSs lead to more desirable
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outcomes in terms of recreational harvest levels, trophy catch, spawning potential ratio,
and the proportion of fecundity produced by the older population, but less desirable
outcomes in terms of biomass yields. Despite the latter finding and taken together with
results of other life-history parameterizations, the authors posit that for range of
management objectives, HS policies can produce more favorable compromises between
fishing-quality and conservation outcomes than ML policies.
Naturally arising from these studies is a question that has yet to be addressed
thoroughly in the current body of literature. That is, to what extent does the aggregate
economic value of recreational fishing vary with the imposition of minimum length only
versus harvest slot policies? We address this question in the context of the recreational
Atlantic striped bass fishery by quantifying both economic and biological returns to a
variety of minimum length only and harvest slot policies and by doing so, compliment
the stream of recent biological literature on the topic.

4 Relevant Economic Literature
Many of the economic studies concerned with assessing the potential economic
effect of recreational fishing regulations estimate angler preferences or willingness-to-pay
(WTP) values for marginal changes in fishing trip characteristics. As fishery managers
are often concerned with the potential effect of new policies, many economists have
employed stated preference (SP) methods for nonmarket valuation (Hicks 2002; Aas et al.
2000; Cha and Melstrom 2018; Knoche and Lupi 2016; Lew and Larson 2014, 2012,
2015; Lew and Seung 2010; Duffield et al. 2012; Goldsmith et al. 2018). SP methods
allows researchers to evaluate angler preferences for and behavioral responses to virtually
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any hypothetical policy scenario because, in contrast to revealed preference methods that
require data on observed behavior, they rely on data obtained from individual responses
to survey questions, carefully designed to compensate for missing or inadequate
observational data.
While estimating angler WTP values is a viable way to understand the value an
average angler places on catching, harvesting, or releasing fish, or on alternative sets of
regulations, these values poorly describe broad economic effects of policy-induced
changes in fishing trip quality. Some studies infer these effects by inserting into the utility
function and incrementally changing average historical values of the explanatory
variables (Goldsmith et al. 2018; Gautum and Steinback 1998). Because discrete choice
models are nonlinear in explanatory variables, however, inserting average historical
values of these variables can lead to biased estimates of the average response (Train
2003).
Additionally, adequately evaluating the broad economic effects of regulatory
change requires considering the randomness in catch and hence the number of fishing
trips that may be affected by such changes, as in a few studies on the topic. McConnell et
al. (1995) estimate angler WTP values for catching additional fish using results from
travel cost model and, separately, model catch at a particular fishing site as a function of
the historical catch rate, time spent fishing, and experience. The effect of a bag limit is
introduced by allowing it to truncate the distribution of fish kept which, under the
assumption that anglers receive utility from keeping their catch, shifts the expected mean
catch rate. To calculate the resultant welfare impacts while accounting for randomness in
catch, McConnell et al. (1995) evaluate the behavioral model at different distributions of
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catch, but the model operates under the implicit assumption that the recreational value to
anglers of releasing fish is zero. More recently, Anderson et al. (2013) integrate marginal
values of keeping and releasing fish, estimated using DCE data, and historical catch data
into a simulation model to evaluate angler WTP to avoid fishery closures for rockfish and
other species in the Puget Sound of Washington. Using the same data and a similar
methodology, Anderson and Lee (2013) evaluate angler WTP for increases in salmon bag
limits and test for differences in harvest values between wild and hatchery-reared salmon.
Some economists have sought to understand how regulations affect anglers as
well as fish stocks (Homans and Ruliffson 1999; Anderson 1993). Woodward and Griffin
(2003) develop a theoretical model of angling behavior with which they derive the shortand long-term implications of recreational bag and size limits on future stock levels.
Their theoretical results suggest that bag limits are always as effective as size limits at
reducing fishing mortality, but for both types of policies, the actual stock implications
depend partly on whether fishing quality and angler effort are substitutes or compliments.
Woodward and Griffin (2003) then apply their theoretical model to an empirical context
by estimating a bioeconomic model of the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery. Modelling
fishing demand as a function of travel costs, household income, expected catch rates,
anglers’ fishing experience, and boat ownership, they find that the effects of regulations
on future stock levels and angler welfare is highly dependent on the discard mortality
rate; when discard mortality rates are high, size limits policies can lead to outcomes that
fall below the efficient frontier of welfare and spawning stock levels. Like McConnell et
al. (1995), however, and due a lack of available data, their model implicitly assumes that
the marginal value to anglers of releasing their catch is zero.
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A few recent studies consider both randomness in catch and the recreational value
of releasing fish when evaluating the aggregate effects of changes in regulations.
Providing the framework for the current research, these studies simulate fishery outcomes
under alternative regulatory conditions by parameterizing an aggregate demand model
with the results of a choice experiment analysis. Holzer and McConnell (2017) examine
how alternative assumptions about summer flounder anglers’ risk preferences for harvest
uncertainty affect welfare and participation predictions. The authors explicitly introduce
summer flounder catch uncertainty by defining its levels in the DCE with ranges of
possible outcomes, as opposed to with discrete values. Estimates from utility models
specified under the assumption of risk aversion indicate that their sample is, on average,
risk averse to random variation in summer flounder harvest. To introduce the effect of
policy changes in the northeast U.S. recreational summer flounder fishery as shifting the
entire catch distribution, which consequently affects both the mean of and dispersion in
expected harvest, their simulation model specifies anglers’ expected level of harvest and
release as averages over multiple draws of the choice occasion. After repeating the
simulation procedure under alternative risk preference parameterizations, they find that
failing to account for angler risk aversion for uncertainty in harvest, when such
preferences hold, can lead to misestimated predictions of welfare changes in response to
changes in regulations.
Lee et al. (2017)’s bioeconomic model of recreational cod and haddock fishing in
the northeast is currently used to determine fishing regulations for these species (83
Federal Register 18972). In this illustration of the model, they evaluate the efficacy of
actual and alternative 2014 policies at reaching allowable catch limits (ACL) for both
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species. They find that while both the actual and proposed 2014 policies had similarly
minimal effects on stock levels three years in the future, only the actual 2014 policy met
target ACLs for both species. Underlying this result, however, was an assumed 0%
haddock discard mortality rate that was subsequently revised by managers to 50%.
Simulation results based on the revised estimate reveal that neither the actual nor
proposed 2014 policies would have successfully met the recreational haddock ACL, a
finding that exemplifies how management success can depend on the time lag in
obtaining new scientific information.
The structure of our aggregate demand model is similar to that employed by
Holzer and McConnell (2017) and Lee et al. (2017) in that angler welfare and behavior
responds to policy-induced shifts in the rate at which legal-sized fish are encountered. Yet
we build on the framework established in these studies by incorporating keep and release
parameters for small, medium, and trophy-sized fish such that angler behavior is also
influenced by policy-induced changes in the proportion of small, medium-sized, and
trophy-sized striped bass that constitute the harvestable population. This modification is
essential given the findings in Section 6 that suggest the recreational value of keeping and
releasing striped bass increases exponentially with the size of fish caught.

5 Angler Behavioral Model
We model of angler behavior using the choice experiment data and random utility
maximum (RUM) framework described in Chapter 1. Fishing trip utility is specified as a
function of the number of the number of small, medium, and trophy striped bass kept and
released (𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝, 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒, 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝, 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒,
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𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑦 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝, and 𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒, respectively), the number of other legal-sized fish
caught (𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ), the trip cost (𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡), and the opt-out alternative (𝑂𝑝𝑡_𝑜𝑢𝑡). We
also include two indicators variables, 𝑀𝑖𝑛28 and 𝑀𝑖𝑛30, which measure the differential
impact to fishing trip utility from a 28” and 30” minimum size limit relative to the impact
of 20” minimum size limit, respectively. The utility that angler 𝑛 receives from
alternative 𝑗, in choice scenario 𝑡, is:
𝑈

=𝑉

+ 𝜀

𝑈

= 𝛽 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝

+ 𝛽 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝

+ 𝛽 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒
+ 𝛽 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ
+ 𝛽 𝑀𝑖𝑛28

+ 𝛽 𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑦 𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝

+ 𝛽 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒
+ 𝛽 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡

+ 𝛽 𝑀𝑖𝑛30

where the indirect utility function, 𝑉

+ 𝛽 𝑂𝑝𝑡_𝑜𝑢𝑡
+𝜀

=𝛽𝑥

+ 𝛽 𝑇𝑟𝑜𝑝ℎ𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒

.

(1)

, relates observed attributes to utility, 𝛽

measures the relative importance to anglers of the attributes 𝑥

that describe alternative

𝑗, and 𝜀 captures the utility derived from all other unobservable factors.
Equation (1) is estimated using a random parameters logit (RPL) specification,
which allows some or all parameters to be randomly distributed across the population of
sampled anglers. We specify the striped bass catch parameters to be normally distributed,
which captures the most important sources of heterogeneity in the context of this study,
and treat the other parameters as fixed. 11 Because respondents selected both a first- and
second-most preferred alternative in each of up to four DCE questions, we treat the data
as a panel and specify the response variable to be a full ranking of alternatives, as

11

Alternative models in which all non-cost parameters are specified to be normally distributed
yielded qualitatively similar results but at the expense less precisely estimated coefficients.
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opposed to as a single choice. Compared to those that use unranked data, choice models
estimated using ranked data have been shown to improve the precision, and thus reduce
sampling variance of estimated utility parameters (Chapman and Staelin 1982).
Table 14 displays estimation results of Equation (1). The mean parameters on the
non-striped bass attributes behave as expected. Catching other species of fish while
fishing for striped bass is a boon to angler utility, as indicated by the positive and
statistically significant coefficient on 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ. The trip cost parameter, which
represents the marginal utility of price, is negative and statistically significant. We infer
from the negative and significant parameter on 𝑂𝑝𝑡_𝑜𝑢𝑡 that striped bass anglers prefer
fishing for striped bass when such an opportunity is available. The coefficient on 𝑀𝑖𝑛28
is negative but statistically insignificant, which suggests that if at least one medium
striped bass can be kept, the average angler is indifferent to regulations that permit
harvest of small striped bass. One potential explanation for this result is that most
recreational striped bass anglers in our sample and across the population are accustomed
to fishing in the absence of small-fish harvest slot regulations. In contrast to that
on 𝑀𝑖𝑛28, the estimated parameter on 𝑀𝑖𝑛30 is negative, significant, and relatively large
in magnitude, indicating that anglers are highly averse to prohibitions on the harvest of
any striped bass shorter than 30”. This result may be driven by angler sensitivity to
changes in the status-quo, 28” recreational minimum size restriction adopted by most
states in recent years (ASMFC 2017, 2016, 2015). Nonetheless, this finding is consistent
with other studies that model angler utility as a function of both catch and catch-andrelease regulations (Cha and Melstrom 2018; Knoche and Lupi 2016).
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Table 14. Utility parameter estimates from panel rank-ordered mixed logit model.

Table 14. Utility parameter estimates from panel rank-ordered mixed logit model.
Variable

Mean Parameters

Standard Deviations

Small keep

0.242***
0.967***
(0.060)
(0.067)
Medium keep
0.348***
1.156***
(0.061)
(0.063)
Trophy keep
0.653***
1.247***
(0.080)
(0.093)
Small release
0.088***
0.407***
(0.023)
(0.024)
Medium release
0.129**
0.512***
(0.058)
(0.059)
Trophy release
0.242***
0.678***
(0.034)
(0.042)
Other catch
0.151***
(0.016)
Cost
-0.018***
(0.002)
Opt-out
-3.170***
(0.130)
Min. 28”
-0.109
(0.088)
Min. 30”
-0.644***
(0.106)
Num. Observations
1,747
Num. individuals
469
Log likelihood
-2003.305
McFadden Pseudo R2
0.360
AIC
4040.600
Notes: 500 Halton draws used to maximize the simulated log-likelihood.
*,**, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance,
respectively.

All estimated keep and release parameters in Table 14 are positive, indicating that
the recreational Atlantic striped bass fishery is executed both for sport and for personal
consumption. A closer look at the magnitudes of these estimates reveals that angler utility
increases almost exponentially with the size of fish kept or released. Additionally, the
estimates intuitively suggest that for each size-class, anglers prefer keeping and releasing
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larger striped bass to smaller ones. Table 14 also reveals the relatively high returns to
angler utility from catching-and-releasing trophy striped bass. For example, the marginal
utility of releasing a trophy-sized striped bass is virtually identical to that of keeping a
small striped bass. Finally, the statistically significant standard deviation coefficients on
each of the striped bass catch variables indicate considerable unobserved preference
heterogeneity across the population of sampled anglers

7 Simulation Procedure
7.1 Overview and Study Area
To evaluate potential impacts of alternative 2015 striped bass regulations on
angler welfare and participation, total recreational removals, and mature female
recreational removals, we integrate the estimates in Table 14 and historical catch and
effort data into an aggregate demand model. The model simulates the striped bass fishery
at the trip-level under actual 2015 policy conditions and compute baseline metrics of
interest. It then imposes alternative 2015 policies that affect expected angler participation
and recreational fishing mortality by altering the number and size of striped bass kept and
released, relative to these outcomes under the actual 2015 policy. By summing and
computing differences in expected levels of angler participation, angler welfare, and
recreational harvest and release across trips across actual and alternative policies, we
reveal the external, short-term economic and biological costs of recreational Atlantic
striped bass fishing policy.
We simulate the 2015 recreational striped bass fishery in Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, and Connecticut, which together accounted for about 32% of the estimated
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20,282,426 recreational striped bass fishing trips taken during 2015 in the ten coastal
states from Maine through Virginia.12 We focus on these three states because, unlike those
further north or further south, each implemented the same set of striped bass regulations
in 2014 and 2015. This makes the simulation procedure more tractable than it would be
otherwise and allows for a straightforward test of the accuracy of its predictions, which
we employ in Section 7.3.

7.2 Data and Procedure
Simulated fishing trips are first assigned a level of striped bass catch that is
randomly drawn from probability distributions created using publicly-available, 2015
Marine Recreational Information Program (MRIP) data. We exclude from these data trips
that record catching more than 15 striped bass, which account for 1.6% of the total
number of directed striped bass trips taken in 2015 across the study region. Given
observed differences in catch-per-trip levels, we generate separate catch distributions for
boat- and shore-based fishing trips. 13 Dividing the 𝑛 trips that caught 𝑐 striped bass from
fishing mode 𝑚 by the total number of directed trips taken from mode 𝑚 gives a
probability mass function,

𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ] =

𝑛
∑

𝑛

.

(2)

These distributions are smoothed using a LOWESS (Cleveland 1979) and shown in the
top panel of Figure 3.

12

We use the Marine Recreational Information Program (MRIP) data to estimate recreational effort,
defined as fishing trips on which striped bass was caught or was the primary target.
13
We aggregate private, charter, and head boat trips when generating the boat-based catch-per-trip
distribution.
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Figure 3. 2015 striped bass catch-per-trip (top) and catch-at-length (bottom) distributions.

Figure 3. 2015 striped bass catch-per-trip (top) and catch-at-length (bottom)
distributions.

After catch levels are assigned, fish sizes are randomly drawn from a catch-atlength distribution created using MRIP and state-level volunteer angler logbook (VAL)
data. Because MRIP data contain few recorded lengths of released striped bass, we first
68

combine and calculate harvest and release proportions-at-length using 2015 VAL data
collected by the Connecticut Volunteer Angler Survey Program and the Massachusetts
Sportfish Data Collection Team (SADC) Program. Raw VAL data is displayed in Figure
A2 in the Appendix. We then multiply these proportions by MRIP-based estimates of
total 2015 harvest and releases across the study region. The total number of length-𝑙 fish
caught (𝐶 ) in the study region during 2015 is

𝐶 =

𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒
∑ 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒

∗ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒

+

ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡
∑ ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡

∗ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡

.

(3)

Calculating Equation (3) for shore and boat modes separately resulted in
qualitatively similar catch-at-length distributions. We therefore aggregate MRIP and VAL
data across fishing modes. The probability of an angler catching a length-𝑙 striped bass,
LOWESS-smoothed and shown in the bottom panel of Figure 3, is

𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ = 𝑙] =

𝐶
∑

𝐶

.

(4)

We impose actual and counterfactual regulations that, along with catch, determine
the realized number and size of striped bass kept and released on each simulated trip.
Striped bass catch is then allocated into one of three size bins—small (≤ 25”), medium
(26”-34”), and trophy (≥ 35”)—that correspond to definitions of the striped bass catch
attributes used in the choice experiment, but we retain catch lengths to calculate the age,
sex, and maturity distribution of total recreational removals.
Simulated anglers harvest legal-sized striped bass as they are encountered until
the bag limit is reached and discard subsequent catch. They do not selectively harvest or
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high-grade.14 Based on anecdotal and empirical evidence, however, we do incorporate
volunteer release behavior, the practice of releasing legal-sized fish despite not reaching
the bag limit. We randomly select choice occasions having positive legal catch level and
reclassify harvested fish as released fish until a pre-specified rate of voluntary release is
reached. Although this reclassification affects predicted levels of recreational fishing
mortality, it does not affect participation or welfare estimates because we assume that the
value anglers place on a voluntarily-released striped bass is at least that of keeping that
same fish.15 We specify the rate of voluntary release to be 0.25 based on calculations
from Connecticut Volunteer Angler Survey Program data that span the period 20132016.16 Finally, simulated trips are assigned a representative, mode-specific trip cost
derived from the most recent angler expenditure survey in which this information is
available (Lovell et al. 2013).17
After deriving the striped bass catch and other variables corresponding to those
used in the behavioral model, we compute the expected utility of each choice occasion,
given by Equation (5). Following Train (2003), the probability of observing the trip,

14

Selective harvesting is when anglers discard legal-sized fish to retain the ability to harvest fish of a more
preferred size; high-grading is when anglers retain but then discard legal-sized fish to harvest fish of a more
preferred size.
15
It is reasonable to assume that rational anglers would not voluntarily release a legal-sized striped bass if
they receive more utility from harvesting that same fish.
16
Using this data, we calculated the rate of voluntary release across the four years by examining trip logs
that recording catching the exact number or fewer legal-sized striped bass permitted under the bag limit. In
2013 and 2014, the daily possession limit in Connecticut was two fish equal to or longer than 28”; in 2015
and 2016, the daily possession limit in Connecticut was one fish equal to or longer than 28”. After
aggregating numbers of legal-sized fish kept and released on these trips across the four years, we calculated
the overall portion of voluntary released striped bass to be 48%. It is likely, however, that anglers who
participate in the Connecticut Volunteer Angler Survey Program are more avid than the population of
anglers at large, and therefore may be more inclined to catch-and-release legally harvestable fish. Thus, we
use a more conservative estimate of voluntary release in the simulation model.
17
Specifically, costs are a weighted average of each state’s average trip cost (minus lodging expenses and
tournament fees) with weights proportional to the number of trips taken in each state. We generate a
separate cost for shore and boat modes, the latter which reflects a weighted average across private, charter,
and head boat trips.
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conditional on the number and size of striped bass kept and released and the trip cost, is

𝑝 =

exp(𝑉 )
.
1 + exp(𝑉 )

(5)

The expected number of length-𝑙 striped bass harvested (released) on each choice
occasion is the probability-weighted number of length-𝑙 fish retained (discarded).
Summing these values across choice occasions gives the total number of length-𝑙 striped
bass harvested and released under a given policy scenario:

𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡 =

(𝑝 × ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡 ),

(6)

𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 =

(𝑝 × 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 ).

(7)

We apply the 0.09 discard mortality rate used in the striped bass stock assessment
to 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 to determine dead releases-at-length. Adding dead releases-at-length to
harvest-at-length and summing these values across length-classes gives total recreational
removals, defined below.

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠 =

𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡 + (𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 × 0.09)

(8)

To calculate mature female recreational removals, we convert removals-at-length
to removals-at-age using an age-length key created by combining data from three
separate 2015 striped bass age-length keys provided each by the Massachusetts’ Division
of Marine Fisheries, New York’s Department of Environmental Conservation Division of
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Marine Resources, and Rhode Island’s Division of Fish and Wildlife. 18 We then multiply
removals-at-age by the female sex proportions-at-age (𝑠 ) and proportions mature-at-age
for females (𝑚 ) indices provided in striped bass stock assessments and sum these values
across age-classes, as in Equation (9) below. We express total and mature female
recreational removals in terms of biomass weight by translating numbers-at-age to
weights-at-age using stock assessment conversion indices.

𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠 =

[(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠) × 𝑠 × 𝑚 ]. (9)

A principal goal of this paper is to understand the impact of recreational striped
bass regulations on angler welfare. Thus, for each simulated trip we compute
compensating variation (CV), which in our case indicates the level of compensation
required to hold anglers’ expected utility constant after a policy-induced change in fishing
trip quality. Following Haab and McConnell (2002), CV for choice occasion 𝑖 is

𝐶𝑉 =

1
𝛽

ln

exp(𝑉 ) − ln

exp(𝑉 )

,

(10)

where 𝑗 indexes alternatives and 𝑉 and 𝑉 is anglers’ expected utility under
current and changed regulatory conditions, respectively. 𝐶𝑉 is summed across all choice
occasions to infer the aggregate effect of regulatory adjustment on angler welfare.

7.3 Model Calibration
We calibrate the model by randomly selecting a subset of choice occasions such

18

Figure A2 in the Appendix displays length-age conversions based on the combined age-length data.
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that ∑ 𝑝 approximates the actual number of fishing trips taken in the study region
during 2015. This process is employed using samples of shore- and boat-based choice
occasion separately given differences in costs and catch-per-trip between the two fishing
modes. The calibrated model predicts the occurrence of 4,045,220 shore- and 2,427,158
boat-based choice occasions, which closely matches the 4,045,181 and 2,427,178
respective trips taken from each mode across the study region during 2015.
Simulation model calibration diagnostics are shown in Table 15. The model
overestimates the total number of striped bass caught by about 7%, which results in
overestimates of total harvest, mature female harvest, release, and total removal numbers
by 21%, 16%, 5%, and 13% relative to actual 2015 levels, respectively. Despite these
overestimates, however, the model underestimates recreational release weight by 20%.
The calibration diagnostics for mature female recreational releases provides some insight
into the possible source of this discrepancy. That is, the model underestimates total
numbers and weight of mature female striped bass released by 33% and 51% compared to
2015 levels, respectively, which suggests that the likelihood of voluntarily releasing
striped bass may increase with the size of fish caught, a behavior that is unaccounted for
in the model. This potential source of error, however, is compensated by overestimates of
total catch, hence predicted levels of mature female removal numbers and weight align
closely with actual 2015 levels.
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Table 15. Simulation model calibration diagnostics.

Table 15. Simulation model calibration diagnostics.
Model

2015 Actual

Error (%)

Total catch (numbers)
Total catch (pounds)

9,151,419
54,306,593

8,578,012
63,780,363

-6.7
14.9

Harvest (numbers)
Harvest (pounds)

837,951
10,460,637

693,135
8,980,707

-20.9
-16.5

Mature female harvest (numbers)
Mature female harvest (pounds)

500,906
7,644,967

432,359
6,799,069

-15.9
-12.4

Releases (numbers)
Releases (pounds)

8,313,468
43,845,956

7,884,877
54,799,656

-5.4
20.0

Mature female releases (numbers)
Mature female releases (pounds)

1,355,476
13,925,708

2,021,500
28,236,467

33.0
50.7

Total removals (numbers)
Total removals (pounds)

1,586,163
14,406,773

1,402,774
13,912,676

-13.1
-3.6

Mature female removals (numbers)
Mature female removals (pounds)

622,899
8,898,281

614,294
9,340,351

-1.4
4.7

Notes: Statistic calculated using MRIP data and information contained in the 2016 stock
assessment update (ASMFC 2016) and the 2018 preliminary stock assessment (ASMFC
2018). More information about these data and the derivation of Table 15 statistics is
given in Table A2 in the Appendix.

As another way to gauge the accuracy of our model at predicting changes in
fishery outcomes, we compare actual and predicted changes in fishery outcomes that
occurred between 2014 and 2015 when recreational striped bass fishery managers in
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut decreased the daily bag limit from two to
one fish, 28” or longer in total length. We run the simulation procedure using a catch-pertrip distribution generated using 2014 MRIP data and the 2015 catch-at-length
distribution described in Section 7.2. The model is calibrated to the number of shore- and
boat-based fishing trips taken across the study region in 2014.
Table 16 shows actual and predicted changes in fishery outcomes that occurred in
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the study region between 2014 and 2015. Predicted changes in fishing trips, harvest
weight, release numbers, and mature female removal weight approximate the actual
changes that occurred between the two years. However, the model overestimates the
observed decrease in recreational harvest numbers, total removals numbers and weight,
and mature female removals numbers and it underestimates the observed increase in
recreational releases numbers and weight. These discrepancies may be an artifact of
assuming a constant, a 0.25 rate of voluntary release across simulated policies, whereas
the actual rate may be higher when anglers can keep two rather than one striped bass per
day. This hypothesis is somewhat validated by responses to a non-DCE question included
in the angler survey that asked respondents to indicate the number of small (20” to 26”),
medium- (27” to 36”), and trophy-sized (37” and 43”) striped bass they would actually
keep if they caught and could legally harvest two of each size-class; on average,
respondents indicated that they would keep 0.96, 1.21, and 1.00 out of two harvestable
small, medium, and trophy-sized striped bass caught on a trip, respectively, which
suggest the rate of voluntary release may be closer to 0.5 when the bag limit is two. Were
we to incorporate this behavior into the simulation, predicated changes in recreational
harvest numbers, total removals numbers and weight, mature female removals numbers,
and recreational releases numbers and weight would more closely align with actual
changes between the two years. Nonetheless, similarity between actual and predicted
changes in the two metrics of interest, total removal numbers and mature female removal
weight, bolsters confidence in the model’s ability to illuminate tradeoffs between angler
welfare and recreational fishing mortality created by different types of recreational
Atlantic striped bass fishing policy.
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Table 16. Actual and predicted changes in fishery outcomes between 2014 and 2015.

Table 16. Actual and predicted changes in fishery outcomes between 2014 and 2015.
% ∆ between 2014 and 2015
Model

Actual

-0.68

-3.04

-30.95
-30.72

-16.22
-28.84

0.43
5.88

3.71
54.79

Total removals (numbers)
Total removals (pounds)

-19.71
-24.07

-7.20
-11.98

Mature female removals (numbers)
Mature female removals (pounds)

-25.67
-26.60

-13.49
-20.91

Number of trips
Harvest (numbers)
Harvest (pounds)
Releases (numbers)
Releases (pounds)

8 Policy Simulation
We simulate the effect of twenty-nine alternative recreational striped bass fishing
policies on angler welfare, total recreational fishing removals, and female SSB
recreational removal volume. Each policy analyzed specifies a one- or two-fish daily
possession limit and a 20”, 24”, or 28” minimum size limit. We examine impacts to
fishery outcomes from full or partial harvest restrictions on larger striped bass by
specifying across the policies analyzed several types of maximum harvest size
restrictions. In addition to minimum length only policies that exclude such a restriction,
some policies specify a maximum size limit that is eight or sixteen inches longer than the
minimum size limit; we refer to these policies as narrow and wide harvest slots,
respectively. We also examine the effect of more complex, partial harvest restrictions on
larger striped bass by simulating two-fish policies defined by two separate, adjacent
narrow harvest slots for each fish in the bag limit, as well as policies defined by a narrow
slot limit for the first fish in the bag limit only. The last type of size restriction analyzed
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also partially restricts harvest of larger striped bass; these slot-option policies allow
anglers to harvest either two smaller, or one smaller and one larger striped bass. Table A3
in the Appendix displays raw outcomes for each the 29 policies analyzed.
To easily assess the relative economic efficiency of changes in biological
outcomes under the various policies analyzed, we plot simulated outcomes in Figures 4,
5, and 6. Figure 4 display each policy’s short-term production plan in terms of welfare
and recreational removal numbers, while Figure 6 displays production plans in terms of
welfare and female SSB recreational removal weight. Figure 5 plots outcomes of the twofish bag limit policies only, allowing us to decipher trends in the effect of different types
of size restrictions on welfare and recreational fishing mortality while holding bag limits
constant. Relative changes in total and mature female fishing mortality are expressed in
terms of fish numbers and fish weights, respectively, as these metrics correspond to those
used in the striped bass stock assessment for estimating the rate of fishing mortality and
the level of female spawning stock biomass. We interpret these indices as inputs to the
production of welfare such that in each figure, the outermost policies plotted shape the
efficient frontier.

8.1 Simulation Results
Tradeoffs between angler welfare and total recreational removals created by the
twenty-six policies analyzed are displayed in Figure 4. Overall, the figure implies a
positive and linear relationship between the aggregate economic value of the fishery and
recreational removals, with the least- and most-restrictive policies analyzed, A2 (2 fish ≥
20”) and E1 (1 fish 28-36”), predicted to yield the highest and lowest relative increase in
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both outcomes, respectively.

: 20” minimum size
A1: 1 fish ≥ 20”
C1: 1 fish 20-28”
D1: 1 fish 20-36”
A2: 2 fish ≥ 20”
B2: 2 fish 20-28”
C2: 2 fish 20-36”
D2: 1 fish 20-28” &
1 fish > 28”
E2: 1 fish 20-28” &
1 fish > 28 to 36”
F2: 2 fish 20-28”; only
1 fish > 28”
G2: 2 fish 20-28”; only
1 fish > 28 to 36”

: 24” minimum size
B1: 1 fish ≥ 24”
F1: 1 fish 24-32”
G1: 1 fish 24-40”
H2: 2 fish ≥ 24”
I2: 2 fish 24-32”
J2: 2 fish 24-40”
K2: 1 fish 24-32” &
1 fish > 32”
L2: 1 fish 24-32” &
1 fish > 32 to 40”
M2: 2 fish 24-32”; only
1 fish > 32”
N2: 2 fish 24-32”; only
1 fish > 32 to 40”

: 28” minimum size
E1: 1 fish 28-36”
H1: 1 fish 28-44”
O2: 2 fish ≥ 28”
P2: 2 fish 28-36”
Q2: 2 fish 28-44”
R2: 1 fish 28-36” &
1 fish > 36”
S2: 1 fish, 28-36” &
1 fish > 36 to 44”
T2: 2 fish 28-36”; only
1 fish > 36”
U2: 2 fish 28-36”; only
1 fish > 36 to 44”

Figure 4. Predicted changes in welfare and recreational removals under alternative
2015 policies in MA, CT, and RI. Actual 2015 policy of one-fish, 28” or longer
Figure 4. Predicted
in welfare
and recreational removals under alternative 2015 policies in MA, CT, and RI.
used changes
as baseline
policy.

The simulated outcomes of policies H1 (1 fish 28-44”) and E1 (1 fish 28-36”)
provide some insight into the primary research objective of evaluating the short-run
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economic and biological returns to minimum length only versus harvest slot policies in
the recreational Atlantic striped bass fishery. Policies H1 and E1 are the sole policies
analyzed predicted to achieve a reduction in recreational fishing mortality relative to
expected levels under the actual 2015 minimum-length-only policy. Furthermore, despite
slight to moderate relative reductions in angler welfare that are predicted to occur under
both policies, each policy lies along the efficient frontier. If accurate, this suggests that by
implementing these policies, managers could consciously reduce the social value of the
fishery in exchange for an efficient reduction in recreational fishing mortality.
Figure 4 reveals the sensitivity of angler welfare and recreational removals to
changes in the minimum size limit. Across policy types, recreational fishing mortality
increases incrementally from 2015 levels with each incremental four-inch decreases in
the minimum size limit from 28”. These changes are due to concurrent, disproportionate
increases in the rate at which anglers encounter legally harvestable, yet smaller striped
bass that reflect the shape of the 2015 striped bass catch-at-length probability distribution
(Figure 3). Along with this effect and despite the lower nonmarket value of smaller
striped bass compared to larger ones, decreasing the minimum size limit also leads to
aggregate angler welfare gains because the nonmarket value of harvesting a striped bass
is nearly thrice that of releasing the same fish across each of the three size-classes
analyzed. Simulated outcomes of policies A1 (1 fish ≥ 20”) and D1 (1 fish 20-36”) also
exemplify the responsiveness of angler welfare to decreases in the baseline, 28”
minimum size limit. These policies constrain the bag limit to one, yet both are predicted
to produce higher returns to angler welfare than all two-fish, 28” minimum size limit
policies analyzed. Taken together, these results imply that, rather than the relative
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difference in nonmarket value between small, medium, and trophy-sized fish, the effect
of policy action on angler welfare is driven largely by how these actions affect the rate at
which anglers encounter legally harvestable fish.
However, the relative economic efficiency of policy-induced changes in
recreational fishing mortality also depends on rate at which anglers encounter legally
harvestable striped bass. This can be seen in Panels A, B and C of Figure 5, where we
plot the outcomes of policies defined by 20”, 24”, and 28” minimum size limit,
separately. For example, by specifying a wide range of legal harvest sizes and not
constraining the number of small or medium-sized striped bass that may be kept under
the bag limit, minimum length only (A2, H2, and O2), slot-option (F2, M2, T2, G2, N2,
and U2), and wide harvest slot policies (C2, J2, Q2) induce larger relative increases in
recreational removals compared to other types of size restrictions in each of panels A, B,
and C. Hence, for reasons discussed above, these policies also induce relatively large,
positive changes in angler welfare. Conversely, policies defined by differentiated size
restrictions for each striped bass in the bag limit (D2, E2, K2, L2, R2, and S2), while
more expensive in terms of angler welfare compared to minimum length only, slotoption, and wide harvest slot policies, are among the most effective at mitigating
recreational fishing mortality. This finding is intuitive because such policies constrain the
number of frequently-encountered, small and medium-sized striped bass that may be
harvested under the bag limit to one. Policies that fully direct harvest toward smaller fish,
however, are excessively costly to both anglers and fish stocks, as all three narrow slot
limit policies, policies B2 (2 fish 20-28”), I2 (2 fish 24-32”), and P2 (2 fish 28-36”), are
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predicted to inefficiently generate angler welfare from recreational removals.

D

B

E

C

F

% ∆ welfare

% ∆ welfare

% ∆ welfare

A

% ∆ total recreational removals

% ∆ female SSB recreational removals

Figure 5. Predicted changes in welfare and recreational removals (Panels A, B, and C)
and welfare and female SSB recreational removal weight (Panels D, E, and F ) under
alternative 2015 two-fish bag limit policies in MA, CT, and RI. Actual 2015 policy of
one-fish, 28” or longer used as baseline policy.
Figure 5. Predicted changes in welfare and recreational removals (Panels A, B, and C) and welfare and female SSB
recreational removal weight (Panels D, E, and F ) under alternative 2015 two-fish bag limit policies in MA, CT, and
RI.
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Thus, directing effort toward or away from certain striped bass size-classes via
specification of the size limit has important implications for angler welfare and
recreational fishing mortality. When accompanying a one-fish increase in the current
daily bag limit, size limits that allow but do not require both striped bass under the bag
limit to be small or medium-sized will likely induce considerable net gains in angler
welfare that come at the expense of high levels of recreational fishing mortality. Although
the magnitude of change in both outcomes diminishes under size limits that allow anglers
to harvest one small and medium-sized, or one medium- and one trophy-sized striped
bass only, these changes remain efficient relative to expected outcomes of the other types
of size limits analyzed. However, size limits requiring both fish in the bag limit to be
small or medium-sized may lead to an inefficient utilization of the stock.
While Figures 4 and 5 show that several sets of efficient recreational striped bass
fishing regulations are available when proposed policy action intends to influence total
recreational fishing mortality, there exist many fewer efficient policy options when these
actions seek to protect the fecund striped bass population. Figure 6 displays impacts of
the simulated policies on angler welfare and female SSB removals. The number of
policies forming the efficient frontier is reduced dramatically compared to that in Figure
4 and only six policies, each defined by a baseline minimum size limits of 20”, are
predicted to achieve efficient changes in female SSB removal volume relative to the
actual 2015 policy. Across policy types, relative changes in female SSB removals volume
increase in magnitude with each incremental, four-inch increase in the baseline minimum
size limit because such policy adjustments direct harvest toward the mature female
striped bass population. Due to the relatively low rate at which anglers encounter this
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population of striped bass, however, we see no clear relationship between female SSB
removal volume and angler welfare.

: 20” minimum size
A1: 1 fish ≥ 20”
C1: 1 fish 20-28”
D1: 1 fish 20-36”
A2: 2 fish ≥ 20”
B2: 2 fish 20-28”
C2: 2 fish 20-36”
D2: 1 fish 20-28” &
1 fish > 28”
E2: 1 fish 20-28” &
1 fish > 28 to 36”
F2: 2 fish 20-28”; only
1 fish > 28”
G2: 2 fish 20-28”; only
1 fish > 28 to 36”

: 24” minimum size
B1: 1 fish ≥ 24”
F1: 1 fish 24-32”
G1: 1 fish 24-40”
H2: 2 fish ≥ 24”
I2: 2 fish 24-32”
J2: 2 fish 24-40”
K2: 1 fish 24-32” &
1 fish > 32”
L2: 1 fish 24-32” &
1 fish > 32 to 40”
M2: 2 fish 24-32”; only
1 fish > 32”
N2: 2 fish 24-32”; only
1 fish > 32 to 40”

: 28” minimum size
E1: 1 fish 28-36”
H1: 1 fish 28-44”
O2: 2 fish ≥ 28”
P2: 2 fish 28-36”
Q2: 2 fish 28-44”
R2: 1 fish 28-36” &
1 fish > 36”
S2: 1 fish, 28-36” &
1 fish > 36 to 44”
T2: 2 fish 28-36”; only
1 fish > 36”
U2: 2 fish 28-36”; only
1 fish > 36 to 44”

Figure 6. Predicted changes in welfare and female SSB recreational removal weight
under alternative 2015 policies in MA, CT, and RI. Actual 2015 policy of one-fish,
28” or longer used as baseline policy.
Figure 6. Predicted changes in welfare and female SSB recreational removal weight under alternative 2015 policies
in MA, CT, and RI.
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Assessing the incentives faced by anglers can uncover the important tradeoffs
between welfare and conservation created by minimum length only and harvest slot
restrictions, as exemplified by the outcomes of policies G1 (1 fish 24-40”) and O2 (2 fish
≥ 28”). The model predicts the two policies yielding roughly the same relative impact to
angler welfare and total recreational removals, as shown in Figure 4. Yet Figure 6 shows
a marked divergence in each policy’s relative effect on female SSB removal volume.
While policy O2 is predicted to induce a 38% increase, policy G1 is predicted to achieve
a 30% decrease in female SSB recreational removal volume relative to the simulated
outcome of the actual 2015 policy. These differential impacts reflect the interface
between regulations and the biological characteristics that govern the natural growth and
reproductive processes of Atlantic striped bass, thus highlighting the importance of
accounting for such characteristics when proposed policy action intends to protect the
fecund population.
As before, we plot the impacts to angler welfare and female SSB removals across
each set of two-fish bag limit policies separately in panel D, E and F of Figure 5. These
panels reveal the important influence of minimum and maximum size limits on female
SSB removal volume. Policy O2 (2 fish ≥ 28”), for example, is predicted to yield a 40%
increase in female SSB removal volume relative to the simulated outcome of the actual
2015 policy. But the magnitude of this relative change dampens with each incremental,
four-inch decrease in the minimum size limit, as policies H2 (2 fish ≥ 24”) and A2 (2 fish
≥ 20”) are predicted to achieve a 22% and 2% relative increase female SSB removal
volume, respectively. We find even larger differential impacts to female SSB removals
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when comparing changes that occur under policy O2, H2, and A2 with each policy’s
narrow harvest slot analogue: policy P2 (2 fish 28-36”), I2 (2 fish 24-32”), and B2 (2 fish
20-28”), are predicted to achieve a -14%, -42%, and -59% relative change in female SSB
removal volume, respectively. Thus, whereas panels A, B, and C reveal narrow harvest
slot policies leading to inefficient outcomes in terms of welfare and total recreational
removals, here we find that, compared to others in panels D, E, and F, these policies are
both efficient and among the most effective at protecting fecund striped bass. Finally, in
each of panels D and E, policies D2 (1 fish 20-28” & 1 fish > 28”) and E2 (1 fish 20-28”
& 1 fish > 28-36”), and policies K2 (1 fish 24-32” & 1 fish > 32”) and L2 (1 fish 24-32”
& 1 fish > 32-40”) are shown to inefficiently generate welfare from female SSB removal
volume. By requiring one fish in the two-fish bag limit to be medium- or trophy-sized,
these policies direct effort toward the fecund population. Given the relatively low
frequency at which angler encounter this population, these policies provide little returns
to angler welfare.
Figures 4, 5, and 6 illuminate the important, short-run biological ramifications of
decreasing the current 28” minimum size limit or implementing harvest restrictions on
medium- and trophy-sized striped bass. These policy adjustments effectively protect
fecund striped bass and are likely to improve the population’s spawning potential, at least
in the short-run. But such adjustments are conducive to high rates of recreational fishing
mortality for small- to medium-sized striped bass. This may yield adverse impacts to the
stock structure in the medium- to long-run. While outside the scope of this study,
integrating a biological growth model into the simulation would allow us to evaluate the
medium- and long-run stock implications of recreational Atlantic striped bass fishing
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policy.

9 Conclusion
In this study, we evaluated the short-run economic and biological impact of
different types of recreational Atlantic striped bass fishing policy. We parameterized an
aggregate demand model with the results of 2016 choice experiment survey to assess the
relative impact of alternative 2015 policies to angler welfare, angler participation, and
total and mature female recreational fishing mortality in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and
Rhode Island. We selected as alternatives to the actual 2015 policy of one fish, 28” or
longer, several one- and two-fish bag limit policies that varied in specification of the
minimum and maximum size limit. We modelled trip-level angler behavior as a function
of trip cost and the number of small, medium-sized, and trophy-sized striped bass kept
and released. Met through incorporating these size-specific harvest and release preference
parameters into the aggregate demand model, one research objective was to examine the
economic and biological impact of full and partial harvest restrictions on trophy-sized
striped bass that to-date have not been considered jointly in the policymaking process.
Angler welfare was found to be highly responsive to changes in the minimum size
limit. Our model predicts that incremental, four-inch decreases in the minimum size limit
from 28” induce considerable gains to angler welfare levels. These gains stem primarily
from anglers encountering and harvesting legal-sized striped bass more frequently, hence
such policy actions also generate high levels of recreational removals. Implementing size
limits that fully or partially restrict harvest of medium- or trophy-sized striped bass were
found to be effective at protecting the fecund population of striped bass. While one might

86

expect such harvest restrictions inducing considerable adverse impacts to angler welfare,
we find some instances in which these costs are low relative to the short-run stock
benefits they may provide.
We found that a wide range of efficient policies are available when the primary
purpose of proposed policy action across the studied region is to control total recreational
fishing mortality. When proposed management action is intended to curtail mature female
recreational fishing mortality, however, proposed policy action that does not account for
potential economic consequences can lead to inefficient outcomes, as exemplified by
several of the policies analyzed lying inside the efficient frontier of welfare and female
SSB recreational removals volume. This finding illuminates the practicality of assessing
angler responses to regulatory stimuli to select efficient and effective policies,
particularly when fisheries managers seeks to balance socioeconomic goals with multiple
conservation objectives.
We assessed the potential economic and biological tradeoffs that are created by
recreational striped bass fishing regulations such that they can be considered during the
policymaking process. Yet anglers’ decision-making processes is complex, and thus it
was necessary to make several assumptions that potentially introduce bias in our results.
First, we assumed that striped bass anglers harvest the first legal-size fish encountered up
to the bag limit, but it is likely that some selectively harvest fish. Anglers might exhibit
such behavior in response to encountering a school or “blitz” of striped bass while
fishing, while others may simply prefer certain size-classes of striped bass to others.
Second, we assumed a constant, 0.25 rate of voluntary release, but the actual rate may
vary with the bag limit or the size of catch . Additionally, we specify a linear-in-catch
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utility function based on the attributes and levels selected for the experimental design.
However, diminishing marginal utility of harvesting and release striped bass is perhaps a
more accurate depiction of returns to angler utility. In the future, we hope to reassess the
validity of these assumptions and update our analysis appropriately.
Our study is also limited by its relatively narrow geographical and temporal
scope. We focus on one sub-region of the fishery but expanding our analysis to the coast
wide fishery is the natural next step in this line of research. Additionally, while we
evaluate the short-run effects of regulations on total and female SSB removals, these
outcomes may differ in the medium- and long-run; changes in total recreational removals,
for example, may be endogenous to changes in female SSB. By integrating a biological
growth model into the simulation procedure, we could consider these dynamics and
assess the future stock impacts of recreational striped bass fishing regulations.
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CHAPTER 3

SUSTAINABILITY AND TOURISM: THE EFFECT OF THE UNITED STATES’
FIRST OFFSHORE WIND FARM ON THE VACATION RENTAL MARKET
by
Andrew Carr-Harris and Corey Lang

is submitted to Resource and Energy Economics

1 Introduction
Although U.S. offshore wind currently accounts for only 0.03% of the 96.5
gigawatts of installed wind capacity in the country (American Wind Energy Association
2018), future growth in wind generation will likely be more concentrated offshore. The
political climate is evolving with federal policies that encourage wind power
development and with aggressive, state-level renewable energy objectives to source wind
power offshore.19 The industry itself reached an important milestone on December 12,
2016 when America’s first and to date only offshore wind farm (OSWF), the five turbine,
30 megawatt (MW) Block Island Wind Farm (BIWF), began generating electricity.
Partially due to the success of BIWF, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut
recently awarded contracts for 800, 400, and 200 MW OSWFs that are expected to be

19

Massachusetts requires state electricity providers to procure 1,600 MW of offshore wind capacity by
2027 (Massachusetts 2016); New York has committed to develop up to 2,400 MW of offshore wind power
by 2030 (NYSERDA 2016); Maryland recently awarded two offshore wind projects the right to receive
Offshore Wind Renewable Energy Credits as part of the state’s Offshore Wind Energy Act of 2013
(Maryland 2013); New Jersey’s governor signed an Executive Order on January 31, 2018 to promote the
development of 3,500 MWs of offshore wind energy generation by 2030 (P. D. Murphy 2018).
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operational by 2021, 2023, and 2023, respectively, assuming permits are granted. Other
OSWF projects along the U.S. east coast are also forthcoming, including New York’s
recently approved 90-MW South Fork Wind Farm that could be operational in 2022 and
Maryland’s 120-MW OSWF project, Skipjack Wind, whose offshore construction will
likely begin in 2021 with generation set for 2022.
Despite the progress, there are several impediments to widespread growth of U.S.
offshore wind energy. The high levelized cost of producing offshore wind energy makes
it difficult to compete with other energy sources without subsidies.20 At the federal level,
the absence of federally mandated offshore wind energy goals, the short-term and
inconsistent nature of production tax credits, and the imposition of lease and royalty fee
payments can discourage development (Portman et al. 2009). At the local level,
community members and other stakeholder groups have fervently opposed proposed
offshore wind energy facilities, as exemplified by failed development plans of Cape Wind
off the coast of Massachusetts. OSWFs have been opposed for several reasons, ranging
from the impacts to marine fauna, the loss of recreational and commercial fishing
grounds, the environmental and human safety risks of ship-turbine collisions, and the
effects on nearby property values.21 Snyder and Kaiser (2009) discuss several of the
ecological and socioeconomic arguments used in favor of and against offshore wind
power.

20

Estimates suggest that the levelized cost of offshore wind is among the highest of all sources of energy
production (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2018a).
21
The extent to which these claims materialize depend on site-specific factors, hence growing with the
industry is a body of case studies investigating the ecological (Bergström et al. 2014; Lindeboom et al.
2011) and socioeconomic (Jensen et al. 2018) impacts of OSWF installations. In some sense, however,
whether there is basis in the academic literature for these claims is irrelevant; valid or not, these claims can
impede OSWF development.
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In coastal communities, one of the most commonly voiced concerns is that OSWF
development will deter tourists. Rudolph (2014) examines how stakeholders rationalized
this apprehension during the planning phase of two OSWFs in Germany and Scotland.
Opponents invoked several lines of reasoning for why the two OSWFs might detract for
the area’s desirability and therefore hurt the tourism industry, including that the wind
farms would visually disturb the seascape, erode the area’s cultural character and identity,
or interfere with recreational activities like boating and fishing. Except for the latter,
these concerns seem valid in the context of American OSWF development based on
suggestive findings from a few recent studies (Parsons and Firestone 2018; Firestone et
al. 2018; ten Brink and Dalton 2018). However, there exists no empirical evidence to
substantiate the overall claim that OSWFs negatively affect tourism. Filling this research
gap is critical because local conflicts about the impact of OSWFs on tourism can have
important implications for where, and how far offshore, proposed offshore wind power
facilities are located.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the effect of offshore wind development on
tourism by examining the effect of the BIWF on the vacation rental market. The BIWF
stands within Rhode Island state waters, approximately three miles off the coast of Block
Island, and is visible from any location on Block Island that has a direct view, as well as
from ferry rides to and from the mainland. We use data from AirBnb over the period
October 2014 to December 2017, which spans before and after construction of the BIWF.
Our method is rooted in a hedonic valuation framework, and we estimate a difference-indifferences (DD) model using three nearby tourist destinations as controls. Our
specification includes property fixed effects to mitigate omitted variable bias, as well as
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temporal variables that control for seasonality and trends in the vacation rental market.
Using this modelling approach, we focus purely on understanding visitor preferences for
the BIWF and leave evaluating impacts to permanent residents for future work.
The model yields an island-wide treatment effect, which is most relevant for
assessing tourism impacts in this context for two reasons. First, there are several impacts
of the BIWF’s presence, like the creation of new recreational fishing opportunities or the
symbolization of progress toward clean energy, that are unrelated to visibility but might
nonetheless stimulate overnight visits to the island. Second, the small geographical size
of Block Island—about 10 square miles—allows for easy access to the best views of the
turbines from any location on the island; hence, overnight visitors need not rent
properties that are in direct viewshed to experience the wind farm. 22 Moreover, it is likely
that few Block Island AirBnb properties in our sample are in direct viewshed of the wind
farm.
Block Island offers an excellent setting for examining visitor preferences for the
BIWF because the tourism industry is the backbone of the local economy. While home to
about 1,000 permanent residents, Block Island can host up to 20,000 visitors per day
during peak summer season (New Shoreham Planning Board 2016). Thus, by
establishing a baseline and examining post-construction movements in the vacation rental
market relative to other tourist destinations, we infer how tourists, in aggregate, respond

22

To put this in perspective, visitors can traverse almost the entire island on a 16-mile bike loop that stops
at the BIWF and all 12 of its other major sites.
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to the wind farm.23 If the overall tourist experience changes because of the BIWF, then
the vacation rental market will change accordingly.
There are two noteworthy features of this analysis. First, our study evaluates
multiple margins of adjustment, which contrasts with many previous hedonic studies
applied to the vacation rental market that evaluate only price adjustments. 24 We estimate
our model using five different dependent variables: booked price, number of nights
available, number of nights reserved, occupancy rate, and revenue. Because the speed at
which vacation rental prices respond to environmental shocks is unknown, 25 it is
important to evaluate other margins of adjustment that may be more elastic. Furthermore,
rental market adjustments may differ in the short-run (1 year) and the long-run (3-5
years). The price and availability of a rental property should be codetermined in the longrun. In the short-run, however, there may be a divergence in the various rental market
metrics because landlords do not immediately respond to environmental shocks, but
renters do. If this were the case, we would expect to see changes in the number of booked
nights, occupancy rates, and revenues, but not in prices nor availability.
Second, our study is the first to empirically test the effect of offshore wind farms
on tourism within a revealed preference framework. Other studies, reviewed in Section 2,
have evaluated preferences for OSWFs using stated preference approaches, but these data

23

Almost certainly, there are tourists that are attracted by and repulsed by the BIWF and everywhere in
between. Our measures are aggregate, and we cannot distinguish preferences of individuals or even the
proportion of tourists falling into different categories.
24
Applications include hedonic pricing of: tourist activity and online reputation (Perles Ribes et al. 2018),
rural recreation amenities (Nelson 2010), seascape amenities (J. M. Hamilton 2007), smoking prohibitions
(Benjamin et al. 2001), access to coastal beaches (Taylor and Smith 2000), and land-uses in Spain (BilbaoTerol et al. 2017), Belgium (Vanslembrouck et al. 2005) and France (LeGoffe 2000)
25
To the best of our knowledge, no study has explored the dynamics of vacation rental property price
responsiveness. While intuition may suggest that more transactions would lead to faster price changes,
(Lang 2015) finds that amenity changes are capitalized more quickly for owner occupied housing than
rental housing.
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can be biased for many reasons, including recall error, motivated reasoning, or just
outright lying. Especially in the case of renewable energy development, support for
which can be tied to a person’s political ideology (Kennedy 2017), results may be biased
as respondents seek to influence outcomes. Biases in this manner have been documented
with stated preference measures in similarly politically contentious issues of gun control
and climate change (Kahan et al. 2017; Goebbert et al. 2012; Howe and Leiserowitz
2013; Lang 2014).
Our results suggest that construction of the BIWF led to significant increase in
nightly reservations, occupancy rates, and monthly revenues for properties in Block
Island during the peak-tourism months of July and August. Specifically, we estimate that,
during each peak-tourism month of July and August following construction, the BIWF
caused a seven-night increase in reservations, a nineteen percentage point increase in
occupancy rates, and a $3,490 increase in revenue for AirBnb properties in Block Island
relative to AirBnb properties in control cities. In other months, treatments effects are
statistically insignificant, though results are often consistent with positive effects. We find
no significant movements in nightly price, despite this being likely the easiest margin of
adjustment. Overall, there is little within-property, temporal variation in prices,
suggesting prices are “sticky”, and that landlords are experiencing changes to other
margins of the vacation rental market. While specific to this context, these findings
mitigate concerns about negative effects of OSFWs on local tourism.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review relevant literature.
Section 3 discusses the data and methodology. We provide results in Section 4 and we
conclude in Section 5.
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2 Literature review
Our research is grounded in hedonic price theory, which postulates that the overall
price of a good is determined by the part-worth contribution from each observable
attribute (Rosen 1974). Hedonic analysis is among the most popular revealed preference
approaches for evaluating preferences for non-market goods and environmental
amenities. Applied to a context of residential housing prices, the hedonic pricing method
(HPM) relates sale prices of housing transactions to a vector of property attributes that
typically include intrinsic, locational, and environmental characteristics. Intrinsic
characteristics are factors such as the size of the house, the size of the lot, the number of
bathrooms, and the number of bedrooms. Locational characteristics can include the
condition of nearby homes, the crime rate, and quality of schools. In the field of
environmental economics, regressors of interest are one or more environmental
characteristic that describes a non-market amenity, such as air quality, adjacent open
space, and ocean views.
HPM has been applied to estimate the implicit value of a wide range of amenities
and disamenities related to energy extraction and production: power plants (Davis 2011),
fracking (Muehlenbachs et al. 2015; Boslett et al. 2016), air quality (Chay and
Greenstone 2005; Bento et al. 2015); and transmission lines (Hamilton and Schwann
1995). Several studies use hedonic methods to infer the external cost of onshore wind
turbine facilities. Those that employ a quasi-experimental identification strategy
generally find insignificant or slightly negative property value impacts from turbine
proximity (Dröes and Koster 2016; Hoen and Atkinson-Palombo 2017; Hoen 2014) or
turbine view (Gibbons 2015; Lang et al. 2014). However, two recent papers suggest
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larger housing price devaluations. Sunak and Madlener (2016) estimate a 9-14% decrease
in values for properties “extremely” to “moderately” visually disturbed by wind turbines.
Heintzelman et al. (2017) analyze upstate New York properties and find that the value of
homes with a full or partial view of a turbine were reduced by about 17% following
turbine construction. Jensen et al. (2018) is the only study to date that estimates property
value impacts from offshore wind energy facilities within a hedonic valuation framework.
Their results indicate that neither of two Danish OSWFs under study had any significant
effect on the prices of primary or secondary homes.26 While the bulk of HPM onshore
wind studies indicate zero to negative price effect, this may not carry over to the vacation
rental market because valuation may be a function of the time horizon spent around the
turbines.27 For example, utility gains from seeing the turbines for the first time or over the
course of a couple of days of vacation may outweigh the loss of unfettered ocean views,
but for a permanent resident, 10 years of lost views may outweigh everything else and
lead to net utility losses.
Although HPM applications to offshore wind are limited, there is a substantial
body of economic literature examining preferences for and tourism impacts of OSWFs.
Most of these studies employ stated preference approaches, which use questionnaire
responses to infer preferences and values. These approaches are appealing in the context
of offshore wind development because observational data is limited or, as it was in the
U.S. prior to the BIWF, non-existent. Yet the novelty of offshore wind development also
raises concerns about the validity of evaluating its external cost using stated preference

26

The two offshore wind farms under study in Jensen et al. (2018) consist of 72 and 90 turbines and are
located approximately six and two miles offshore, respectively.
27
More broadly, some amenities (e.g., local school quality) are expected to be reflected in the price of
nearby housing but not in the price of nearby vacation rentals, and vice versa.
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data. These data may be affected by the degree of respondent familiarity and experience
with the good or amenity in question (Boyle et al. 1993; Cameron and Englin 1997),
which is limited when it comes to OSWFs; nearly all the existing nonmarket valuation
studies of OSWFs analyze stated preference data generated by individuals who lack any
experience with this type of environmental amenity. Observational data, if representative
of the population of interest, is not subject to this potential source of bias nor others, like
sample selection bias, protest and strategic response bias, and hypothetical bias that may
threaten valid inference. Moreover, it is generally argued that individuals’ behavior in the
market can convey information about their core preferences for nonmarket goods and
amenities. We therefore believe our revealed preference approach to illumining the
socioeconomic impacts of OSWFs is a critical departure from the current body of
literature. Nonetheless, it is important to review the existing economic literature that uses
stated preference methods to infer such impacts. This stream of literature can be
classified into two groups: the first estimates the implicit cost of visual disturbances from
OSWFs and the second estimates the impact of these facilities on aggregate recreational
visitation and beach use.
With the exception of a few studies that find mixed preferences for OSWFs
(Fooks et al. 2017a; Westerberg et al. 2013), the first group of stated preference studies
generally reveal OSWFs to be an environmental disamenity. These studies find that the
visual disturbance from an OSWF located near the shore can generate considerable
welfare losses for individuals, but these losses diminish as the distance of the OSWF
from shore increases (Ladenburg and Dubgaard 2009, 2007; Krueger et al. 2011; Landry
et al. 2012). Among this group, our study is perhaps most closely related to the work of
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Lutzeyer et al. (2018), who evaluate potential responses of the vacation rentals market to
OSWF development. They survey recent renters of oceanfront and ocean-view vacation
properties in North Carolina and assess their preferences for future rentals with different
utility-scale wind farm configurations using a choice experiment.28 For all visible turbine
configurations, utility parameter estimates are negative and significant, which suggests
that this population of renters, on average, strongly prefers unobstructed views of
seascape. This result is broadly consistent with Fooks et al. (2017b), who, using an
incentive compatible elicitation mechanism, find that tourists prefer hotel rooms without
a view of an onshore wind turbine to those with a view of a turbine. Lutzeyer et al. (2018)
also estimate utility parameters using a latent class model. These results reveal substantial
heterogeneity in preferences across respondent groups, ranging from repulsion for all
visible turbine configurations to indifference and even attraction to certain visible
configurations, relative to the status-quo of no visible turbines. However, positive utility
estimates from this model never translate to statistically significant willingness-to-pay
values for moving OSWF turbines closer to shore.
The second group of stated preference studies are less conclusive about the impact
of OSWFs. Landry et al. (2012) estimate an aggregate demand model to assess the
behavioral response of North Carolina residents to a widespread offshore wind energy
development scenario: 100-turbine OSWFs located one mile off the coast of all major
beach destinations in North Carolina. They find indistinguishable differences in the
expected number of annual beach trips between the hypothetical windfarm scenario and
the current, no-windfarm scenario. Most recently, Parsons and Firestone (2018) employ a

28

The most intrusive visible OSWF configuration has 144 turbines and is located five miles offshore; the
least intrusive visible OSWF configuration has 64 turbines and is located 18 miles offshore.
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contingent behavior web survey to evaluate beachgoer perceptions about offshore wind
development and behavioral responses to OSWFs at beaches along the U.S. east coast.
Consistent with the findings from other studies, theirs suggest that wind farms located
close to the shore, within about 13 miles, will lead to reductions in beach trips and
economic losses in form of foregone beachgoer welfare.
One complication with accurately predicting the net impact of OSWFs on coastal
recreational is the population of recreators may change. Parsons and Firestone (2018)
estimate that, for an average beach, the first OSWF could generate nearly 13 million
additional “curiosity trips” over the course of five to ten years from people who would
not otherwise visit that beach. These estimates are not included in their main results, but
the authors note that, if realized, an influx of curiosity trips of this magnitude would
likely lead to net positive effects for many beaches. Other studies have also evidenced the
potential for new OSWFs to attract tourists. In Lilley et al. (2010)’s intercept survey of
Delaware beachgoers, 66% of out-of-state residents indicated being somewhat or very
likely to visit a new or different beach at least once to see a 200-turbine OSWF located
approximately six miles from the beach. In Firestone et al. (2009)’s mail survey, 84% of
Delaware residents expressed being somewhat or very likely to visit a new or different
beach at least once to see a 500-turbine OSWF located six miles from the beach.
It is difficult to draw conclusions about the projected impact of OSWFs on coastal
recreation given the findings uncovered across the relevant stated preference literature.
People prefer seascape horizons that are uncontaminated by wind turbines, but it remains
unclear if and to what extent their behavior will change in response to OSWFs, as well as
how many will be attracted to new OSWFs. Furthermore, many of the studies mentioned
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above capture preferences prior to OSWF installation, and preferences and support may
change once OSWFs are installed. For example, Firestone et al. (2018) survey residents
of Block Island, near-coastal Rhode Island, and coastal Rhode Island both before and
after operation of the BIWF to understand changes in and determinants of support for the
BIWF. Compared to those in the pre-installation period, levels of support in the postoperation period increased across all three strata, yet only among the coastal Rhode
Island stratum were these changes in opinion found to be statistically significant. The
authors also find that a respective 83% and 78% of Block Island and non-Block Island
residents who saw the BIWF “[liked] the way the turbines looked”, and this factor most
strongly determined current support for the BIWF. In sum, the impacts of OSWFs on
coastal recreation and tourism remains ambiguous. A concrete understanding of these
impacts is vital for managers and developers of U.S. offshore wind resources to
accurately assess externalities of OSWF development.

3 Data and Methods
In this section, we discuss the study context and data in relation to the
econometric modelling strategy, sample construction, and identifying assumptions.
Section 3.1 provides a timeline of events that guides our definition of the treatment
period. Section 3.2 gives an overview of the data. We specify the econometric models in
Section 3.3. Construction of the sample is outlined in Section 3.4 and sample
characteristics are described in Section 3.5. Finally, Section 3.6 discusses the assumptions
behind the DD estimator and potential threats to identification.
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3.1 Timeline of Events
First established in 2004, Rhode Island’s Renewable Energy Standard (RES)
requires that 38.5% of the state’s electricity come from renewable resources by the end of
2035. RES targets began in 2007, requiring electricity providers to source 3% of their
retail sales from renewable resources, with incremental increases in target levels each
year. To help meet the goals of the RES, in 2008 Rhode Island selected Deepwater Wind
as the state’s preferred offshore wind developer and initiated the Ocean Spatial Area
Management Plan (Ocean SAMP), a marine zoning plan that provides management
recommendations for developing and protecting Rhode Island’s marine resources
(Smythe and McCann 2018). Approved in 2011, the Ocean SAMP identified the waters
off the southern coast of Block Island as having the highest wind speeds and lowest
relative costs of development within RI state waters, and thus deemed this area viable for
offshore renewable energy development. The Ocean SAMP designated this 13 squaremile area, which extends east to southwest of Block Island, a Renewable Energy Zone
(REZ) (Coastal Resources Managment Council 2010).
Following approval of the Ocean SAMP, Deepwater Wind surveyed the sea floor
within the REZ to determine potential locations for the turbine foundations and the two
underwater cables, one connecting Block Island to the BIWF and one connecting Block
Island to mainland Rhode Island.29 Deepwater Wind opted to locate the turbine array
within southeast portion of the REZ to minimize environmental impacts and costs

29

A fiber optic cable for high speed-internet access was included in the undersea cable connecting Block
Island to mainland Rhode Island. Block Island renters having better internet connection due to the
construction of the BIWF may lead to identification problems. However, our data cover the period when
the necessary on-island infrastructure was not yet built, hence renters experienced no change in internet
service quality due to the BIWF over the course of the study period.
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(Deepwater Wind 2012). They submitted state and federal permit applications for the
wind farm in 2012 and received the final permit needed to advance the project in
September 2014. In March 2015, Deepwater Wind fully financed the BIWF project by
securing more than $290 million in loans.
Offshore construction of the BIWF project commenced in the summer of 2015.
By the end of the 2015 offshore construction season, in early December, turbine
foundations that protrude slightly from the water had been set in place. At this point,
scheduled strategically to avoid overlap with the tourist season, onshore construction
activities began and lasted through spring of 2016. The 2016 offshore construction season
started in early August and ended soon after, on August 18, 2016, when Deepwater Wind
installed the fifth and final 600-foot-tall, 6 MW wind turbine. On December 12, 2016,
after several weeks of testing, the BIWF began providing wind-generated electricity to
mainland Rhode Island. Block Island was connected to the BIWF’s electrical grid in May
of 2017, prior to which four diesel generators sourced the island’s electricity needs. Now,
because Block Island relies primarily on the electricity generated from the BIWF, these
diesel generators operate only occasionally, which reduces air and noise pollution on one
part of the island.
Our identification strategy involves comparing pre- and post-treatment rental
activities, thus it is necessary to define when the treatment period begins, which is a bit
ambiguous. In our case, the most important determinant of treatment-induced rental
market adjustments is public awareness of the BIWF, so that tourists can take the
information into account when deciding where to visit. The natural candidates are the
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dates of completed construction and grid connection. 30 We choose to define treatment as
completed construction because that is when the turbines are visible, but the Appendix
discusses results from models that use an alternative treatment date defined by grid
connection.
An additional event, unrelated to BIWF, is necessary to discuss. In March 2017,
corporate representatives from AirBnb visited Block Island and Nantucket Island to
increase the number of AirBnb listings in those locations. They were particularly focused
on encouraging owners of existing boutique hotel and bed-and-breakfast properties to use
the AirBnb platform. Their visit to Block Island seems to have had the intended effect
because beginning in March 2017, the data reveal an influx of new Block Island AirBnb
properties,31 most of which are boutique hotels or bed-and-breakfasts. This event
motivates some key modelling decisions, and we discuss its relevance in more detail in
Section 3.4.

3.2 Data
AirBnb is an online hospitality service that provides people with short-term
lodging options from hosts seeking to rent out their rooms or properties. We obtained
AirBnb rental data from AirDNA, a company that collects publicly available information
about individual properties from the AirBnb website. AirDNA currently tracks the
performance of roughly four million AirBnb listings worldwide through an automated
scraping procedure that occurs every three days. The data cover a 39-month period

30

A simple Google Trends query for “Block Island Wind Farm” confirms these milestones as important, as
the weeks including August 18, 2016 and December 12, 2016 are the two highest points of search interest.
31
Figure A4 in the Appendix displays this graphically.
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starting in October 2014, when AirDNA began collecting this information, to December
2017. Both daily and monthly data is provided, but we estimate our model using the
monthly-aggregated data to ease interpretation of results. 32
The dataset contains two important types of information on each property: rental
activities and property characteristics. Rental activities include nightly rates, monthly
revenues, and whether nights are reserved, available but not reserved, or blocked by the
host and thus unavailable for reservation. We use this information to generate our
dependent variables. Property characteristics include city, number of bedrooms, number
of bathrooms, minimum length of stay, maximum number of guests allowed, cleaning
fee, extra people fee, security deposit, listing type (private room, entire place, etc.), and
property type. There are a variety of property types included in the data and we aggregate
them into four categories: bed-and-breakfasts, apartments, guest suites, and houses.
Approximate latitude and longitude coordinates are also included, and we use these
variables to calculate Euclidean distance to the coast. In Figure A5 in the Appendix, we
plot these approximate locations to ascertain the visibility of the BIWF from our sample
of AirBnb properties. Also included in Figure A5 is a visibility map of the area
surrounding Block Island, adapted from Griffin et al. (2015). The figure suggests that few
Block Island properties are in direct viewshed of the wind farm.
We estimate econometric models using five different dependent variables. These
variables are measured at the monthly level and are defined as follows: (1) Available
nights, which equals the sum of reserved and available nights, (2) Reservation nights,
which equals the number of nights a property was booked, (3) Occupancy rate, which is

32

We obtain qualitatively similar results when we estimate our model using the daily data.
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equal to Reservation nights divided by Available nights, (4) Average booked rate, which
equals the average price of booked nights, and (5) Revenue, which is equal to total
monthly AirBnb revenue.33 Because owners determine directly the number of nights their
property is available and its price, short-run changes in Available nights and Average
booked rate might capture supply-side responses. Conversely, short-run changes in
Reservation nights, Revenue, and Occupancy rate may be more representative of
consumer demand. While these variables are of course related and determined by many
of the same forces, our goal is to understand different margins of adjustment and get a
broad picture of the whole story of how the vacation rental market responds to an
environmental shock.
Our method is rooted in hedonic valuation; however, our data are not the standard
property sales typically used with this method. As a first step to build confidence in our
data and as exploration of implicit prices in the vacation rental market, we estimate a
basic, cross-sectional hedonic regression with log(Average booked rate) on the left-hand
side and property characteristics on the right-hand side. We use all observations occurring
before construction of the BIWF.
The estimated coefficients in Table 17 generally follow the direction of a priori
expectations, and thus bolster our confidence that valuable signals can be recovered from
the data. Properties with greater numbers of bedrooms or bathrooms command higher
rental rates. Those within 0.1 miles of the coast come with a substantial, roughly 30%
rental premium. A one-person increase in the maximum number of guests allowed to stay

33

Average booked rate and Revenue also include a per-visit cleaning fee, but additional fees charged for
extra people are not visible on the AirBnb website and are therefore not included in the calculation of these
variables.
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at a property increases average booked rates by about 5%. After controlling for other
rental rate determinants, rental rates for houses and bed-and-breakfasts are not
statistically different than rental rates for apartments; guest suites, however, are booked at
13% lower average price than apartments. Compared to Block Island properties, rental
rates are more than 40% lower in Narragansett, RI and Westerly, RI, and about 19%
higher in Nantucket, MA. Average booked rates are highest relative to January in July,
August, and September.
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Table 17. Determinants of nightly booked rates: OLS estimation results.

Table 17. Determinants of nightly booked rates: OLS estimation results.

Variable
Bedrooms
Bathrooms
Within 0.1 miles of coast (1=yes)
Minimum stay
Maximum number of guests allowed
Security deposit ($100’s)
Extra people fee ($100’s)
House
Bed and breakfast
Guest suite
Nantucket
Narragansett
Westerly
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
2015
2016
Observations
R-squared

Dependent Variable:
log(Average booked rate)
Standard
Coefficient
error
0.101***
(0.039)
0.126***
(0.035)
0.274***
(0.059)
0.007
(0.006)
0.049***
(0.017)
0.024***
(0.007)
0.040
(0.041)
0.018
(0.059)
0.057
(0.072)
-0.131*
(0.075)
0.188**
(0.091)
-0.436***
(0.084)
-0.480***
(0.106)
-0.017
(0.094)
-0.134
(0.089)
0.131
(0.081)
0.309***
(0.081)
0.287***
(0.082)
0.408***
(0.082)
0.406***
(0.082)
0.444***
(0.090)
0.300***
(0.094)
0.256**
(0.101)
0.312***
(0.082)
0.108
(0.070)
0.254***
(0.084)
2,188
0.701

Notes: Sample contains property-months with at least one reservation night and
is restricted to observations occurring prior to September 2016. Standard errors
are clustered at the property level. *,**, and *** represent significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively.

3.3 Econometric Models
We use a DD modeling strategy to examine the effect of the BIWF on the
vacation rental market. We compare rental transactions in Block Island, the treated group,
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to other tourist destinations, the control group, before and after construction of the wind
farm. Control locations are Narragansett, RI, Westerly, RI, and Nantucket, MA. These
cities are comparable to Block Island in that they are highly desirable summer vacation
and tourist destinations in Southern New England. Figure 7 shows a map of all four cities
and the approximate location of the BIWF. Narragansett and Westerly are located on the
southern coast of mainland Rhode Island, approximately 10 miles from Block Island. 34
Nantucket is located approximately 20 miles off the coast of Cape Cod, Massachusetts
and, like Block Island, offers a unique island experience to visitors. A standard DD
equation applied to this context can be written as:
𝑦

= 𝛽 (𝐵𝐼 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 )
+ 𝛽 𝐵𝐼 + 𝛽 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑋′ 𝜃 + 𝜀 ,

where 𝑦

(1)

is the outcome variable for property 𝑖 in city 𝑐 during year-month 𝑡, 𝐵𝐼 is a

dummy variable that equals one if a property is in Block Island, and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
is a dummy variable that equals one if an observation occurred during the postconstruction period. Although construction of the BIWF was completed on August 18,
2016, we specify the post-construction period to begin on September 2016 because our
data are aggregated to the monthly level. 35 Property characteristics are contained in 𝑋 .
Finally, 𝜀

is the error term. We cluster errors at the property level to allow correlation

across time within individual properties. The difference in rental market outcomes
between Block Island and control groups cities, and between the pre- and post-treatment

34

The BIWF can be seen from a few locations on the southern portion of Narragansett. From these
locations, however, the turbines appear as an extremely small cluster on the horizon and can be perceived
only under certain weather and sky conditions.
35
In the Appendix, we provide results from models that exclude August 2016 from the sample given this
treatment status uncertainty. These results are very similar to our main results.
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period, are measured by 𝛽 and 𝛽 , respectively. 𝛽 is the coefficient of interest, and it
measures the differential change in rental market outcomes from the pre-treatment period
for Block Island properties relative to changes in rental market outcomes for properties in
Narragansett, Westerly, and Nantucket.

Figure 7. Geographic location of treated and control locations and the BIWF turbines.
Figure 7. Geographic location of treated and control locations and the BIWF turbines.

Equation (1) is a standard DD model, but we chose to strengthen it with several
sets of fixed-effects and other control variables. First, we include property fixed effects
that purge from the error term any unobservable time-invariant factors, such as nearby
amenities and online appeal, that both affect rental market outcomes and differ across
individual properties. Second, we include year-month fixed effects that capture regionwide temporal variation in rental activity. Such variation is particularly large in this
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context because of the highly seasonal nature of the vacation rentals market. Third, we
include city-specific time trends to control for rental market trends at the city level. These
variables are critical for disentangling impacts of the BIWF from other potential locationspecific growth trends. After including these variables, our new specification is
𝑦

= 𝛽 (𝐵𝐼 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ) + 𝑋′ 𝜃 + 𝛾 + 𝛼 + 𝛿 𝑡 + 𝜀 ,

(2)

where terms are as described previously with the addition of 𝛼 , the property fixedeffects, 𝛾 , the year-month fixed effects, and 𝛿 , which estimate the city-specific time
trends. We find that models which include year-month fixed effects and city-specific time
trends are, across the five dependent variables, broadly superior in terms model fit and
Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) than those that omit one or both of sets of controls;
Table A4 of the Appendix discusses the results of models that add these control variables
sequentially.
All time-invariant property characteristics, including property location, distance to
the coast, and property type are excluded from estimation due to the inclusion of property
fixed-effects. Yet for a small portion of properties, listed amenities such as minimum
length of stay, maximum number of guests, security deposit, cleaning fees, and fees for
extra people do change over time, and hence we include them in 𝑋 .36 If these timevarying property amenities are endogenous to treatment, however, their inclusion in
model would violate the basic identification condition 𝐸[𝑋𝜀] = 0 and render OLS
estimates inconsistent. This is a plausible source of endogeneity for our study,
considering that landlords in Block Island or elsewhere may have, in response to the

36

Models for Average booked rate and Revenue exclude cleaning fees from the vector of time-varying
property amenities because these fees are incorporated in the dependent variable.
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BIWF, sought out additional means to make their properties more attractive—by
decreasing the minimum length of stay or extra-people fee, for example. To address this
concern, we first examined properties in the main estimation sample (Table 18) and found
that only a few properties in Nantucket or Narraganset—no Block Island properties—
varied their amenities over time (Appendix Table A6). Next, we estimated DD models
like those defined by Equations (3) and (4) below but specified the time-varying property
amenities as the dependent variable (Appendix Table A7). Although these models reveal
negative and significant treatment effects for one of the five property amenity variables,
these effects are driven by a few properties in Nantucket and the coefficient estimates are
negligible in magnitude. Based on these findings, we take all time-varying property
characteristic as exogenous to treatment.
The treatment effect in Equations (1) and (2) is an average across all months of
the year. Because most rental market activity occurs during the tourist season, 37 we
hypothesize that treatment effects may be different during this period compared to other
times of the year. Hence, we specify two models that differentiate treatment effects by
time of year. In the first, we interact the treatment effect term 𝐵𝐼 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
with indicator variables for summer and off-summer, where summer is defined as the
months of June, July, August, and September. The second model is similar, but further
differentiates peak (July and August) and off-peak (June and September) summer. We
choose to specify these models such that the full effect of treatment in each season is
represented by a single coefficient on a triple interaction term. These two models are
defined below.

37

To see this, Table A5 in the Appendix displays each month’s contribution to the total sample revenue and
reservation nights that accrued over 2015, 2016, and 2017.
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𝑦

= 𝛽 (𝐵𝐼 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑂𝑓𝑓_𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟 )
+ 𝛽 (𝐵𝐼 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑆𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟 )
+𝛽 (𝐵𝐼 × 𝑂𝑓𝑓_𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟 ) + 𝛽 (𝐵𝐼 × 𝑆𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟 )
(3)

+ 𝑋′ 𝜃 + 𝛾 + 𝛼 + 𝛿 𝑡 + 𝜀

𝑦

= 𝛽 (𝐵𝐼 × 𝑂𝑓𝑓_ 𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 )
+ 𝛽 (𝐵𝐼 × 𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑦_𝐴𝑢𝑔 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 )
+ 𝛽 (𝐵𝐼 × 𝐽𝑢𝑛𝑒_𝑆𝑒𝑝 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 )
+𝛽 (𝐵𝐼 × 𝑂𝑓𝑓_ 𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟 ) + 𝛽 (𝐵𝐼 × 𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑦_𝐴𝑢𝑔 )
+ 𝛽 (𝐵𝐼 × 𝐽𝑢𝑛𝑒_𝑆𝑒𝑝 )+ 𝑋′ 𝜃 + 𝛾 + 𝛼 + 𝛿 𝑡 + 𝜀

(4)

3.4 Sample Construction
The full dataset comprises 1,368 AirBnb rental properties and $39.5 million in
rental transaction revenue. Omitted from Equations (2), (3), and (4), however, are 630
properties that are active only during the post-treatment period and 120 properties that are
active only during the pre-treatment period because for these properties, the withinproperty variation in pre- and post-treatment rental market outcomes necessary to identify
a treatment effect does not exist. We refrain from estimating Equations (2), (3), and (4)
without property fixed-effects, which would retain these properties in the sample,
because, as discussed in Section 3.1, corporate representatives from AirBnb seem to have
successfully persuaded many existing Block Island bed-and-breakfast properties to begin
using the Airbnb platform during the post-treatment period, and thus we are missing
important pre-treatment information for these properties. We also examined the 630
properties active only during the post-treatment period and found significant differences
in means between treatment groups for almost all housing characteristic variables,
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including a 45% higher proportion of bed-and-breakfast properties in Block Island. We
would have additionally liked to examine the extensive margin by looking at new
entrants into the market. However, given the coincidence of AirBnb’s corporate visit to
the island, we cannot separate the impact of that event from new entrants due to the wind
farm. Thus, we focus only on the intensive margin, and leave the extensive for future
research in a different setting.
We subsequently remove all bed-and-breakfasts from our sample because the
outcome variables for these properties may be measured with error. We find an
abundance of “blocked” property-nights, during both summer and off-summer months, in
the rental histories of these properties. With near certainty, these properties can be rented
year-round, so it is likely that some “blocked” nights indicate reservations arranged
outside of the AirBnb platform.38 If this type of measurement error is correlated with any
of the independent variables, OLS estimates will biased and inconsistent (Wooldridge
2013).39 After removing bed-and-breakfasts, we have 590 properties in our sample.
To improve comparability between treated and control group properties, we
remove control group properties whose number of bathrooms, number of bedrooms, or
minimum length of stay are outside the range of values observed for treated group
properties. These excluded properties have more than six bedrooms, more than five
bathrooms, or require a minimum stay of more than seven nights. Our final sample
consists of 558 AirBnb rental properties.

38

Some of these properties in Block Island do use alternative rental platforms as confirmed by members of
the Block Island Chamber of Commerce who have relationships with these property owners.
39
The independent variable most likely to be correlated with the measurement error is the treatment group
indicator, because these types of properties account for a substantially higher proportion of the remaining
sample properties in Block Island (30%) than in other cities (6%).
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3.5 Sample Characteristics
Table 18 assesses the degree of similarity between properties in the treatment and
control group by displaying pre-treatment means and differences in means between
groups. Variables are taken as averages across all pre-treatment months in which a
property had at least one available night or reservation night. Block Island properties
have fewer available and reservation nights by about 2.5 nights per month than control
properties. Pre-treatment period monthly revenue is also lower in Block Island by about
$1,000 per month, which is intuitive given the differences in monthly reservation nights
and the mean of average booked rates for Block Island properties ($559). Pre-treatment
occupancy rates and average booked rates are not statistically different between treated
and control groups.
The housing characteristic control variables are well-balanced between groups.
The average Block Island property has three bedrooms and two bathrooms, and requires a
minimum stay of 3.6 nights, a roughly $500 security deposit, and $15 for each person
above the maximum number of guests allowed. Twenty percent of properties in each
treatment group are located within 0.1 miles of the coast. Each treatment group contains
mostly houses, but apartments constitute a higher, though statistically insignificant,
proportion of the sample in Block Island than in Narragansett, Westerly, and Nantucket.
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Table 18. Summary statistics of property characteristics.

Table 18. Summary statistics of property characteristics.
Pre-treatment means
(standard deviations)
Block
Control
Variable
Island
cities
Available nights
21.19
23.72
(7.61)
(6.18)

Difference
in means

-2.53**
(1.18)

Reservation nights

2.85
(2.54)

5.40
(5.22)

-2.55***
(0.96)

Occupancy rate

0.18
(0.19)

0.23
(0.21)

-0.05
(0.04)

Revenue ($)

1495.83
(1452.91)

2506.39
(3198.00)

-1010.56*
(587.68)

Average booked rate ($)

559.18
(304.65)

554.97
(469.85)

4.20
(97.04)

Bedrooms

2.93
(1.28)

2.85
(1.47)

0.08
(0.27)

Bathrooms

1.95
(1.06)

2.03
(1.09)

-0.08
(0.20)

Within 0.1 miles of coast (1=yes)

0.20
(0.41)

0.20
(0.40)

-0.00
(0.08)

Minimum stay (number of nights)

3.63
(2.06)

3.63
(2.11)

0.00
(0.40)

Maximum number of guests allowed

6.63
(2.24)

6.20
(3.11)

0.44
(0.58)

Security deposit ($)

493.33
(365.24)

422.04
(521.72)

71.29
(96.61)

Extra people fee ($)

13.67
(31.43)

12.79
(34.96)

0.87
(6.53)

House (1=yes)

0.80
(0.41)

0.87
(0.33)

-0.07
(0.06)

Apartment (1=yes)

0.20
(0.41)

0.11
(0.32)

0.09
(0.06)

30

528

558

Observations

Notes: Property characteristic variables are taken as average values across all pre-treatment
months in which a property had one or more available or reservation night. For the variable
Average booked rate, the number of observations across columns is 24, 447, and 471 due to
some properties having zero rental transactions during the pre-treatment period. Standard
errors below in parenthesis in the difference in means column. *,**, and *** represent
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively.
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3.6 Assumptions
While the results in Table 18 suggest that treated properties have common support
along the spectrum of control group properties, the DD estimator relies on two untestable,
identifying assumptions. First, we must assume that in the absence of treatment,
differences in outcomes between treatment groups would remain constant over time.
Support for this “common trends” assumption can be found by visually inspecting
outcome trends during the pre-treatment period. Because the properties included in the
sample change over time, instead of graphing raw outcome means, we estimate a version
of Equation (2) that excludes the interaction term 𝐵𝐼 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, recover the
residuals, and calculate differences in residuals between treatment and control. 40 Figure 8
plots these estimated differences with 95% confidence intervals.

40

For completeness, Figure A6 in the Appendix displays graphs of raw outcome means between treated
and control groups.
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Figure 8. Pre-treatment trends in dependent variables. Notes: A version of Equation (2)
that excludes the interaction term 𝐵𝐼 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is estimated for each
dependent variable and residuals are calculated. Figures plot differences in residuals
between treatment and control by month. 95% confidence intervals plotted in gray.
Vertical red lines indicate the onset of the treatment period.
Figure 8. Pre-treatment trends in dependent variables.

Figure 8 reveals that treated and control groups have similar trends in Reservation
nights, Occupancy rate, Average booked rate, and Revenue during the pre-treatment
period.41 For these outcome variables, we find relatively large but statistically
insignificant differences in some pre-treatment period months, but these differences likely
reflect the small sample size of the treated group. Figure 8 also shows that differences in
residuals for Reservation nights, Occupancy rate, Average booked, and Revenue are

41

For the Average booked rate plot, missing values of differences in residuals reflect months in which no
Block Island properties transacted; missing confidence intervals reflect months in which only one Block
Island property transacted.
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largest—and statistically significant for all but the latter outcome—during the posttreatment period, which is unobserved in these models. Our DD model specification
serves to identify the portion of this unobserved variation attributable to the BIWF. The
one concerning result in Figure 8 is the large and statistically significant deviation in
Available nights residuals that immediately precedes treatment. One possible explanation
is that the construction phase of the BIWF rendered Block Island a less attractive tourist
destination, prompting landlords in Block Island to reduce monthly availability. However,
this seems unlikely because we see reductions in Available nights during the summer of
2015, when offshore construction began, for both groups (Appendix Figure A6).
Alternatively, Block Island landlords may use other rental platforms as their primary
means of renting out rooms during the summer, resulting in a fewer number of available
nights during the summer than at other times of the year. This explanation is equally
questionable because we observe Block Island-specific reductions in available nights
during the summers of 2015 and 2016, but not in the summer of 2017 (Appendix Figure
A6). Nonetheless, the treated group’s decrease in monthly availability during the months
preceding treatment will result in DD estimators that overstate the effect of the BIWF on
Available nights.
The second major assumption necessary for casual inference in DD models is the
stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA), which requires that treatment does not
affect the outcome of the control group (Rubin 1980). In the context of our study, this
means we assume that the BIWF had no impact on rental activities in Nantucket,
Narragansett, or Westerly. However, there are two plausible scenarios that would lead to a
SUTVA violation. First, tourists may view the control locations as substitutes for Block
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Island. If they are attracted to the BIWF, then they may vacation on Block Island instead
of their normal destination of Nantucket. Or, if they are repulsed by the BIWF, they may
do the opposite. This substitution behavior would lead to exaggerated treatment effect
estimates. A second possibility is that the BIWF is an attractive force even in control
group cities. This is a concern particularly for Narragansett, as this is one of the main
ports for ferries to Block Island. Tourists may be more likely to visit Narragansett
knowing they can take a day-trip to Block Island to see the turbines. This SUTVA
violation would lead to an underestimate of positive treatment effects. Given that we
estimate positive treatment effects, the possible SUTVA violations have opposing effects,
which renders any resulting bias ambiguous. While we cannot verify the SUTVA
assumption holds, when we estimate models that omit Nantucket or Narragansett, the
estimates change in the opposite way as would be expected if the hypothesized SUTVA
violations were true. Thus, we proceed cautiously that the SUTVA holds.

4 Results
Table 19 presents our main results. Panel A reports estimates from Equation (3),
and Panel B and Panel C come from Equation (4). All models include property fixed
effects, property amenity variables that change over time, year-month fixed effects, and
city-specific time trends.42
We first discuss the results in Panel A. We find positive and significant summer
and off-summer treatment effects on Available nights, and the range of point estimates
imply an increase of between 2.7 and 6 available nights per month for Block Island

42

Results from estimating Equation 2 are displayed in Table A4 in the Online Appendix.
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properties in response to the BIWF. However, these results are likely overestimates of the
true effect of treatment on Available nights given the pre-treatment parallel trend issues
discussed in Section 3.6. The summer treatment effect on Reservation nights is positive
and statistically significant, and its coefficient indicates a 4.3-night increase in the
number of reservations for the average Block Island property in each month from June
through September. The coefficient representing the off-summer treatment effect on
Occupancy rate is significant at the 10% level of confidence, indicating a seven
percentage point decrease in occupancy rates for treated properties during off-summer
months. In contrast, the summer treatment effect on Occupancy rate is positive but
statistically insignificant. Estimated summer and off-summer treatment effects on
Average booked rate are positive but insignificant, each with large standards errors. 43
Finally, Panel A shows a significant summer treatment effect on Revenue. The magnitude
of this coefficient implies that construction of the BIWF induced monthly revenue gains
of $1,721 for Block Island properties relative to control group properties during the
following summer months of June, July, August, and September.

43

The large standard errors likely reflect the smaller sample size used in these models - we exclude
property-month observations with zero rental transactions. Further, there is limited residual variation in
prices remaining after controlling for property-specific factors, as shown in Table A4 in the Appendix.
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Table 19. The effect of BIWF on the vacation rental market.

Table 19. The effect of BIWF on the vacation rental market.
Panel A: Summer and off-summer treatment effects
Available Reservation Occupancy Average
nights
nights
rate
booked rate
BI×Post_construction×Off_summer
BI×Post_contsruction×Summer
Observations
R-squared

2.675*
(1.494)
6.010***
(1.621)
10,019
0.254

-0.164
(0.809)
4.312***
(1.264)
10,019
0.481

-0.069*
(0.039)
0.083
(0.052)
10,019
0.512

47.960
(34.959)
7.787
(47.337)
4,385
0.930

Panel B: Off-summer, peak-summer, and off-peak summer treatment effects
Available Reservation Occupancy Average
nights
nights
rate
booked rate

Revenue
-55.881
(436.147)
1721.120**
(869.615)
10,019
0.412

Revenue
-32.868

BI×Post_construction×Off_summer
BI×Post_construction×July_Aug
BI×Post_construction×June_Sep
Observations
R-squared

2.065
(1.582)
7.416***
(2.280)
2.519
(1.766)
10,019
0.255

-0.266
(0.791)
7.081***
(1.837)
1.248
(1.263)
10,019
0.482

-0.055
(0.037)
0.188***
(0.071)
0.028
(0.052)
10,019
0.512

32.351
(30.877)
-18.750
(55.573)
-5.771
(36.469)
4,385
0.930

(378.234)
3489.919**
(1451.393)
75.870
(798.076)
10,019
0.413

Panel C: Restricted sample, June through September
Available Reservation Occupancy Average
Revenue
nights
nights
rate
booked rate
BI×Post_construction×July_Aug
8.935*** 6.010***
0.131
-10.265
3398.752**
(3.001)
(2.119)
(0.085)
(70.513)
(1687.622)
BI×Post_construction×June_Sep
4.339*
-0.556
-0.068
-13.724
-550.277
(2.262)
(1.763)
(0.075)
(36.679)
(989.486)
Observations
3,923
3,923
3,923
2,649
3,923
R-squared
0.358
0.505
0.542
0.946
0.490
Notes: ‘BI’ stand for Block Island, ‘Post_construction’ is an indictor variable for the post-construction
(treatment) period, ‘Summer’ is an indicator variable for the months of June, July, August, and
September, ‘Off_summer’ is an indicator variable for the months of October through May, ‘July_Aug’ is
an indicator variable for the months of July and August, and ‘June_Sep’ is an indicator variable for the
months of June and September. Included in all regressions as controls are minimum stay (number of
nights), maximum number of guests, security deposit ($), extra people fee ($), and cleaning fee ($);
however, regressions for Average booked rate and Revenue exclude cleaning fees, as these fees are
incorporated in the outcome variable. All regressions include property fixed-effects, year-month fixed
effects, city time trends, and a constant term. Standard errors are shown below in parenthesis and
clustered at the property level. *,**, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of
significance, respectively.

Panel B of Table 19 presents a similar story, but indicates that all treatment effects
are occurring in the peak tourism months of July and August. For Available nights, the
treatment effect is 7.416 for July and August, but just 2.519 for June and September. In
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the Reservation nights and Revenue models, we observe a similar pattern, but the
treatment effects grow substantially in magnitude for July and August relative to Panel A.
The magnitude of these coefficients implies that construction of the BIWF caused a
seven-night increase in the number of nights booked and a $3,490 increase in AirBnb
revenue in each of July and August for Block Island properties relative to control group
properties. These effects are considerable, as the seven-night treatment effect on
Reservation nights represents a roughly 125% increase relative to the average number of
Reservation nights among Block Island properties during pre-treatment months of July
and August. This result is somewhat comparable to Parsons and Firestone (2018)’s
findings that curiosity trips to a first OSWF project at larger beaches (five million visitors
per year) along the U.S. east coast could lead to a 40% annual increase in beach trips, and
that at smaller beaches (half a million visitors per year), the potential market for curiosity
trips could lead to a 400% increases in annual beach trips.
Panel B also lends evidence to support demand increasing rather than supply-side
adjustments. By disentangling the effect of treatment during the peak-tourism months of
July and August from its average effect across all four summer months, the differential
increase in Available nights over Reservation nights becomes smaller. As a result, and in
contrast to Panel A, the coefficient representing the treatment effect on Occupancy rate
during July and August in Panel B is positive and highly significant, indicating a 19
percentage point increase in occupancy rates during these months for Block Island
properties, relative to the control group properties. In other months of the year, the effect
of treatment on Occupancy rate is statistically insignificant. This finding implies that,
during the peak-tourism months of July and August following construction, the BIWF
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yielded a disproportionately higher effect on Reservation nights than on Available nights,
which suggests that treatment-induced changes in Reservation nights are not driven
purely by treatment-induced changes in Available nights. In other words, this finding is
evidence that our results are driven by changes in consumer demand, as measured by
changes in Reservation nights, as opposed to supply-side responses that are reflected by
changes in Available nights.
Because the data generating process may differ between summer and off-summer
months, the models in Panel C use a sample that is restricted to observations occurring
from June through September. This sample captures almost 75% of sample Revenue and
Reservation nights in Panel B. Except for those pertaining to Available nights, estimated
peak-summer treatment effects in Panel C are attenuated compared to those Panel B, but
results are broadly consistent between the two panels. Panel C reveals lower but
comparable peak-summer treatment effects on Reservation nights and Revenue, which is
further evidence that the effect of treatment is largely confined to the peak summer
months of July and August. Like in Panels A and B, we see estimate no significant change
in prices, which bolsters the idea that landlords set prices and stick to them while
experiencing changes to other margins of the vacation rental market.
In sum, we broadly see increases in rental activity during July and August and no
change in other months. This could indicate that rental activity in the months of
September through June is unresponsive to the BIWF; however, it is more likely a
byproduct of the sparsity of rental activity during these months relative to July and
August. Each panel of Table 19 yields similar results, yet treatment effects on
Reservation nights, Occupancy rate, and Revenue, are most precisely estimated when
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differentiated between peak-summer (July and August), off-peak summer (June and
September), and off-summer (October through May) months. Our preferred set of results
are therefore those in Panel B.
As stated before, the focus of this paper is tourism and not impacts to permanent
residents, and one reason for this is the ambiguity of our results applied to permanent
residents. The positive treatment effects on Revenue could imply welfare gains. However,
landlords may view the BIWF as a disamenity and decide to stay in their property less
often and increase its availability on the rental market. If this leads to welfare losses that
outweigh concurrent AirBnb revenue gains, the net effect on landowners would be
negative. While this behavior is plausible, results in Figure 8 lend credence to the idea
that construction of the BIWF had little effect on rental market participation. The figure
shows that only in the model for Available nights do differences in residuals between
treated and control group cities remain relatively constant during the post-construction
period. We view this as additional evidence that our results driven primarily by changes
in consumer demand.

4.1 Heterogeneity of impacts by property characteristics
If rental sorting behavior occurs across different segments of the population, there
may be heterogeneity in the effect of the BIWF that depends on property characteristics.
In Table 20, we investigate heterogeneity in the effect of treatment across two property
characteristics: 𝐵𝑒𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑠, which is the mean-centered number of bedrooms, and 𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑠𝑡,
which is a dummy variable that equals one if a property is within 0.1 miles of the coast.
Note that we examine heterogeneity with respect to 𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑠𝑡 not to illuminate the
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differential effects of treatment with respect to turbine visibility, as we cannot ascertain
this factor from the data, but rather to discern whether different segments of the vacation
rental market are more strongly affected by treatment than others. Specifically, properties
located within 0.1 miles of the coast are, on average across all four cities, 27% more
expensive than properties located further inland (Table 17), hence these properties are
likely to accommodate a different segment of the renter population.
Each column of Table 20 shows results from two models. The models are
specified by Equation (4), but they also include all two- and three-way interactions
between the property amenity variable of interest, 𝐵𝐼 , 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, and the
seasonal indicator variables that are necessary to identify differential effects of treatment
by season and property characteristic. These differential effects are measured by
coefficients on the four-way interactions terms displayed in the table. Because estimated
𝑂𝑓𝑓_𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟 and 𝐽𝑢𝑛𝑒_𝑆𝑒𝑝 treatment effects have been largely insignificant, Table 20
displays the estimated coefficient on the main and interacted 𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑦_𝐴𝑢𝑔 treatment effect
only. Other variables are not displayed in Table 20 for ease of exposition. We also report
under each set of estimates the linear combination of the two coefficients displayed.
These estimates indicate the effect of treatment for properties with one bedroom above
the mean or properties on the coast.
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Table 20. Heterogeneity of BIWF treatment effects by property characteristic.

Table 20. Heterogeneity of BIWF treatment effects by property characteristic.
Available
nights
5.025**
(2.094)

Reservation Occupancy
Average
Revenue
nights
rate
booked rate
6.943***
0.213*** -64.411
2600.966**
(2.130)
(0.076)
(45.133) (1191.415)

β2(BI×Post_construction
×July_Aug×Bedrooms)

0.950
(1.606)

0.666
(1.331)

β1 + β2
β1(BI×Post_construction×July_Aug)

Variable
β1(BI×Post_construction×July_Aug)

β2(BI×Post_construction
×July_Aug×Coast)

0.057
(0.052)

39.547
(55.504)

1397.293
(1407.110)

5.975*** 7.609***
(2.273)
(1.863)

0.270***
(0.069)

-24.863
(81.244)

3998.258**
(1869.507)

5.959*** 6.898***
(2.172)
(2.126)
-3.290
4.213
(4.371)
(4.785)

0.199***
(0.076)
0.382
(0.301)

-44.627
(56.675)
-7.015
(86.818)

3102.638*
(1640.852)
6381.021**
(2736.047)

β1 + β2

2.668
11.110***
0.581**
-51.642
9483.660***
(3.795)
(4.327)
(0.292)
(69.043) (2200.988)
Notes: Estimated interaction coefficients from two separate regressions, delineated by horizontal lines,
are shown in each column. Estimated coefficients on other variables are not displayed, but a full table of
results is available upon request. ‘BI’ stand for Block Island, ‘Post_construction’ is an indictor variable
for the post-construction (treatment) period, ‘July_Aug’ is an indicator variable for the months of July
and August, ‘Bedrooms’ is the mean-centered number of bedrooms, and ‘Coast’ is a dummy variable that
equals one if a property is within 0.1 miles of the coast and zero otherwise. Numbers of observations
across columns are listed in Panel B of Table 4. Included in all regressions as controls are minimum stay
(number of nights), maximum number of guests, security deposit ($), extra people fee ($), and cleaning
fee ($); however, regressions for Average booked rate and Revenue exclude cleaning fees, as these fees
are incorporated in the outcome variable. All regressions include property fixed-effects, year-month
fixed effects, city time trends, and a constant term. Standard errors are shown below in parenthesis and
clustered at the property level. *,**, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of
significance, respectively.

Overall, we see little evidence of heterogeneity across property characteristics, but
with a couple suggestive findings. Differential treatment effects on Available nights,
Reservation nights, Occupancy rate, and Average booked rate are statistically
insignificant for each property amenity variable. However, models that disentangle
treatment effects on Reservation nights, Occupancy rate, and Revenue between properties
with and above the sample average number of bedrooms yield an interesting result: for
each outcome variable, the coefficients on (𝐵𝐼 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑦_𝐴𝑢𝑔 ×
𝐵𝑒𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑠) is positive and the total effect of treatment on properties having one more
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bedroom than the sample average is significant at the 5% level or higher. These results
imply that properties able to accommodate larger parties are more strongly affected by
treatment than those able to accommodate smaller parties. They may also be an indication
that treatment-induced changes in rental market outcomes are not driven purely by
“curiosity trips” to the wind farm, which we would expect to be composed of smaller
parties.
The coefficient on (𝐵𝐼 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑦_𝐴𝑢𝑔 × 𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑠𝑡) in the model
for Revenue implies a significant, $6,381 difference in the effect of treatment between
properties located within and those located further than 0.1 miles from the coast.
Additionally, the effect of treatment on Reservation nights, Occupancy rate, and Revenue
for properties located within 0.1 miles from the coast properties is significant and
considerably larger in magnitude than its effect on properties located further inland.
Given these findings and that coastal proximity comes with a substantial rental premium,
it is possible that the positive treatment impacts estimated by our preferred specification
are driven largely by behavioral changes occurring among the high-income segment of
the vacation renter population.

5 Conclusion
In this study we evaluate the impact of the BIWF on tourism as measured by
changes in local AirBnb rental market activity. Within a hedonic valuation framework, we
estimate a series of DD models using scraped AirBnb data. To uncover the full story of
how the BIWF impacted the local rental market, we estimate each model using multiple
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dependent variables, each of which derives from a confluence of supply- and demandside adjustments.
We find that the installation of the BIWF acted not as a tourist deterrent, but as
tourist attractant. Results from our preferred specifications indicate that during each peaktourism month of July and August following its construction, the BIWF caused a sevennight increase in the number of nights reserved, a nineteen percentage point increase in
occupancy rates, and a $3,490 increase in revenue for AirBnb properties in Block Island
relative to properties in control group cities.
While there are no other similar studies with which we can compare results, our
findings align with several indications of public interest in the BIWF that are outside of
the vacation rental market. The Block Island Ferry, local for-hire fishing boats, and
helicopter charters have all capitalized on the BIWF by adding new tours around the wind
farm. Because its underwater structures act as fish aggregators, the BIWF has created
new fishing opportunities (ten Brink and Dalton 2018) and thus drawn praise from the
recreational fishing community (Monti 2018, 2017). One for-hire fishing boat owner was
pleasantly surprised about the impacts of the BIWF, saying that “the business level
picked up more than [expected]” and that it “continues to grow” (Maritime Executive
2018). Representatives from other sectors of the tourism industry in Block Island
expressed similar sentiments about the BIWF during recent focus group interviews
(Smith et al. 2018). Another potential indicator of public interest is that information about
the BIWF is emphasized on the Block Island Times website. Thus, taken within the
broader context, our results are plausible reflections of wider interest in and economic
gains from the BIWF.
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Another factor that may be driving our results is the “warm glow” effect of
OSWF development. Evidenced in a few recent studies, this effect is unrelated to the
visibility or ecological impacts of OSWFs; rather, it derives from the positive feelings
some may experience when supporting a renewable energy source. Parsons and Firestone
(2018) find that the rationale behind 52% of respondents who indicated that a wind farm
would improve their beach experience was knowing something good was being done for
the environment; only 11% of these respondents cited as their rationale the aesthetic
appeal of the turbines in the horizon. Additionally, the authors find little variation in the
percentage of respondents who would switch from their current beach to an alternative
one with an OSWF with respect to the distance of the OSFW from the beach, which is
also consistent with the “warm glow” effect. Firestone et al. (2018) provide additional
evidence of the “warm glow” effect after studying determinants of support for the BIWF,
noting that “the description of the [Block Island] wind turbines that resonated most
universally among both Block Island and coastal Rhode Island supporters [who had seen
the turbines] was ‘symbolic of progress towards clean energy’”. Hence, it could be that
our results are driven partly by increased visitation from individuals who like the feeling
of supporting a clean energy source, but might not necessarily care about seeing the
BIWF.
Our study is novel and a strong application of revealed preference data, however
several limitations exist. Because the AirBnb rental property data used to proxy for
tourism represents one segment of the tourist population, we are unable to capture
behavioral responses from other important segments, like single-day visitors and those
who book short-term lodging accommodations through other rental platforms. Research
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using more comprehensive data is needed to explore whether preferences for the BIWF
revealed in this study are representative of the tourist population at large. The data is also
confined to a relatively short, roughly one-year post-construction time horizon. Updating
our analysis using additional years of data would allow us to ascertain whether BIWFrelated tourism impacts are transient or persistent.
The overarching objective of this research is to understand the effects of offshore
wind energy development on tourism. However, because we focus on the BIWF, there are
several factors that limit the external validity of our results, in the sense that our estimates
may not apply to future OSWFs. First, our estimates come from the United States’ very
first OSWF, which may elicit more excitement or interest than subsequent developments.
Second, future OSWFs in the U.S. will differ from the BIWF in terms of the number of
turbines, installed capacity, proximity to and visibility from the shoreline and beach, and
the physical and socioeconomic characteristics of the surrounding community. Thus, we
urge caution when trying to generalize our results to future OSWFs. However, our results
provide an important data point to the ongoing debate surrounding tourism impacts of
OSWFs and provide a baseline for future work.
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APPENDICES

The appendix for this dissertation provides supplemental figures, statistics, and
results to the main text.

Appendix for Chapter 1
Table A1 shows estimation results from a panel rank-ordered mixed logit model in
which observations are weighted by the inverse of predicted response propensity.
Estimated utility parameters from this model are consistent with those estimated by our
preferred specification.
Figure A1 displays an example of the 2016 recreational striped bass angler mail
survey.

Appendix for Chapter 2
Table A2 shows data and their sources used to calculate actual fishery outcomes
displayed in Table 15.
Figure A2 displays raw 2015 VAL data collected by the Connecticut Volunteer
Angler Survey Program and the Massachusetts Sportfish Data Collection Team (SADC)
Program.
Figure A3 displays length-age conversions based combined data from three
separate 2015 striped bass age-length keys provided each by the Massachusetts’ Division
of Marine Fisheries, New York’s Department of Environmental Conservation Division of
Marine Resources, and Rhode Island’s Division of Fish and Wildlife.
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Appendix for Chapter 3
Figure A4 plot the number of new rental market properties in each month as a
proportion of the number of properties that existed in October 2014 and includes all
properties in the raw dataset. For reference, 7, 54, 21, and 7 AirBnb properties operated in
Block Island, Nantucket, Narragansett, and Westerly during October 2014, respectively.
The figure shows that rental market entrance is generally highest during the summer
months. Trends are similar across cities until March 2017, when an influx of new AirBnb
properties enter the Block Island market.
Figure A5 includes a map depicting the approximate location of sample AirBnb
properties in Block Island (left) and a visibility map of the waters surrounding Block
Island, adapted from Griffin et al. (2015) (right). Many sample properties are clustered
around the main town and beach area on the eastern side of the island, from which the
BIWF is not visible. The BIWF could be visible from a few, but likely no more six,
properties located on the southern part of the island.
Figure A6 shows raw outcome means between treated and control groups using
the sample of properties included in Table 18 in the main paper. The vertical red line
marks the treatment date, September 2016.
Table A4 presents results from estimating Equation (2). The table has three
columns, which each add covariates to the model. The first column includes property
fixed effects and property variables that change over time, Column (2) adds year-month
fixed effects, and Column (3) adds city-specific time trends. The table also has five
panels, one for each of our dependent variables.
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The results in Panel A of Table A4 imply that the BIWF lead to a statistically
significant increase in Available nights for Block Island properties relative to control
group properties. Estimates of this increase range from about two nights per month in
Columns (1) and (2), to about five nights per month in Column (3). Within R-squared
increases only slightly moving from Column (1) to Columns (2) and (3), which suggests
that there is little within variation in Available nights over time once property fixed
effects are included in the model. Columns (1) and (3) of Panel B show a significant
treatment effect on Reservation nights. These coefficients indicate a treatment-induced
monthly increase of 1.6 booked nights for the average Block Island property compared to
the average control group property. Panel C indicates small and statistically insignificant
effects of treatment on Occupancy rate. Panel E shows a positive effect of treatment on
Revenue, though only statistically significant in the first column. Overall, these results
suggest a weak increase in tourism due to BIWF.
Panel D of Table A4 presents results from models with Average booked rate as the
dependent variable. The estimated coefficients are positive, but imprecisely estimated.
This is consistent with the overall story of these results indicating a weak increase in
tourism activity. However, there is another pattern worth discussing. Like the results for
Available nights but unlike those for the other dependent variables, within R-squared
increases only slightly with the inclusion of year-month fixed effects, which implies that
prices do not change much over time, but reservations, occupancy rates, and revenues do.
This indicates that property fixed effects explain a huge amount of variation in prices and
there is little within variation remaining. These findings strongly support our use of
multiple dependent variables to evaluate the effect of the BIWF on the vacation rental
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market.
Results in Panels A, B, C, and E Table A4 inform our selection of control
variables used in the specifications presented in the main paper. In these panels, the
Column (3) specification is preferred because it yields the highest within R-squared and
lowest AIC among the three specifications. We therefore include year-month fixed effects
and city-specific time trends in model specifications presented in the main paper.
Table A5 shows each month’s contribution to total 2015, 2016, and 2017 Revenue
and Reservation using the sample of properties from Table 2 in the main paper. This table
reveals rental market activity to be highly concentrated in the summer months of June,
July, August, and September; within these months, rental market activity is highest during
July and August. Findings in this table motivate our exploration of seasonal heterogeneity
in the effect of treatment.
Table A6 shows the percent of sample properties in each city whose amenities
changed over time. The table reveals that a very small proportion of properties in
Nantucket and Narragansett varied these amenities over the course of the study period.
No properties in Block Island varied these amenities over the course of the study period.
Table A7 shows estimation results from DD models akin to Equations (3) and (4)
in the main paper but that use the time-varying property amenity variables as dependent
variables. Construction of the BIWF significantly affected one of the five property
amenity variables, minimum stay, but the magnitude of the estimated coefficient is very
small. Additionally, there is such little variation in these amenities over the study period
to be explained by the model that these relationships seem no more than spurious
correlations. Thus, we take all five property amenities as exogenous to treatment.
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Table A8 serves as a robustness check to Table 19 in the main paper by specifying
an alternative treatment date, December 2016, that corresponds to when the BIWF was
connected to the electrical grid. The results in Table A8 are broadly consistent with Table
19 results. In Panel A, estimates of the summer and off-summer treatment effect on
Occupancy rate are statistically significant, unlike in Table 19 where only the latter effect
is significant. The estimated summer treatment effect on Revenue in Panel A of Table A8
is smaller compared to Table 19.
In Panel B of Table A8, treatment effects during July and Augusts on Reservation
nights and Revenue are attenuated compared to Table 19 estimates. Although the offsummer treatment effect on Occupancy rate is statistically significant, unlike in Panel B
of Table 19, the effect does not translate to significant decreases in revenue, as implied by
estimated coefficient in the Revenue model. Finally, Panel C of Table A8 shows
exaggerated treatment effect during July and August on Reservation nights, Occupancy
rate, and Revenue compared to the estimates in Panel C of Table 19. Ultimately, the
findings in Table A8 support our primary set of results in the main paper. They confirm
that the BIWF lead to significant increases in reservation nights, occupancy rates, and
monthly revenue during the peak-tourism months on July and August for Block Island
properties compared to control group properties.
Table A9 displays results from DD models that exclude August 2016 observations
from the sample. These specifications are a robustness check on our main results given
uncertainty about whether August 2016 is a treated or untreated month. We define the
treatment period to begin when construction of the BIWF was complete, which occurred
on August 18, 2016; in the main paper, however, we specify the first treated month as
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September 2016 because our analysis uses monthly data. Overall, the results in Table A9
are consistent with those displayed in Table 19. When significant, estimates representing
the effect of treatment during the peak-tourism months of July and August in Panel B and
C are approximate in magnitude to those presented in the main paper.
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Figure A1. 2016 recreational striped bass angler mail survey.
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Figure A1 (continued). 2016 recreational striped bass angler mail survey.
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Figure A1 (continued). 2016 recreational striped bass angler mail survey.
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Figure A1 (continued). 2016 recreational striped bass angler mail survey.
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Figure A1 (continued). 2016 recreational striped bass angler mail survey.
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Figure A1 (continued). 2016 recreational striped bass angler mail survey.
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Figure A1 (continued). 2016 recreational striped bass angler mail survey.
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Figure A1 (continued). 2016 recreational striped bass angler mail survey.
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Figure A1 (continued). 2016 recreational striped bass angler mail survey.
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Figure A1 (continued). 2016 recreational striped bass angler mail survey.
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Figure A2. Raw VAL data used to generate 2015 striped bass catch-at-length
distribution.
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Figure A3. Striped bass length-age conversions based on combined 2015 agelength keys from NY, MA, and RI by length.
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Figure A4. New properties in proportion to the number of properties in October 2014.
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Figure A5. Left: Approximate location of Block Island AirBnb properties,
plotted in red, included in main estimation sample and the BIWF turbines,
plotted in white. Right: favorable visibility areas over the 20-year lifetime
of the BIWF, adapted from Griffin et al. (2015). For all map locations
(cells), viewer days reflects the sum across all viewers of the number of
days that each viewer, resident or visitor, can see a turbine at that location.
Viewing is weighed more heavily for residents than for visitors.
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Figure A6. Mean outcome trends by treatment group.
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Table A1. Utility parameter estimates from weighted panel rank-ordered mixed
logit model.
Variable

Mean Parameters

Small keep

Standard Deviations

0.233***
0.966***
0.056
0.061
Medium keep
0.278***
1.168***
0.055
0.058
Trophy keep
0.656***
1.369***
0.075
0.091
Small release
0.084***
0.417***
0.021
0.022
Medium release
0.127**
0.496***
0.054
0.052
Trophy release
0.244***
0.710***
0.031
0.039
Other catch
0.157***
0.015
Cost
-0.017***
0.002
Opt-out
-3.086***
0.115
Min. 28”
-0.121
0.081
Min. 30”
-0.672***
0.101
Num. Observations
1,684
Num. individuals
447
Log likelihood
-2475
McFadden Pseudo R2
0.180
AIC
4983
Notes: Observations from each individual are weighted by the inverse of their
predicted response propensity. 500 Halton draws used to maximize the simulated
log-likelihood.*,**, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level
of significance, respectively.
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Table A2. Data and derivation of removals-at-age and mature female removals-at-age numbers and weights.
2015 proportions-at2015 mature female
2015 removals-at-age
age
removals-at-age
Proportions
Weights
Female sex
mature-atAge
Harvest1 Releases1
-at-age
proportionsNumbers
Pounds
Numbers
Pounds
age for
1
1
(lbs.)
at-age
females2
1

0.000

0.000

0.33

0.53

0

2

0.001

0.013

0.64

0.56

0

3

0.004

0.086

2.03

0.56

0

4

0.027

0.393

3.51

0.52

0.09

5

0.136

0.223

5.51

0.57

6

0.164

0.078

8.27

7

0.133

0.039

10.05

8

0.135

0.029

9

0.130

10
11
12
13+

18

0

9,931

6,350

0

0

63,747

129,295

0

0

297,105

1,041,458

13,905

48,740

0.32

253,131

1,395,145

46,171

254,474

0.65

0.45

169,145

1,398,380

49,475

409,026

0.73

0.84

119,766

1,204,018

73,441

738,304

12.54

0.81

0.89

114,056

1,430,747

82,223

1,031,425

0.035

15.37

0.88

1

114,873

1,765,168

101,088

1,553,347

0.110

0.035

16.95

0.92

1

101,555

1,721,718

93,431

1,583,981

0.079

0.030

19.73

0.95

1

76,126

1,502,063

72,319

1,426,960

0.029

0.021

23.24

0.97

1

34,750

807,487

33,708

783,262

0.052

0.017

31.13

1

1

48,534

1,510,831

48,534

1,510,831

1,402,774 13,912,676

614,294

9,340,351

Total

54

0

Notes: 2015 total striped bass recreational harvest and release numbers in MA, RI, and CT was 693,135 and 7,884,877,
respectively. Removals-at-age numbers calculated as: (total harvest numbers × harvest proportions-at-age) + (total release
numbers × release proportions-at-age × 0.09). Removals-at-age weight calculated as: removals-at-age numbers × weightsat-age. Mature female removals-at-age numbers calculated as: removals-at-age numbers × female sex proportions-at-age ×
proportions mature-at-age for females. Mature female removals-at-age weight calculated as: mature female removals-atage numbers × weights-at-age.
1
Sourced from 2016 striped bass stock assessment update.
2
Sourced from preliminary 2018 stock assessment.
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Table A3. Simulated fishery outcomes under alternative 2015 policies.

Policy
A1
B1
C1
D1
E1
F1
G1
H1
A2
B2
C2
D2
E2
F2
G2
H2
I2
J2
K2
L2
M2
N2
O2
P2
Q2
R2
S2
T2
U2

Regulation
CV ($M)
1 fish ≥ 20”
16.74
1 fish ≥ 24”
11.94
1 fish 20-28”
6.49
1 fish 20-36”
12.89
1 fish 28-36”
-8.84
1 fish 24-32”
12.89
1 fish 24-40”
10.30
1 fish 28-44”
-0.76
2 fish ≥ 20”
51.16
2 fish 20-28”
32.27
2 fish 20-36”
44.31
1 fish 20-28” &
40.15
1 fish > 28”
1 fish 20-28” &
30.41
1 fish > 28-36”
2 fish 20-28”;
49.89
only 1 > 28”
2 fish 20-28”;
43.69
only 1 > 28-36”
2 fish ≥ 24”
37.48
2 fish 24-32”
20.40
2 fish 24-40”
34.70
1 fish 24-32” &
27.03
1 fish > 32”
1 fish 24-32” &
23.44
1 fish > 32-40”
2 fish 24-32”;
36.57
only 1 > 32”
2 fish 24-32”;
34.03
only 1 > 32-40”
2 fish ≥ 28”
12.67
2 fish 28-36”
-0.40
2 fish 28-44”
11.46
1 fish 28-36” &
6.08
1 fish > 36”
1 fish, 28-36” &
4.84
1 fish > 36-44”
2 fish 28-36”;
12.04
only 1 > 36”
2 fish 28-36”;
10.97
only 1 > 36-44

∆ Female SSB Removals
(%)
Num. fish
Weight
-21.95
-35.59
-9.28
-20.49
-49.53
-68.61
-32.20
-51.99
-21.15
-34.01
-32.20
-51.99
-13.79
-29.74
-1.95
-4.74
23.24
1.83
-28.92
-59.09
3.82
-28.44

∆ Num. of
Expected
Trips (%)
1.02
0.75
0.36
0.77
-0.58
0.77
0.64
-0.05
3.29
2.06
2.84

Num. fish
37.62
24.30
29.95
35.44
-7.97
35.44
23.27
-0.67
114.06
94.12
108.35

Weight
-4.50
0.67
-26.5
-14.04
-21.06
-14.04
-4.61
-2.82
50.03
6.91
31.66

2.55

84.05

45.97

29.83

17.82

1.91

72.94

21.12

5.22

-20.70

3.21

112.74

46.32

18.64

-3.70

2.80

107.67

30.10

1.66

-30.51

2.42
1.30
2.24

79.87
62.21
77.33

50.82
9.30
41.35

38.34
-9.88
30.30

22.09
-42.09
6.23

1.70

52.76

38.98

31.49

26.37

1.47

48.31

27.05

21.69

7.64

2.36

78.91

47.94

34.91

17.38

2.20

76.56

39.30

27.67

2.97

0.79
-0.05
0.71

26.14
11.21
24.72

34.27
-0.28
29.59

37.60
2.43
34.15

39.61
-13.96
32.06

0.36

11.30

18.78

19.87

25.32

0.28

9.75

13.98

16.33

17.69

0.75

25.22

32.11

35.40

36.24

0.68

24.05

27.95

32.41

29.44

∆ Total Removals (%)

Notes: Actual 2015 policy was one fish ≥ 28” and is used as the baseline policy.
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Table A4. The effect of BIWF on the vacation rental market.
Panel A: Dependent variable is Available nights
(1)
(2)
(3)
BI×Post_construction
1.866**
2.157***
5.273***
(0.898)
(0.831)
(1.436)
0.012
0.073
0.075
Within R2
68,179
67,607
67,598
AIC
Panel B: Dependent variable is Reservation nights
(1)
(2)
(3)
BI×Post_construction
1.601**
0.896
1.552*
(0.649)
(0.689)
(0.916)
Within R2
0.006
0.297
0.298
AIC
67,545
64,140
64,131
Panel C: Dependent variable is Occupancy rate
(1)
(2)
(3)
BI×Post_construction
0.020
-0.010
-0.023
(0.027)
(0.025)
(0.042)
Within R2
0.005
0.311
0.312
AIC
2,785
-822
-825
Panel D: Dependent variable is Average booked rate
(1)
(2)
(3)
BI×Post_construction
49.731
47.639
14.327
(49.718)
(50.354)
(39.455)
Within R2
0.003
0.070
0.070
AIC
54,482
54,253
54,255
Panel E: Dependent variable is Revenue
(1)
(2)
(3)
BI×Post_construction
745.815**
439.569
388.066
(318.160)
(330.980)
(578.829)
Within R2
0.002
0.205
0.209
AIC
199,304
197,105
197,060
Year-month fixed-effects
N
Y
Y
City time trends
N
N
Y
Notes: ‘BI’ stand for Block Island, ‘Post_construction’ is an indictor variable for the
post-construction (treatment) period. In panels A, B, C, and E, the number of
observations is 10,019. In panel D, the number of observations is 4,385. Included in all
regressions as controls are minimum stay (number of nights), maximum number of
guests, security deposit ($), extra people fee ($), and cleaning fee ($); however,
regressions for Average booked rate and Revenue exclude cleaning fees, as these fees
are incorporated in the outcome variable. All regressions include property fixed-effects
and a constant term. Standard errors are shown below in parenthesis and clustered at
the property level. *,**, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level
of significance, respectively.
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Table A5. Proportion of total 2015, 2016, and 2017 revenue and
reservation nights, by month.
Month

Revenue (%)

Reservation nights (%)

January

0.4

0.8

February

0.4

0.8

March

1.0

1.2

April

3.2

3.2

May

7.4

7.6

June

11.5

12.3

July

23.6

22.2

August

25.1

23.8

September

15.4

14.6

October

5.5

6.6

November

2.9

3.1

December
3.6
3.9
Notes: Statistics reflect the sample of properties in Table 18 of the
main paper.
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Table A6. Percent of properties in estimation sample with changing property amenities, by city.
Property Amenity
Maximum number of
guests
Cleaning fee

Block Island

Nantucket

Narragansett

Westerly

0

0

0.7%

0

0

1.8%

0

0

Minimum stay

0

4.5%

0

0

Security deposit

0

1.8%

0

0

Extra people fee

0

0.3%

0.7%

0

Notes: Statistics reflect the sample of properties in Table 18 of the main paper.
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Table A7. The effect of BIWF on rental property amenities.
Panel A: Summer and off-summer treatment effects

BI×Post_construction
×Off_summer
BI×Post_construction
×Summer
Observations
R-squared

Max. Guests

Security
Deposit

Extra
People Fee

Minimum
Stay

Cleaning
Fee

0.002
(0.002)
0.005
(0.005)
10,019
1.000

0.489
(0.468)
0.666
(0.604)
10,019
0.999

0.010
(0.034)
0.071
(0.072)
10,019
0.999

-0.014*
(0.007)
-0.007
(0.005)
10,019
0.996

-0.005
(0.299)
0.233
(0.202)
10,019
0.995

Minimum
Stay
-0.016**
(0.007)
-0.019**
(0.009)
-0.003
(0.005)
10,019
0.996

Cleaning
Fee
-0.008
(0.239)
0.011
(0.255)
0.364
(0.284)
10,019
0.995

Panel B: Off-summer, peak-summer, and off-peak summer treatment effects
Max. Guests
BI×Post_construction
×Off_summer
BI×Post_construction
×July_Aug
BI×Post_construction
×June_Sep
Observations
R-squared

0.002
(0.002)
0.005
(0.006)
0.005
(0.005)
10,019
1.000

Security
Deposit
0.630
(0.486)
1.216
(1.461)
0.615
(0.430)
10,019
0.999

Extra
People Fee
0.013
(0.036)
0.040
(0.093)
0.113
(0.085)
10,019
0.999

Panel C: Restricted sample, June through September
Security
Extra
Minimum
Cleaning
Max. Guests
Deposit
People Fee
Stay
Fee
BI×Post_construction
0.000
0.701
0.035
-0.012
0.403
×July_Aug
(.)
(1.146)
(0.038)
(0.011)
(0.535)
BI×Post_construction
0.000
0.105
0.032
0.003
0.766
×June_Sep
(.)
(0.325)
(0.035)
(0.005)
(0.776)
Observations
3,923
3,923
3,923
3,923
3,923
R-squared
1.000
0.999
0.999
0.997
0.996
Notes: ‘BI’ stand for Block Island, ‘Post_construction’ is an indictor variable for the post-construction
(treatment) period, ‘Summer’ is an indicator variable for the months of June, July, August, and
September, ‘Off_summer’ is an indicator variable for the months of October through May, ‘July_Aug’
is an indicator variable for the months of July and August, and ‘June_Sep’ is an indicator variable for
the months of June and September. All regressions include property fixed-effects, year-month fixed
effects, city time trends, and a constant term. Standard errors are shown below in parenthesis and
clustered at the property level. *,**, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of
significance, respectively.
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Table A8. The effect of BIWF on the vacation rental market, treatment date defined by grid connection
(December 2016).
Panel A: Summer and off-summer treatment effects
Available
Reservation
Occupancy
Average
Revenue
nights
nights
rate
booked rate
BI×Post_connection
1.823
-0.924
-0.064**
76.715
-505.499
×Off_summer
(1.198)
(0.855)
(0.032)
(70.753)
(368.677)
BI×Post_connection
5.370***
3.781**
0.101*
37.371
1597.148
×Summer
(1.490)
(1.548)
(0.061)
(68.482)
(1098.376)
Observations
10,516
10,516
10,516
4,579
10,516
R-squared
0.251
0.482
0.512
0.932
0.411
Panel B: Off-summer, peak-summer, and off-peak summer treatment effects
Available
Reservation
Occupancy
Average
nights
nights
rate
booked rate
BI×Post_connection
1.858
-0.899
-0.064**
74.875
×Off_summer
(1.188)
(0.871)
(0.032)
(67.658)
BI×Post_connection
8.926***
6.362***
0.150*
25.262
×July_Aug
(1.927)
(2.000)
(0.079)
(87.378)
BI×Post_connection
2.669
1.650
0.054
49.689
×June_Sep
(1.706)
(1.470)
(0.058)
(53.072)
Observations
10,516
10,516
10,516
4,579
R-squared
0.254
0.483
0.512
0.933

Revenue
-492.025
(374.737)
2963.787*
(1531.455)
428.814
(910.412)
10,516
0.412

Panel C: Restricted sample, June through September
Available
Reservation
Occupancy
Average
Revenue
nights
nights
rate
booked rate
BI×Post_connection
10.057***
8.423***
0.200*
65.910
4733.241**
×July_Aug
(3.334)
(2.865)
(0.115)
(115.804)
(1972.163)
BI×Post_connection
4.638
2.819
0.052
82.776
1342.639
×June_Sep
(3.240)
(2.589)
(0.099)
(77.701)
(1477.465)
Observations
3,643
3,643
3,643
3,643
3,643
R-squared
0.338
0.495
0.526
0.944
0.488
Notes: ‘BI’ stand for Block Island, ‘Post_connection’ is an indictor variable for the post-electrical grid
connection (treatment) period, ‘Summer’ is an indicator variable for the months of June, July, August,
and September, ‘Off_summer’ is an indicator variable for the months of October through May,
‘July_Aug’ is an indicator variable for the months of July and August, and ‘June_Sep’ is an indicator
variable for the months of June and September. Included in all regressions as controls are minimum
stay (number of nights), maximum number of guests, security deposit ($), extra people fee ($), and
cleaning fee ($); however, regressions for Average booked rate and Revenue exclude cleaning fees, as
these fees are incorporated in the outcome variable. All regressions include property fixed-effects, yearmonth fixed effects, city time trends, and a constant term. Standard errors are shown below in
parenthesis and clustered at the property level. *,**, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level of significance, respectively.
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Table A9. The effect of BIWF on the vacation rental market; sample excludes August 2016
observations.
Panel A: Summer and off-summer treatment effects
Available
Reservation
Occupancy
Average
nights
nights
rate
booked rate
BI×Post_construction
1.877
-0.304
-0.061
32.170
×Off_summer
(1.556)
(0.793)
(0.038)
(34.983)
BI×Post_construction
4.187**
3.328***
0.071
-19.643
×Summer
(1.679)
(1.235)
(0.049)
(40.703)
Observations
9,185
9,185
9,185
3,891
R-squared
0.256
0.490
0.515
0.931
Panel B: Off-summer, peak-summer, and off-peak summer treatment effects
Available
Reservation
Occupancy
Average
nights
nights
rate
booked rate
BI×Post_construction
1.643
-0.153
-0.045
19.788
×Off_summer
(1.597)
(0.788)
(0.037)
(32.190)
BI×Post_construction
5.956**
6.514***
0.186**
-47.543
×July_Aug
(2.368)
(1.926)
(0.078)
(54.532)
BI×Post_construction
2.195
1.160
0.021
-21.651
×June_Sep
(1.736)
(1.275)
(0.052)
(38.939)
Observations
9,185
9,185
9,185
3,891
R-squared
0.257
0.491
0.516
0.931

Revenue
-170.384
(413.404)
1262.520
(863.465)
9,185
0.432

Revenue
-7.080
(366.229)
3295.099**
(1550.609)
45.473
(805.603)
9,185
0.432

Panel C: Restricted sample, June through September
Available
Reservation
Occupancy
Average
Revenue
nights
nights
rate
booked rate
BI×Post_construction
8.265**
5.066**
0.099
-37.135
3145.601*
×July_Aug
(3.554)
(2.328)
(0.102)
(71.467)
(1833.962)
BI×Post_construction
4.557*
-0.750
-0.085
-31.861
-635.360
×June_Sep
(2.419)
(1.798)
(0.078)
(40.280)
(984.784)
Observations
3,891
3,891
3,891
2,224
3,891
R-squared
0.368
0.527
0.561
0.947
0.528
Notes: ‘BI’ stand for Block Island, ‘Post_construction’ is an indictor variable for the post-construction
(treatment) period, ‘Summer’ is an indicator variable for the months of June, July, August, and
September, ‘Off_summer’ is an indicator variable for the months of October through May, ‘July_Aug’
is an indicator variable for the months of July and August, and ‘June_Sep’ is an indicator variable for
the months of June and September. Included in all regressions as controls are minimum stay (number of
nights), maximum number of guests, security deposit ($), extra people fee ($), and cleaning fee ($);
however, regressions for Average booked rate and Revenue exclude cleaning fees, as these fees are
incorporated in the outcome variable. All regressions include property fixed-effects, year-month fixed
effects, city time trends, and a constant term. Standard errors are shown below in parenthesis and
clustered at the property level. *,**, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of
significance, respectively.
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